§2.2.1Τὰ ζητούμενά ἐστιν ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσαπερ ἐπιστάμεθα.
The things we seek are equal in number to the things we know.
ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν.
And we seek four things: the "that", the "why", if it exists, and what it is.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε ζητῶμεν, εἰς ἀριθμὸν θέντες, οἷον πότερον ἐκλείπει ὁ ἥλιος ἢ οὔ, τὸ ὅτι ζητοῦμεν.
For when we seek whether it is this or that, putting it into a number of alternatives—as for instance whether the sun is eclipsed or not—we seek the "that".
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· εὑρόντες γάρ ὅτι ἐκλείπει πεπαύμεθα· καὶ ἐὰν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰδῶμεν ὅτι ἐκλείπει, οὐ ζητοῦμεν πότερον.
A sign of this is that when we have found that it is eclipsed, we stop; and if we know from the beginning that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is.
ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶμεν τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον· εὐδότες ὅτι ἐκλείπει καὶ ὅτι κινεῖται ἡ γῆ, τὸ διότι ἐκλείπει ἢ διότι κινεῖται ητοῦμεν.
But when we know the "that", we seek the "why"—for instance, knowing that it is eclipsed and that the earth moves, we seek why it is eclipsed or why it moves.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως, ἔνια δʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ζητοῦμεν, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι κένταυρος ἢ θεός·
These things, then, are so; but we seek some things in another way, for instance whether a centaur or a god exists or does not exist.
τὸ δʼ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς λέγω, ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰ λευκὸς ἢ μή.
And by "whether it exists or not" I mean absolutely, and not whether it is white or not.
γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον τί οὖν ἐστι θεός, ἢ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.
And having known that it exists, we seek what it is—for instance, what then is a god, or what is a man.
§2.2.2Ἃ μὲν οὖν ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἃ εὑρόντες σμεν, ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν.
The things, then, which we seek and which, having found, we know, are these and of this number.
ζητοῦμεν δέ, ὅταν μὲν ητῶμεν τὸ ὅτι ἢ τὸ) εἰ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς, ἇρʼ ἔστι μέσον αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὅταν δὲ γνόντες ἢ τὸ ὅτι ἢ εἰ ἔστιν, ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς, πάλιν τὸ διὰ τί ζητῶμεν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστι, τότε ζητοῦμεν τί τὸ μέσον.
But we seek, when we seek the "that" or whether it exists absolutely, whether there is a middle term for it or not; but when we have recognized either the "that" or whether it exists, whether in part or absolutely, and seek again the "why" or "what it is", then we seek what the middle term is.
λέγω δὲ τὸ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ ἀπλῶς, ἐπὶ μέρους μέν, ἆρʼ ἐκλείπει ἡ σελήνη ἢ αὔξεται; εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὶ ἢ μὴ ἔστι τί, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ζητοῦμεν· ἁπλῶς δʼ, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ σελήνη ἢ νύξ. συμβαίνει ἄθρα ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ζητήσεσι ζητεῖν ἢ εἰ ἔστι μέσον ἢ τί ἐστι τὸ μέσον.
And I call the "that it is" in part and absolutely; in part indeed, "is the moon eclipsed or does it wax?"—for in such things we seek if it is something or is not something; but absolutely, "does a moon or a night exist or not?" It happens, then, in all these inquiries to seek either if there is a middle term or what the middle term is.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ μέσον, ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τοῦτο τητεῖται.
For the cause is the middle term, and in all cases this is what is sought.
ἆρʼ ἐκλείπει; ἆρʼ ἔστι τι αἴτιον ἢ οὔ; μετὰ ταῦτα γνόντες ὅτι ἔστι τι, τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἔστι ητοῦμεν.
"Is it eclipsed?" is "is there some cause or not?" After these things, having known that there is some cause, we seek what this is.
τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι μὴ τοδὶ ἢ τοδὶ ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἁπλῶς λά τι τῶν καθʼ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ μέσον ἐστίν.
For the cause of its being, not as being this or that but absolutely the essence, or of its being not absolutely but some of its essential properties or accidental attributes, is the middle term.
λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον σελήνην ἢ γῆν ἢ ἥλιον ἢ τρίγωνον, τὸ δὲ τὶ ἔκλειφιν, ἰσότητα ἀνισότητα, εἰ ἐν μέσῳ ἢ μή.
And I mean by "absolutely" the subject, such as the moon, the earth, the sun, or a triangle; and by "something" the eclipse, equality, inequality, or whether it is in the middle or not.
ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τούτοις φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν.
For in all these cases it is clear that what it is and why it is are the same.
τί ἐστιν ἕκλειφις; στέρησις φωτὸς ἀπὸ σελήνης ὑπὸ γῆς ἀντιφράξεως. διὰ τί ἔστιν ἕκλειψις, ἢ διὰ τί ἐκλείπει ἡ σελήντη; διὰ τὸ ἀπολείπειν τὸ φῶς ἀντιφραττούσης τῆς γῆς. τί ἐστι συμφωνία; λόγος ἀριθμῶν ἐν ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ. διὰ τί συμφωνεῖ τὸ ὀξύ τῷ βαρεῖ; διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν ἀριθμῶν τὸ ὀξύ καὶ τὸ βαρύ. ἆρʼ ἔστι συμφωνεῖν τὸ ὀξύ καὶ τὸ βαρύ; ἆρʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν; λαβόντες δʼ ὅτι ἔστι, τίς οὖν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος; Ὅτι δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου ἡ ζήτησις, δηλοῖ ὅσων τὸ μέσον αἰσθητόν.
"What is an eclipse?" "A deprivation of light from the moon by the screening of the earth." "Why is there an eclipse, or why is the moon eclipsed?" "Because of the leaving of light, the earth screening it." "What is a consonance?" "A ratio of numbers in high and low pitch." "Why does the high pitch consort with the low pitch?" "Because the high pitch and the low pitch have a ratio of numbers." "Do the high pitch and the low pitch consort?" is "is their ratio in numbers?" and having grasped that it is, we seek "what then is the ratio?" And that the inquiry is of the middle term is shown by those cases in which the middle term is perceptible.
ητοῦμεν γὰρ μὴ ᾐσθημένοι, οἷον τῆς ἐκλείφεως, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή.
For we seek when we have not perceived—as for instance concerning the eclipse— whether it exists or not.
εἰ δʼ ἦμεν ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης, οὐκ ἄν ἐζητοῦμεν οὔτʼ εἰ γίνεται οὔτε διὰ τί, ἀλλʼ ἅμα δῆλον ἂν ἦν.
But if we were on the moon, we would not seek either if it is happening or why, but it would have been clear at the same time.
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αἴσθεσθαι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐγένετο ἄν ἡμῖν εἰδέναι.
For from perceiving, knowing the universal would also have come to us.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ὅτι νῦν ἀντιφράττει (καὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει)· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸ καθόλου ἂν ἐγένετο.
For perception is that it is now screening (for indeed it is clear that it is now eclipsed), and from this the universal would have come to be.
Ὥσπερ οὖν λέγομεν, τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰδέναι ταὐτό ἐστι καὶδιὰ τί ἔστιν, τοῦτο δʼ ἢ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τι, ἢ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, οἷον ὅτι δύο ὀρθαί, ἢ ὅτι μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον.
Just as we say, then, to know what it is is the same as to know why it is, and this is either absolutely and not one of the attributes, or of the attributes, such as being equal to two right angles, or being greater or less.