§1.2.18Ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος γίνεται παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος.
A false argument occurs because of the first falsehood.
ἢ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων πᾶς ἐστι συλλογισμός.
For every syllogism is from either two premises or more.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν δύο, τούτων ἀνάγκη τὴν ἑτέραν ἢ καὶ ἀμφοτέρας εἶναι ψευδεῖς· ἐξ ἀληθῶν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ψευδὴς συλλογισμός.
If, then, it is from two, it is necessary for one or both of these to be false; for a false syllogism does not come from true premises.
εἰ δʼ ἐκ πλειόνων, οἷον τὸ μὲν Γ διὰ τῶν Α Β, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ τῶν Δ Ε Ζ Η, τούτων τι ἔσται τῶν ἐπάνω ψεῦδος, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ Α καὶ Β διʼ ἐκείνων περαίνονται.
But if it is from more, as for example if Γ is concluded through A and B, and these through Δ, E, Ζ, H, some of these higher premises will be false, and because of this the argument will be false; for A and B are concluded through them.
ὥστε παρʼ ἐκείνων τι συμβαίνει τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος.
Consequently, the conclusion and the falsehood occur because of some of those.
§1.2.19Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ κατασυλλογίζεσθαι παρατηρητέον, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν συμτπερασμάτων ἐρωτᾷ τὸν λόγον, ὅπως μὴ δοθῇ δὶς ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν, ἐπειδήπερ ἴσμεν ὅτι ἄνευ μέσου συλλογισμός οὐ γίνεται, μέσον δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ πλεονάκις λεγόμενον.
In order not to be refuted by a syllogism, one must watch out, when someone asks for the argument without the conclusions, so that the same thing is not given twice in the premises, since we know that a syllogism does not occur without a middle term, and the middle is that which is mentioned more than once.
ὡς δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον σιυμπέρασμα τηρεῖν τὸ μέσον, φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ εἰδέναι ποῖον ἐν ἑκάστῳ σχήματι δείκνυται. τοῦτο δʼ ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι πῶς ὑπέχομεν τὸν λόγον.
How we must guard the middle term for each conclusion is clear from knowing what sort of conclusion is proved in each figure; and this will not escape us because of our knowing how we maintain the argument.
Χρὴ δʼ ὅπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν.
And what we advise to guard against when answering, we ourselves must try to escape notice when making an attempt.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται πρῶτον, ἐὰν τὰ συμπεράσματα μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται ἀλλʼ εἰλημμένων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄδηλα ᾖ, ἔτι δὲ ἂν μὴ τὰ σύνεγγυς ἐρωτᾷ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι μάλιστα ἄμεσα.
And this will occur first if they do not pre-syllogize the conclusions but they remain unclear when the necessary premises have been assumed, and further if one does not ask for things that are close, but rather for those that are as far as possible without intermediate terms.
οἶον ἔστω δέον συμπεραίνεσθαι τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Ζ·
For example, let it be required to conclude A of Ζ; let the middles be B, Γ, Δ, E.
μέσα Β Γ Δ Ε. δεῖ οὖν ἐρωτᾶν εἰ τὸ τῷ Β, καὶ πάλιν μὴ εἰ τὸ Β τῷ Γ, ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τὸ Δ τῷ Ε, κἄπειτα εἰ τὸ Β τῷ Γ, καὶ οὕτω τὰ λοιπά.
One should then ask whether A belongs to B, and again not whether B belongs to Γ, but rather whether Δ belongs to E, and then whether B belongs to Γ, and so on for the rest.
κἂν διʼ ἑνὸς μέσου γίνηται ὁ συλλογισμός, ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἄρχεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν οὕτω λανθάνοι τόν ἀποκρινόμενον.
And if the syllogism occurs through a single middle, one should begin with the middle; for in this way it would best escape the notice of the answerer.
§1.2.20Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔχομεν πότε καὶ πῶς ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων γίνεται συλλογισμός, φανερὸν καὶ πότʼ ἔσται καὶ πότʼ οὐκ ἔσται ἔλεγχος.
Since we possess the knowledge of when and under what conditions of the terms a syllogism occurs, it is also clear both when there will be a refutation and when there will not.
πάντων μὲν γὰρ σιυγχωρουμένων, ἢ ἐναλλὰξ τιθεμένων τῶν ἀποκρίσεων, οἷον τῆς μὲν ἀποφατικῆς τῆς δὲ καταφατικῆς, ἐγχωρεῖ γίνεσθαι ἔλεγχον.
For when all things are conceded, or when the answers are given alternately—for example, one negative and the other affirmative—it is possible for a refutation to occur.
ἦν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς καὶ οὕτω καὶ ἐκείνως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ κείμενον ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἔλεγχον· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός.
For a syllogism was possible when the terms were related both in this way and in that, so that if the assumption is opposite to the conclusion, a refutation must occur; for a refutation is a syllogism of a contradiction.
εἰ δὲ μηδὲν συγχωροῖτο, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἔλεγχον· οὐ γὰρ ἦν συλλογισμὸς πάντων τῶν ὅρων στερητικῶν ὄντων, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἔλεγχος·
But if nothing is conceded, it is impossible for a refutation to occur; for there was no syllogism when all the terms were negative, so there is no refutation either.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγχος, ἀνάγκη συλλογισμόν ναι, συλλογισμοῦ δʼ ὄντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔλεγχον.
For if there is a refutation, there must be a syllogism, but when there is a syllogism, there need not be a refutation.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν τεθείη κατὰ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν ὅλῳ· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔσται διορισμός ἐλέγχου καὶ συλλογισμοῦ.
Similarly also if nothing is assumed as a whole in the answer; for the definition of a refutation and of a syllogism will be the same.