Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Prior Analytics §2.2.12#2

Middle Terms in Non-Simultaneous Causes and Circular Coming to Be

Passage 117 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Discusses the role of the middle term in past and future non-simultaneous causal relations, illustrating the circular process of coming to be and the status of middle terms in events that hold "for the most part."

§2.2.12#2Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πῶς ἄν ἐφεξῆς γινομένης τῆς γενέσεως ἔχοι τὸ μέσον τὸ αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ελήφθω.
So let this much be assumed concerning how the middle term, which is the cause, would stand when coming to be occurs successively.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τό μέσον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἄμεσα εἶναι.
For in these cases too, the middle term and the first term must be immediate.
οἷον τὸ Α γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὸ Γ γέγονεν (ὕστερον δὲ τὸ Γ γέγονεν, ἔμπροσθεν δὲ τὸ Α· ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ Γ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύτερονν τοῦ νῦν εἶναι, ὅ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ χρόνου).
For example, A has come to be, since Γ has come to be (but Γ has come to be later, and A earlier; and Γ is the starting-point because it is closer to the now, which is the starting-point of time).
τὸ δὲ Γ γέγονεν, εἰ τὸ Δ γέγονεν.
And Γ has come to be, if Δ has come to be.
τοῦ δὴ Δ γενομένου ἀνάγκη τὸ Α γεγονέναι.
Therefore, when Δ has come to be, A must have come to be.
αἴτιον δὲ τὸ τοῦ γὰρ Δ γενομένου τὸ Γ ἀνάγκη γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ Γ γεγονότος ἀνάγκη πρότερον τὸ Α γεγονέναι.
And the cause is Γ; for when Δ has come to be, Γ must have come to be, and when Γ has come to be, A must previously have come to be.
οὕτω δὲ λαμβάνοντι τὸ μέσον στήσεταί που εἰς ἄμεσον, ἢ ἀεὶ παρεμπεσεῖται διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον;
If one takes the middle term in this way, will it stop somewhere at an immediate term, or will something always fall in between because of the infinite?
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον γεγονὸς γεγονότος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη.
For, as was said, what has come to be is not next to what has come to be.
ἀλλʼ ἄρξασθαί γε ὅμως ἀνάγκη ἀπʼ ἀμέσου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν πρώτου.
But nonetheless, one must begin from an immediate term and from the first 'now'.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔσται.
And likewise in the case of 'it will be'.
εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται τὸ Δ, ἀνάγκη πρότερον ἀληθὲς εὐπεῖν ὅτι τὸ Α ἔσται.
For if it is true to say that Δ will be, it must previously be true to say that A will be.
τούτου δʼ σἴτιον τὸ Γ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ Δ ἔσται, πρότερον τὸ Γ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ Τὸ Γ ἔσται, πρότερον τὸ ἔσται.
And the cause of this is Γ; for if Δ will be, Γ will be prior; and if Γ will be, A will be prior.
ὁμοίως δʼ ἄπειρος ἡ τομὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐσόμενα χόμενα ἀλλήλων.
And in these cases too, the division is likewise infinite; for things that will be are not next to each other.
ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἄμεσος ληπτέα.
But in these cases too, an immediate starting-point must be taken.
ἔχει δὲ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· εἰ γέγονεν οἰκία, ἀνάγκη τετμῆσθαι λίθους καὶ γεγονέναι.
And this is how it is in actual facts: if a house has come to be, it is necessary for stones to have been cut and to have come to be.
τοῦτο διὰ τί;
Why is this?
ὅτι ἀνάγκη θεμέλιον γεγονέναι, εἴπερ καὶ οἰκία γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ θεμέλιον, πρότερον λίθους γεγονέναι ἀνάγκη.
Because a foundation must have come to be if a house indeed has come to be; and if a foundation has come to be, stones must previously have come to be.
πάλιν εἰ ἔσται οἰκία, ὡσαύτως τπρότερον ἔσονται λίθοι, δείκνυται δὲ διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁμοίως·
Again, if there will be a house, likewise there will be stones previously.
ἔσται γὰρ θεμέλιος πρότερον.
And this is shown likewise through the middle term; for there will be a foundation previously.
Ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις κύκλῳ τινὰ γένεσιν οὐσαν, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο εἶναι, εἴπερ ἕποιντο ἀλλήλοις τὸ μέσον καὶ οἱ ἄκροι· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν ἐστίν.
