§2.1.33Τὸ δʼ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ διʼ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν.
What is scientific and science differ from the object of opinion and opinion, because science is universal and proceeds through necessary things, and what is necessary cannot be otherwise.
ἔστι δέ τινα ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα, ἐνδεχόμενα δὲ καὶ ἄλίως ἔχειν.
But there are some things that are true and real, but which can also be otherwise.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν· εἴη γὰρ ἄν ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ δυνατὰ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
It is clear, then, that about these there is no science; for otherwise, things that are capable of being otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ νοῦς (λέγω γὰρ νοῦν ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης) οὐδʼ ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως.
But neither is it intellect (for by intellect I mean the principle of science) nor indemonstrable science—and this is the acceptance of an immediate premise.
ἀληθὴς δʼ ἐστὶ νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ τὸ διὰ τούτων λεγόμενον· ὥστε λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ φεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
But intellect, science, opinion, and what is said through these are true; so it remains that opinion is about what is true or false, but which can also be otherwise.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίας.
And this is the acceptance of an immediate and non-necessary premise.
καὶ ὁμολογούμενον δʼ οὕτω τοῖς φαινομένοις· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα ἀβέβαιον, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοιαύτη.
And this is in agreement with the appearances; for opinion is unstable, and such is the nature of its object.
πρός δὲ τούτοις οὐδεὶς οἴεται δοξάζειν, ὅταν οἴηται ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ἐπίστασθαι· ἀλλʼ ὅταν εἶναι μὲν οὕτως, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως οὐδὲν κωλύειν, τότε δοξάζειν, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τοιούτου δόξαν οὖσαν, τοῦ δʼ ἀναγκαίου ἐπιστήμην.
In addition to these, no one thinks that they are opining when they think that it is impossible to be otherwise, but rather that they know; but when they think that it is indeed so, yet nothing prevents it from being otherwise as well, then they think that they are opining, on the ground that opinion is of such an object, whereas science is of what is necessary.
Πῶς οὖν ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ δοξάσαι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται ἡ δόξα ἐπιστήμη, εἴ τις θήσει ἅπαν ὃ οἶδεν ἐνδέχεσθαι δοξάειν;
How then is it possible to opine and know the same thing, and why will opinion not be science, if someone posits that it is possible to opine everything that one knows?
ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ ὁ μὲν εἰδώς ὁ δὲ δοξάζων διὰ τῶν μέσων, ἕως εἰς τὰ ἄμεσα ἔλθῃ, ὥστʼ εἴπεςρ ἐκείνος οἶδε, καὶ ὁ δοξάζων οἴδεν.
For the one who knows and the one who opines will follow through the middle terms until they reach the immediate ones, so that if the former knows, the one who opines also knows.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅτι δοξάζειν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ διότι· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μέσον.
For just as it is possible to opine the 'that', so also the 'why'; and this is the middle term.
ἢ εἰ μὲν οὕτως ὑπολήφεται τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν ὥσπερ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς διʼ ὧι αἱ ἀποδείξεις, οὐ δοξάσει ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήσεται· εἰ δʼ ἀληθῇ μὲν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα γε αὐτοῖς ὑτπάρχειν κατʼ οὐσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, δοξάσει καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήσεται ἀληθῶς, καὶ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ διότι, ἐὰν μὲν διὰ τῶν ἀμέσων δοξάσῃ· ἐἀν δὲ μὴ διὰ τῶν ἀμέσων, τὸ ὅτι μόνον δοξάσει;
Or, if one accepts things that cannot be otherwise in the same way as the definitions through which proofs are made, one will not opine but know; but if one accepts that they are true, yet not that these very things belong to them in virtue of their essence and in virtue of their form, one will opine and not truly know, both the 'that' and the 'why', if one opines through the immediate premises; but if not through the immediate premises, one will opine only the 'that'?
τοῦ δʼ αὐτοῦ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐ πάντως ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ φευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπον τινά, οὕτω καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
But opinion and science are not of the same thing in every way, but just as false and true opinion are of the same thing in a certain way, so also science and opinion are of the same thing.
