§2.1.32Τὰς δʼ αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπάντων εἶναι τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀδύνατον, πρῶτον μὲν λογικῶς θεωροῦσιν.
It is impossible for the principles of all syllogisms to be the same, first of all if we consider it logically.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖς εἰσι τῶν συλλογισμῶν, οἱ δὲ φευδεῖς.
For some syllogisms are true, and others are false.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ἐκ φευδῶν συλλογίσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ τοῦτο γίνεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ Γ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ β ψεῦδος·
For even if it is possible to syllogize what is true from what is false, yet this happens only once, as for example if [A] is true of C, but the middle term B is false; for neither does A belong to B, nor B to C.
οὔτε γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ Β τῷ Γ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν τούτων μέσα λαμμβάντηται τῶν τπροτάσεων, φευδεῖς ἔσονται διὰ τὸ τπᾶν συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος ἐκ φευδῶν εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ἀληθ5 ἐξ ἀληθών, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ φευδή καὶ τἀληθῆ.
But if middle terms of these premises are assumed, these premises will be false, because every false conclusion is from false premises, whereas true conclusions are from true premises, and false things are different from true things.
εἴτα οὐδὲ τὰ φευδῇ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῖς· ἔστι γὰρ φευδῇ ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐναντία καὶ ἀδύνατα ἅμα εἶναι, οἶον τὸ τὴν δικαιοσύντην εἶναι ἀδικίαν ἢ δειλίαν, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, ἢ τὸ ἴσον μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον.
Furthermore, not even false conclusions are from premises that are the same as themselves; for there are false propositions that are contrary to one another and impossible to be at the same time, as for example that justice is injustice or cowardice, and that man is a horse or an ox, or that the equal is greater or less.
Ἐκ δὲ τῶν κειμένων ὧδε· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ πάντων.
And from the facts laid down, [we see it] as follows: for not even of true conclusions are the principles the same for all.
ἕτεραι γὰρ πολλῶν τῷ γένει αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ οὐδʼ ἐφαρμόττουσαι, οἶον αἱ μονάδες ταῖς στιγμαῖς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττουσιν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσι θέσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν.
For the principles of many things are different in genus, and do not even fit one another—as, for example, units do not fit points; for the former do not have position, while the latter do.
ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἢ εἰς μέσα ἁρμόττειν ἢ ἄνωθεν ἢ κάτωθεν, ἢ τοὺς μὲν εἴσω ἔχειν τοὺς δʼ ἔξω τῶν ὅρων.
But it is necessary [if they fit] either to fit as middle terms, or from above, or from below, or to have some terms inside and others outside.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἀρχῶν οἷόν τʼ εἶναί τινας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντα δειχθήσεται· λέγω δὲ κοινὰς οἷον τὸ πᾶν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι.
But neither is it possible for there to be any common principles from which everything will be proved; by common principles I mean, for example, 'to affirm or deny everything'.
τὰ γὰρ γέντη τῶν ὄντων ἕτερα, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς ποσοῖς τὰ δὲ τοῖς ποιοῖς ὑπάρχει μόνοις, μεθʼ ὧν δείκνυται διὰ τῶν κοινῶν.
For the genera of beings are different, and some belong to quantities only, others to qualities only, with which they are proved through the common principles.
ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ οὐ πολλῷ ἐλάττους τῶν σιυμτπερασμάτων· ἀρχαὶ μὲν γὰρ αἱ τπροτάσεις, αἱ δὲ τπροτάσεις ἢ προσλαμβανομένου ὅρου ἢ ἐμ· βαλλομένου εἰσίν.
Moreover, the principles are not many fewer than the conclusions; for the premises are principles, and premises are produced either by assuming an additional term or by interpolating one.
ἔτι τὰ συμτπεράσματα ἄπειρα, οἱ δʼ ὅροι τπεπερασμένοι.
Moreover, the conclusions are infinite, but the terms are finite.
ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, αἱ δʼ ἐνδεχόμεναι.
Moreover, some principles are of necessity, others are contingent.
Οὕτω μἐν ακοπουμένοις ἀδύνατον τὰς αὐτὰς εἷναι πεπερασμένας, ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν αυμπερασμάτων.
To those who consider it in this way, then, it is impossible for the same principles to be finite, when the conclusions are infinite.
εἰ δ’ ἄλλως πως λέγοι τις, οἷον ὅτι αἱδὶ μὲν γεωμετρίας αἱδὶ δὲ λογισμῶν αἶδὶ δὲ ἰατρικῆς, τί ἄν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ἄλλο πλὴν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν;
But if someone were to say it in some other way, as for example that 'these are the principles of geometry, these of arithmetic, and these of medicine', what else would this statement mean than that there are principles of the sciences?
τὸ δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς φάναι γελοῖον, ὅτι αὐταὶ αὐταῖς αἱ αὐταί· πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γίγνεται ταὐτά.
But to say that they are the same is ridiculous, because they are the same as themselves; for in this way all things would become the same.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων δείκνυσθαι ὁτιοῦν, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἴητεῖν ἀπάντων εἶναι τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχάς· λίαν γὰρ εὔηθες.
Nor indeed does the proving of anything from all premises constitute seeking that there are the same principles for all; for this is too naive.
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαθήμασι τοῦτο γίνεται, οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει δυνατόν· αἱ γὰρ ἄμεσοι προτάσεις ἀρχαί, ἕτερον δὲ συμπέρασμα προσληφθείσης γίνεται προτάσεως ἀμέσου.
For this does not happen in the obvious mathematical sciences, nor is it possible in analysis; for immediate premises are principles, and a different conclusion is produced when another immediate premise is assumed.
εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις τὰς πρώτας ἀμέσους τπροτάσεις, ταύτας εἶναι ἀρχάς, μία ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ἐστίν.
And if someone should say that the first immediate premises are the principles, there is one in each genus.
εἰ δὲ μήτʼ ἐξ ἀπασῶν ὡς δέον δεὐενυσθαι ὁτιοῦν μήθʼ οὕτως ἑτέρας ὥσθʼ ἑκάστης ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ἑτέρας, λείπεται εἰ συγγενεῖς αἱ ἀρχαὶ πάντων, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τωνδὶ μὲν ταδί, ἐκ δὲ τωνδὶ ταδί.
And if it is neither necessary that anything be proved from all premises, nor are the principles so different that there are different ones for each science, the remaining possibility is that the principles of all things are kindred, but 'from these, these are proved, and from those, those are proved'.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι ἄλλαι ἀρχαὶ τῷ γένει εἰσὶν αἱ τῶν διαφόρων τῷ γένει.
But it is clear that this too is impossible; for it has been shown that the principles of things that are different in genus are themselves different in genus.
αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ διτταί, ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὅ·
For the principles are twofold: those from which [we prove], and that about which [we prove].
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν κοιναί, αἱ δὲ περὶ ὃ ἴδιαι, οἷον ἀριθμός, μέγεθος.
The former (those from which) are common, while the latter (that about which) are proper, as for example number and magnitude.