Since we see that there is a certain circular coming to be among things that come to be, this is possible if the middle term and the extremes follow one another; for in these there is conversion.
δέδεικται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ὅτι ἀντιστρέφει τὰ συμτπεράσματα· τὸ δὲ κύκλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν.
And this has been shown in our first treatises, namely that the conclusions convert; and this is what circular is.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων φαίνεται ὧδε· βεβρεγμένης τῆς γῆς ἀνάγκη ἀτμίδα γενέσθαι, τούτου δὲ γενομένου νέφος, τούτου δὲ γενομένου ὕδωρ· τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀνάγκη βεβρέχθαι τὴν γῆν·
And in actual facts, it appears as follows: if the earth is wet, steam must come to be; and when this has come to be, a cloud; and when this has come to be, water; and when this has come to be, the earth must be wet.
τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥστε κύκλῳ περιελήλυθεν· ἑνὸς γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁτουοῦν ὄντος ἕτερον ἔστι, κἀκείνου ἄλλο, καὶ τούτου τὸ πρῶτον.
And this was the starting-point, so that it has gone around in a circle; for when any one of them is, another is, and when that is, another is, and when this is, the first is.
Ἕοτι δʼ ἔνια μὲν γινόμενα καθόλου (ἀεί τε γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς οὕτως ἢ ἔχει ἢ γίνεται), τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ μὲν οὔ, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δέ, οἶον οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄρρην τὸ γένειον τριχοῦται, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
Some things that come to be are universal (for they are or come to be so always and in every case), whereas others are not always, but for the most part; for example, not every male human grows a beard, but it is for the most part.
τῶν δὴ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ μέσον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ τπολὺ εἶναι.
Therefore, for such cases, the middle term too must be for the most part.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ Β καθόλου κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τοῦ Γ καθόλο, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Γ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ καθόλου, τὸ ἐπὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ἀλλʼ ὑπέκειτο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ τπολύ·
For if A is predicated of B universally, and this of Γ universally, A must be predicated of Γ always and in every case; for this is what the universal is: what holds in every case and always.
ἀνάγκτη ἄρα καὶ τὸ μέσον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ εἶναι τὸ ἐφʼ οὗ τὸ Β. ἔσονται τοίνυν καὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἀρχαὶ ἄμεσοι, ὅσα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ οὕτως ἔστιν ἢ γίνεται.
But it was assumed to hold for the most part; therefore, the middle term B too must be for the most part. Therefore, there will also be immediate starting-points for what is for the most part—namely, for all those things that exist or come to be for the most part in this way.

Notes

  1. 95b16ἐπεὶ — Here ἐπεὶ means not a simple causal "since" but rather a temporal or conditional "after" or "on the condition that". Aristotle is discussing the retrogressive deduction where the occurrence of a prior event (A) is inferred from a later event (Γ).
  2. 95b21στήσεται — The clause στήσεται ... ἢ ἀεὶ παρεμπεσεῖται forms an alternative direct question ("will it stop ... or will it always fall in between"). The phrase διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ("because of the infinite") modifies the second option (παρεμπεσεῖται).
  3. 95b38εἴπερ ἕποιντο ἀλλήλοις — The conjunction εἴπερ followed by the optative ἕποιντο expresses a logical hypothesis ("if indeed they should follow one another"), which harmonizes with the potentiality expressed by ἐνδέχεται in the main clause.
  4. 96a12εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Β — Here Α is supplemented after τὸ to form the standard subject of the first premise (A is predicated of B), contrasting with the conclusion τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Γ and completing the syllogism in the first figure (A-B, B-Γ, therefore A-Γ).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Prior Analytics §2.2.12#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:2.2.12%232

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.