καὶ γὰρ δόξαν ἀληθῇ καὶ φευδῇ ὡς μέν τινες λέγουσι τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἄτοπα συμβαίνει αίρεῖσθαι ἄλλα τε καὶ μὴ δοξάειν ὅ δοξάζει φευδῶς·
For if one says, as some do, that true and false opinion are of the same thing, one is led to adopt absurdities, such as, among others, that one does not opine what one falsely opines.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ.
But since 'the same' is said in several ways, in one sense it is possible, and in another it is not.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ σύύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀληθῶς δοξάζειν ἄτοπον· ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος, περὶ ἣν αἱ δόξαι, τὸ αὐτό, οὕτω τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐ τὸ αὐτό.
For to opine truly that the diagonal is commensurable is absurd; but because the diagonal, about which the opinions are, is the same, in this way they are of the same thing, though the essence ('what it was to be') for each according to the definition is not the same.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
In the same way, science and opinion are of the same thing.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως τοῦ ζῴου ὥστε μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι ζῶον, ἡ δʼ ὥστʼ ἐνδέχεσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἡ μὲν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, ἡ δʼ ἀνθρώπου μέν, μὴ ὅπερ δʼ ἀνθρώπου.
For the former is of 'animal' in such a way that it is impossible for it not to be an animal, while the latter is in such a way that it is possible—as for example if the former is of what is essentially man, while the latter is of man indeed, but not of what is essentially man.
τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δʼ ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτό.
For it is the same in that it is man, but not the same in the manner of being.
Φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐδὲ δοξάζειν ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐνδέχεται.
It is clear from these things that it is also impossible to opine and know the same thing at the same time.
ἅμα γὰρ ἄν ἔχοι ὑπόληφιν τοῦ ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἄλλως τὸ αὐτό ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
For otherwise one would have at the same time the acceptance of the same thing's being both able to be otherwise and unable to be otherwise, which is impossible.
ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάτερον εἶναι ἐνδέχεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὡς εἴρηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδʼ οὕτως οἷόν τε· ἕξει γὰρ ὑπόληφιν ἅμα, οἷον ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὅπερ ζῷον (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι μὴ ζῷονν) καὶ μὴ ὅπερ ζῷον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι.
For although it is possible for each of them to be in different people concerning the same thing, as has been said, in the same person not even this is possible; for he would have at the same time the acceptance, for example, that man is essentially an animal (for this was its being impossible not to be an animal) and not essentially an animal (for let this be its being possible).
Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπί τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας,. τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας μᾶλλόν ἐστιν.
As for the remaining things, namely, how one should distribute them among thought, intellect, science, art, prudence, and wisdom, some of these belong rather to physical, and others to ethical inquiry.
§2.1.34Ἡ δʼ ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόν τοῦ μέσου, οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμτπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου·
Quickness of mind is a certain skill in hitting upon the middle term in an imperceptible time.
ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίῦλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
For example, if someone, seeing that the moon always has its bright side turned toward the sun, quickly understood why this is so—namely, because it shines by reflecting light from the sun; or if someone, seeing someone talking to a rich man, knew that it is because he is borrowing money; or why they are friends, because they have the same enemy.
πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα ἐγνώρισεν.
For, having seen all the middle terms which are the causes, he recognized the extremes.
τὸ λαμπρόν εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τὸν λιον ἐφʼ οὗ Α, τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου B, σελήνη τὸ Γ. ὑπάρχει δὴ τῇ μὲν σελήνη τῷ Γ τὸ Β, τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου·
Let A be 'having its bright side turned toward the sun', B 'shining by reflecting light from the sun', C 'the moon'.
τῷ δὲ Β τὸ Α, τὸ πρὸς τοῦτʼεἶναι τὸ λαμπρόν, ἀφʼ οὗ λάμπει· ὥστε καὶ τῷ Γ τὸ διὰ τοῦ Β.
Then B, 'shining by reflecting light from the sun', belongs to the moon, C; and A, 'having its bright side turned toward that from which it shines', belongs to B; so that A also belongs to C through B.