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Aristotle · Prior Analytics §1.2.21#1

Simultaneous Knowledge and Ignorance of the Same Object

Passage 72 of 123 · Greek

Summary

This passage discusses how a person can simultaneously possess knowledge and ignorance of the same thing without holding contrary beliefs, through the distinction between universal and particular knowledge.

§1.2.21#1Σμβαίνει δʼ ἐνίοτε, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ θέσει τῶν ὅρων ἀπατώμεθα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπάτην, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ πλείοσι πρώτοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ μὲν λεληθέναι τινὰ καὶ οἴεσθαι μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι.
It sometimes happens that, just as we are deceived in the setting out of the terms, so also the deception occurs in our belief, as, for example, if it is possible for the same thing to belong to several primary terms, and for someone to escape notice on the one hand and think it belongs to none, and on the other hand to know it.
ἔστω τὸ Α τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχον, καὶ ταῦτα παντὶ τῷ Δ ὡσαύτως.
Let A belong to B and to Γ in themselves, and let these both belong to all D in the same way.
εἰ δὴ τῷ μὲν Β τὸ Α παντὶ οἴεται ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Δ, τῷ δὲ Γ τὸ Α μηδενί, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Δ παντί, τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἕξει ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἄγνοιαν.
If, then, someone thinks that A belongs to all B, and this to D, but that A belongs to no Γ, and this to all D, he will have knowledge and ignorance of the same thing in the same respect.
πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπατηθείη περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει τῷ Β, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ Γ καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Δ, ὑπολαμβάνοι δὲ τὸ παντὶ τῷ ὑπάρχειν καὶ πάλιν μηδενὶ τῷ Γ· ἅμα γὰρ εἴσεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ὑπολήψεται ὑπάρχειν.
Or again, if someone should be deceived about the things from the same coordinate series, as, for example, if A belongs to B, and B to Γ, and Γ to D, and he should assume that A belongs to all B and again to no Γ; for he will at the same time know and not assume that it belongs.
ἆῤ οὖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀξιοῖ ἐκ τούτων ἢ ὃ ἐπίσταται, τοῦτο μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν;
Does he then expect nothing else from these than not to assume what he knows?
ἐπίσταται γάρ πως ὅτι τὸ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει διὰ τοῦ Β, ὡς τῇ καθόλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ὥστε ὅ πως ἐπίσταται, τοῦτο ὅλως ἀξιοῖ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
For he knows in a way that A belongs to Γ through B, as the particular is known by the universal, so that what he knows in a certain way, he expects not to assume at all; which is impossible.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος, εἰ μὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας τὸ μέσον, καθʼ ἑκάτερον μὲν τῶν μέσων ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν, οἷον τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β παντί, τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, ταῦτα δʼ ἀμφότερα παντὶ τῷ Δ. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντίαν λαμβάνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην πρότασιν.
On the previously mentioned case, if the middle is not from the same coordinate series, it is not possible to assume both premises with respect to each of the middles, as, for example, that A belongs to all B, and to no Γ, and both of these to all D. For it happens that the first premise is assumed as contrary, either absolutely or in a particular respect.
εἰ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, παντὶ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνει ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Δ οἶδε, καὶ ὅτι τῷ Δ τὸ Α οἶδεν.
For if someone assumes that A belongs to all to which B belongs, and knows that B belongs to D, he also knows that A belongs to D.
67a ὥστʼ εἰ πάλιν, ᾧ τὸ Γ, μηδενὶ οἴεται τὸ ὑπάρχειν, ὧ τὸ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ οὐκ οἴεται τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν.
Consequently, if again he thinks that A belongs to none of those to which Γ belongs, then to whatever B belongs in part, he thinks that A does not belong to this.
τὸ δὲ παντὶ οἰόμενον ᾧ τὸ Β, πάλιν τινὶ μὴ οἴεσθαι ᾧ τὸ Β, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντίον ἐστίν.
