§1.2.2#2Μὴ ὅλης δὲ λαμβανομένης ψευδοῦς ἔσται.
But if it is assumed not wholly false, the conclusion will be true.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ δὲ Β τινί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον κύκνῳ μὲν παντὶ λευκῷ δὲ τινί, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν παντὶ κύκνῳ, ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὸ παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει ἀληθῶς· πᾶς γὰρ κύκνος ζῷον.
For if A belongs to all C but to some B, and B to all C—for instance, animal belongs to every swan but to some white thing, and white to every swan—if it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C, A will belong to all C truly; for every swan is an animal.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ στερητικὸν εἴη τὸ Α Β· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β τινὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον τινὶ λευκῷ χίονι δʼ οὐδεμιᾷ, λευκὸν δὲ πάσῃ χιόνι.
And similarly also if the premise AB should be negative; for it is possible for A to belong to some B but to no C, and B to all C—for instance, animal belongs to some white thing but to no snow, and white to all snow.
εἰ οὖν ληφθείη τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ. τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.
If, therefore, it should be assumed that A belongs to no B, and B to all C, A will belong to no C.
Ἐὰν δʼ ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις ὅλη ληφθῇ ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ὅλη ψευδής, ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἀληθής· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ὅσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἴδη μὴ ὑπʼ ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει, ἵππος δʼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.
But if the premise AB is assumed wholly true, and BC wholly false, the syllogism [conclusion] will be true; for nothing prevents A from belonging to all of both B and C, while B belongs to no C, for instance, species of the same genus which are not subordinate to one another; for animal belongs both to horse and to man, but horse to no man.
ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα, ψευδοῦς ὅλης οὔσης τῆς Β Γ προτάσεως.
If, therefore, it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C, the conclusion will be true, although the premise BC is wholly false.
ὁμοίως. δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως.
And similarly also when the premise AB is negative.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ Α μήτε τῷ Β μήτε τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲ τὸ μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τοῖς ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδεσι τὸ γένος· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε μουσικῇ οὔτʼ ἰατρικῇ ὑπάρχει, οὐδʼ ἡ μουσικὴ ἰατρικῇ.
For it is possible for A to belong to neither B nor C, and for B to belong to no C, for instance, a genus in relation to species of another genus; for animal belongs neither to music nor to medicine, nor does music belong to medicine.
ληφθέντος οὖν τοῦ μὲν μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τοῦ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα.
If, then, it is assumed that [A belongs] to no B, and B to all C, the conclusion will be true.
καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅλη ψευδὴς ἡ Γ ἀλλʼ ἐπί τι, καὶ αὕτως ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.
And even if the premise BC is not wholly false but false in part, in this way too the conclusion will be true.
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ παντὶ πεζῷ, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος τινὶ πεζῷ καὶ οὐ παντί.
For nothing prevents A from belonging both to B and to the whole of C, while B belongs to some C, for instance, a genus in relation to species and difference; for animal belongs to every man and to every pedestrian, but man belongs to some pedestrian and not to all.
εἰ οὖν τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ληφθείη, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει· ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές.
If, therefore, it should be assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C, A will belong to all C; which was true.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Β προτάσεως.
And similarly also when the premise AB is negative.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ Α μήτε τῷ Β μήτε τῷ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδει καὶ διαφορᾷ· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε φρονήσει οὐδεμιᾷ ὑπάρχει οὔτε θεωρητικῇ, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τινὶ θεωρητικῇ.
For it is possible for A to belong to neither B nor to any C, while B belongs to some C, for instance, a genus in relation to a species and difference of another genus; for animal belongs neither to prudence nor to any contemplative faculty, but prudence belongs to some contemplative faculty.
εἰ οὖν ληφθείη τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Α ὑπάρξει· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἀληθές.
If, therefore, it should be assumed that A belongs to no B, and B to all C, A will belong to no C; and this was true.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ τῆς πρώτης προτάσεως ὅλης οὔσης ψευδοῦς τῆς δʼ ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ συμπέρασμα, καὶ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς οὔσης τῆς πρώτης τῆς δʼ ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς τῆς δʼ ἐν μέρει ψευδοῦς, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν.
In the case of particular syllogisms, it is possible for the conclusion to be true even when the first premise is wholly false and the other true, and when the first is false in part and the other true, and when one is true and the other false in part, and when both are false.
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινί, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ τινί, οἷον ζῷον οὐδεμιᾷ χιόνι λευκῷ δὲ τινὶ ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἡ χιὼν λευκῷ τινί. εἰ οὖν μέσον τεθείη ἡ χιών,.
For nothing prevents A from belonging to no B but to some C, and B from belonging to some C, for instance, animal belongs to no snow but to some white thing, and snow to some white thing.
πρῶτον δὲ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ληφθείη τὸ μέν Α ὅλῳ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἡ μὲν Α ὅλη ψευδής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.
If, therefore, snow should be placed as the middle, and animal as the first, and it should be assumed that A belongs to the whole of B, and B to some C, the premise AB indeed is wholly false, and BC is true, and the conclusion is true.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι.
And similarly also when the premise AB is negative; for it is possible for A to belong to the whole of B but not to belong to some C, while B belongs to some C...