§1.2.21#2Τῇ μὲν οὖν καθόλου θεωροῦμεν τὰ ἐν μέρει, τῇ δʼ οἰκείᾳ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὥστʼ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ αὐτά, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως, ἀλλʼ ἔχειν μὲν τὴν καθόλου, ἀπατᾶσθαι δὲ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.
Therefore, we contemplate particulars by universal knowledge, but we do not know them by proper knowledge, so that it is possible even to be deceived about them, though not in a contrary way, but rather by having universal knowledge and being deceived in particular knowledge.
ὁμοίως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν· προειρημένων· οὐ γὰρ ἐναντία ἡ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἀπάτη τῇ κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐδʼ ἡ καθʼ ἑκάτερον τῶν μέσων ὑπόληψις.
Similarly, then, also in the cases previously mentioned; for the deception concerning the middle is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism, nor is the belief concerning each of the middles.
οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει εἰδότα καὶ ὅτι τὸ ὅλῳ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο τῷ Γ, οἰηθῆναι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῷ Γ, οἷον ὅτι πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος καὶ αὕτη ἡμίονος οἴεσθαι κύειν ταύτην· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταται ὅτι τὸ Α τῷ Γ μὴ συνθεωρῶν τὸ καθʼ ἑκάτερον.
And nothing prevents someone who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B, and this in turn to Γ, from thinking that A does not belong to Γ, as, for example, knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule, but thinking that she is pregnant; for he does not know that A belongs to Γ, since he does not consider the cases together.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν οἶδε τὸ δὲ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀπατηθήσεται· ὅπερ ἔχουσιν αἱ καθόλου πρὸς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμας.
Thus it is clear that even if he knows one thing but does not know another, he will be deceived; which is the relation that universal knowledges have to particular ones.
οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξω τῆς αἰσθήσεως γενόμενον ἴσμεν, οὐδʼ ἂν ᾐσθημένοι τυγχάνωμεν, εἰ μὴ ὡς τῷ καθόλου καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἐνεργεῖν.
For we know none of the objects of sense when they are outside of actual sensation, even if we happen to have perceived them, except by universal knowledge and by having the proper knowledge, but not by exercising it.
τὸ γὰρ ἐπίτασθαι λέγεται τριχῶς, ἢ ὡς τῇ καθόλου ἢ ὡς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἢ ὡς τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἠπατῆσθαι τοσαυταχῶς.
For "knowing" is used in three senses: either by universal knowledge, or by proper knowledge, or by exercising it; and consequently, "being deceived" is used in as many ways.
οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει καὶ εἰδέναι καὶ ἠπατῆσθαι περὶ ταὐτό, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως.
Nothing, therefore, prevents one from both knowing and being deceived about the same thing, though not in a contrary way.
ὅπερ συμβαίνει καὶ τῷ καθʼ ἑκατέραν εἰδότι τὴν πρότασιν καὶ μὴ ἐπεσκεμμένῳ πρότερον.
This is also what happens to someone who knows each of the two premises but has not previously examined them together.
ὑπολαμβάνων γὰρ κύειν τὴν ἡμίονον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπιστήμην, οὐδʼ αὖ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληφιν ἐναντίαν ἀπάτην τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ· συλλογισμὸς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντία ἀπάτη τῇ καθόλου.
For someone who believes that the mule is pregnant does not possess the knowledge in act, nor does he have, by his belief, a deception contrary to his knowledge; for the deception contrary to universal knowledge is a syllogism.
Ὁ δʼ ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι κακῷ εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπολήφεται ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ κακῷ.
And he who believes that being good is being bad will believe that the same thing is both good and bad.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἐφʼ οὗ Α, τὸ δὲ κακῷ εἶναι ἐφʼ οὗ Β, πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἐφʼ οὗ Γ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ, καὶ εἶναι τὸ Γ τὸ Β ὑπολήψεται, καὶ πάλιν τὸ τὸ Α εἶναι ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Γ τὸ Α ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἦν ἀληθές, καθʼ οὗ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β, καὶ καθʼ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Γ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἦν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν.
For let being good be A, being bad be B, and again being good be Γ. Since, then, he believes B and Γ to be the same, he will believe that Γ is B, and again that it is A in the same way, so that he also believes Γ is A. For just as, if it were true that B belongs to that to which Γ belongs, and A belongs to that to which B belongs, it would also be true that A belongs to Γ, so it is also in the case of believing.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ Γ καὶ Β, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ Β καὶ Α, καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Α ταὐτὸν ἦν· ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξάζειν ὁμοίως.
And similarly also in the case of being; for since Γ and B are the same, and again B and A, Γ was also the same as A; and therefore it is similar also in the case of opining.
ἆῤ οὖν τοῦτο μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τις δώσει τὸ πρῶτον;
Is this, then, necessary, if one grants the first premise?
ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐκεῖνο ψεῦδος, τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν τινὰ κακῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πολλαχῶς γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ τοῦθʼ ὑπολαμβάνειν.
But perhaps that premise is false, namely, that someone believes being good to be being bad, except accidentally; for it is possible to believe this in many ways.
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο βέλτιον.
This, however, must be investigated better.