But to think that it belongs to all to which B belongs, and again to think that it does not belong to some to which B belongs, is contrary either absolutely or in a particular respect.
Οὕτω μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπολαβεῖν, καθʼ ἑκάτερον δὲ τὴν μίαν ἢ κατὰ θάτερον ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Δ, καὶ πάλιν τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ. ὁμοία γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀπάτη καὶ ὡς ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ ὧ τὸ Β, παντὶ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ παντί, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.
In this way, then, it is not possible to assume, but nothing prevents assuming one premise with respect to each middle, or both premises with respect to one of them, as, for example, that A belongs to all B, and B to D, and again A to no Γ. For such deception is similar to how we are deceived about particulars, as, for example, if A belongs to all to which B belongs, and B belongs to all Γ, A will belong to all Γ.
εἰ οὖν τις οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ Α, ᾧ τὸ Β, ὑπάρχει παντί, οἶδε καὶ ὅτι τῷ Γ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγνοεῖν τὸ Γ ὅτι ἔστιν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν Α δύο ὀρθαί, τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ Β τρίγωνον, τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ᾧ Γ αἰσθητὸν τρίγωνον.
If, then, someone knows that A belongs to all to which B belongs, he knows also that it belongs to Γ. But nothing prevents him from being ignorant of the existence of Γ, as, for example, if A is two right angles, B is triangle, and Γ is a sensible triangle.
ὑπολάβοι γὰρ ἄν τις μὴ εἶναι τὸ Γ, εἰδκὼς ὅτι πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δύο ὀρθάς, ὥσθ’ ἅμα εἴσεται καὶ ἀγνοήσει ταὐτόν.
For one might assume that Γ does not exist, though knowing that every triangle has two right angles, so that he will at the same time know and be ignorant of the same thing.
τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι πᾶν τρίγωνον ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ τὴν καθόλου ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ τὴν καθʼ ἕκαστον.
For knowing that every triangle has two right angles is not simple, but on the one hand is by having universal knowledge, and on the other hand by having particular knowledge.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὡς τῇ καθόλου οἶδε τὸ Γ ὅτι δύο ὀρθαί, ὡς δὲ τῇ καθʼ ἕκαστον οὐκ οἶδεν, ὥστʼ οὐχ ἕξει τὰς ἐναντίας.
In this way, then, he knows by universal knowledge that Γ has two right angles, but he does not know it by particular knowledge, so that he will not have contrary beliefs.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμντησις.
The argument in the Meno is also similar, namely that learning is recollection.
οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ συμβαίνει προεπίστασθαι τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἀλλʼ ἅμα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ λαμβάνειν τὴν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ ἀναγνωρίζοντας.
For it never happens that we pre-know the particular, but we receive the knowledge of the particulars at the same time as the introduction, as if recognizing them.
ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ἴσμεν, οἷον ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς, ἐὰν ἴδωμεν ὅτι τρίγωνον.
For some things we know immediately, as, for example, that it has two right angles, if we see that it is a triangle.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly also in other cases.

Notes

  1. ¦20¦τὸ μὲν λεληθέναι τινὰ καὶ οἴεσθαι μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι — The correlative structures τὸ μὲν and τὸ δὲ refer to the two different aspects of the same attribute (A) belonging to two different terms (B and Γ). The accusative pronoun τινά serves as the subject of the infinitives λεληθέναι and εἰδέναι.
  2. ¦67a¦ᾧ τὸ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχει — The relative clause 'to whatever B belongs in part' refers to the term D, to which both B and Γ belong. Although D is co-extensive with B's subject, it is framed here as a particular instance to which B belongs.
  3. ¦25¦ἅμα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ — The noun ἐπαγωγή here refers not to formal logical induction, but to the 'bringing in' or 'presentation' of a concrete particular instance. It explains the process of recognizing a universal property immediately as soon as a particular (e.g., a triangle) is presented.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Prior Analytics §1.2.21#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:1.2.21%231

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