§1.2.2#1Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστʼ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις διʼ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἔστι δʼ ὥστε ψευδεῖς, ἔστι δ᾿ ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀληθῇ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ.
It is possible, then, for the premises through which a syllogism is generated to be true, and it is possible for them to be false, and it is possible for one to be true and the other false.
τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
But the conclusion is of necessity either true or false.
ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκ ψευδῶν δʼ ἔστιν ἀληθές, πλὴν οὐ διότι ἀλλʼ ὅτι· τοῦ γὰρ διότι οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός· διʼ ἣν δʼ αἰτίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις λεχθήσεται.
Now, from true premises it is not possible to conclude what is false, but from false premises it is possible to conclude what is true, except not as to the 'why' but only as to the 'that'; for there is no syllogism of the 'why' from false premises; and for what reason this is so will be stated in what follows.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐξ ἀληθῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον.
First, then, that it is impossible to conclude what is false from true premises is clear from the following.
εἰ γὰρ τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β εἶναι, τοῦ Β μὴ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ μὴ εἶναι.
For if, when A is, B must be, then when B is not, A must not be.
εἰ οὖν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ Α, ἀνάγκη τὸ Β ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι· τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον.
If, therefore, A is true, B must be true, or it will happen that the same thing at the same time is and is not; but this is impossible.
μὴ ὅτι δὲ κεῖται τὸ εἷς ὅρος, ὑποληφθήτω ἐνδέχεσθαι ἑνός τινος ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τι συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε·
Let it not be supposed, because a single term is laid down, that it is possible for something to follow of necessity from some single thing being; for this is not possible.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι, διʼ ὧν δὲ τοῦτο γίνεται ἐλαχίστων, τρεῖς ὅροι, δύο δὲ διαστήματα καὶ προτάσεις.
For that which follows of necessity is the conclusion, and the fewest things through which this comes about are three terms, and two intervals and premises.
εἰ οὖν ἀληθές, ᾧ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, τὸ παντί, ᾧ δὲ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β, ᾧ τὸ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ψεῦδος εἶναι· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρξει ταὐτὸ καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρξει.
If, therefore, it is true that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs, and B to that to which C belongs, it is necessary for A to belong to that to which C belongs, and it is not possible for this to be false; for at the same time the same thing will belong and not belong.
τὸ οὖν Α ὥσπερ ἓν κεῖται, δύο προτάσεις συλληφθεῖσαι.
A, therefore, is laid down as one, two premises being taken together.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶνστερητικῶν ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀληθῶν δεῖξαι ψεῦδος.
And similarly also in the case of negative syllogisms; for it is not possible to prove what is false from true premises.
Ἐκ ψευδῶν δʼ ἀληθὲς ἔστι συλλογίσασθαι καὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων ψευδῶν· οὐσῶν καὶ τῆς μιᾶς, ταύτης δʼ οὐχ ὁποτέρας ἔτυχεν ἀλλὰ τῆς δευτέρας, ἐάνπερ ὅλην λαμβάνῃ ψευδῆ· μὴ ὅλης δὲ λαμβανομένης ἔστιν ὁποτερασοῦν.
But from false premises it is possible to conclude what is true, both when both premises are false and when only one is, and this not either of the two as it happens but the second, provided that one assumes it to be wholly false; but if it is assumed not wholly false, it can be either of the two.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχον, τῷ δὲ Β μηδενί, μηδὲ τὸ Β τῷ Γ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λίθῳ οὐδενὶ ζῷον, οὐδὲ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.
For let A belong to the whole of C, but to no B, and B to no C. This is possible, for instance, animal belongs to no stone, nor does stone to any man.
ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει, ὥστʼ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ψευδῶν ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον.
If, then, it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C, A will belong to all C, so that from both being false the conclusion is true; for every man is an animal.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ στερητικόν.
And similarly also in the case of the negative.
ἔστι γὰρ τῷ Γ μήτε τὸ α ὑπάρχειν μηδενὶ μήτε τὸ Β, τὸ μέντοι Α τῷ Β παντί, οἷον ἐὰν τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ληφθέντων μέσον τεθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· λίθῳ γὰρ οὔτε ζῷον οὔτε ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ παντὶ ζῷον.
For it is possible for neither A nor B to belong to any C, but for A to belong to all B, for instance if, the same terms being taken, man is placed as the middle; for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone, but animal belongs to all man.
ὥστʼ ἐὰν ᾧ μὲν ὑπάρχει, λάβῃ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει, παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀμφοῖν ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα.
So that if one assumes that what belongs to it belongs to none, and what does not belong to it belongs to all, the conclusion will be true from both premises being false.
ὁμοίως δὲ δειχθήσεται καὶ ἐὰν ἐπί τι ψευδὴς ἐκατέρα ληφθῇ.
And similarly it will be shown also if each is assumed false in part.
Ἐὰν δʼ ἡ ἑτέρα τεθῇ ψευδής, τῆς μὲν πρώτης ὅλης ψευδοῦς οὔσης, οἷον τῆς Β, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἔσται.
But if one of the premises is assumed false, when the first is wholly false, such as the premise B, the conclusion will not be true, but when the premise BC is false, it will be.
λέγω δʼ ὅλην ψευδῆ τὴν ἐναντίαν, οἷον εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχον παντὶ εἴληπται ἢ εἰ παντὶ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν.
I mean by 'wholly false' the contrary, for instance, if what belongs to none is assumed to belong to all, or if what belongs to all is assumed to belong to none.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ τῷ Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχον, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ παντί.
For let A belong to no B, and B to all C.
ἂν δὴ τὴν μὲν Β Γ πρότασιν λάβω ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ τὸ Α Β ψευδῆ ὅλην, καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Β τὸ Α, ἀδύνατον τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τῶν Γ, εἴπερ ᾧ τὸ Β, μηδενὶ τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ. ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ εἰ τὸ τῷ Β παντὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ, ἐλήφθη δʼ ἡ μὲν τὸ Β Γ ἀληθὴς πρότασις, ἡ δὲ τὸ Α Β ψευδὴς ὅλη, καὶ μηδενὶ ᾧ τὸ Β, τὸ Α—τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος ἔσται·
If indeed I assume the premise BC to be true, but the premise AB to be wholly false, namely that A belongs to all B, it is impossible for the conclusion to be true; for A belonged to none of C, since A belongs to no B, and B belongs to all C. Similarly, not even if A belongs to all B, and B to C, and the premise BC is assumed true, but AB wholly false, namely that A belongs to nothing to which B belongs—the conclusion will be false; for A will belong to all C, since A belongs to all B, and B belongs to all C.
παντὶ γὰρ ὑπάρξει τῷ Γ τὸ Α, εἴπερ ᾧ τὸ Β, παντὶ τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ὅλης λαμβανομένης ψευδοῦς, ἐάν τε καταφατικῆς ἐάν τε στερητικῆς, τῆς δʼ ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς, οὐ γίνεται ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα.
It is clear, then, that when the first premise is assumed wholly false, whether affirmative or negative, and the other is true, the conclusion does not become true.