§1.2.17Τὸ δὲ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν τὸ ψεῦδος, ὃ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, πρῶτον μέν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοῖς, ὅταν πρὸς ἀντίφασιν ᾗ τούτου ὃ ἐδείκνυτο τῇ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον.
The phrase "the falsehood does not occur because of this," which we are often accustomed to say in arguments, occurs first in syllogisms leading to the impossible, when [the syllogism] is directed towards the contradiction of that which was being proved by the reduction to the impossible.
οὔτε γὰρ μὴ ἀντιφήσας ἐρεῖ τὸ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ψεῦδός τι ἐτέθη τῶν πρότερον, οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ δεικνυούσῃ· οὐ γὰρ τίθησι ὃ ἀντίφησιν.
For neither will someone who does not contradict say "not because of this" (but rather that some falsehood was assumed among the prior premises), nor will he say so in a direct proof; for a direct proof does not assume what contradicts.
ἔτι δʼ ὅταν ἀναιρεθῇ τι δεικτικῶς διὰ τῶν Β Γ, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐ παρὰ τό κείμενον γεγένηται ὁ συλλογισμός. τὸ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τότε λέγομεν, ὅταν ἀναιρεθέντος τούτου μηδὲν ἧττον περαίνηται ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς δεικτικοῖς· ἀναιρεθείσης γὰρ τῆς θέσεως οὐδʼ ὁ πρὸς ταύτην ἔσται συλλογισμός.
Furthermore, when something is refuted directly through B and Γ, it is not possible to say that the syllogism has occurred "not because of what was assumed." For we say that "not because of this" occurs when, even if this assumption is removed, the syllogism is nonetheless concluded, which is not the case in direct proofs; for if the thesis is removed, there will not even be a syllogism directed towards it.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον λέγεται τὸ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσις ὥστε καὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ οὔσης ταύτης οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνειν τὸ ἀδύνατον.
It is clear, then, that "not because of this" is said in those [arguments] leading to the impossible, and when the original hypothesis is so related to the impossible that, whether it exists or does not exist, the impossible occurs nonetheless.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν φανερώτατος τρόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ παρά τὴν θέσιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀσύναπτος ᾖ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων πρός τὸ ἀδύνατον ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀπικοῖς.
Now, the most obvious way for the falsehood to be "not because of the thesis" is when the syllogism leading from the hypothesis through the middle terms to the impossible is disconnected, which has also been stated in the *Topics*.
τὸ γὰρ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι τοῦτό ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ βουλόμενος δεῖξαι ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος, ἐπιχειροίη τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι κινεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀπάγοι τὸ ἀδύνατον· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ οὐδαμῇ συνεχές ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ φάσει τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
For this is to assume the non-cause as cause, as for example if someone, wishing to show that the diagonal is incommensurable, should attempt Zeno's argument that motion is impossible, and reduce to this impossible; for the falsehood is in no way and by no means continuous with the original assertion.
ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος, εἰ συνεχὲς μὲν εἴη τὸ ἀδύνατον τῇ ὑποθέσει, μὴ μέντοι διʼ ἐκείνην συμβαίνοι.
Another way is if the impossible is indeed continuous with the hypothesis, but does not occur because of it.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω λαμβάνοντι τὸ συνεχές, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β κεῖται ὑπάρχον, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ τῷ Δ, τοῦτο δʼ εἴη ψεῦδος, τὸ τὸ Β τῷ Δ ὑπάρχειν.
For this can happen both to one who takes the continuous upward and to one who takes it downward, as for example if A is assumed to belong to B, B to Γ, and Γ to Δ, and this were false, namely that B belongs to Δ.
εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ Α μηδὲν ἧττον ὑπάρχοι τὸ Β τῷ Γ καὶ τὸ τῷ Δ, οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ ψεῦδος διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν.
For if, when A is removed, B nonetheless belongs to Γ and [Γ] to Δ, the falsehood would not be because of the original hypothesis.
ἢ πάλιν εἴ τις ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω λαμβάνοι τὸ συνεχές, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τῷ Β, τῷ δὲ Α τὸ Ε καὶ τῷ Ε τὸ Ζ, ψεῦδος δʼ εἴη τὸ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Α τὸ Ζ· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον εἴη τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως.
Or again, if someone should take the continuous upward, as for example if A belongs to B, and to A belongs E, and to E belongs Ζ, and it is false that Ζ belongs to A; for in this way too, the impossible would nonetheless exist even if the original hypothesis were removed.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρους συνάπτειν τὸ ἀδύνατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ κάτω λαμβάνοντι τὸ συνεχὲς πρὸς τὸν κατηγορούμενον τῶν ὅρων (εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τὸ Α τῷ Δ ὑπάρχειν, ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ Α οὐκέτι ἔσται τὸ ψεῦδος)· ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνω, καθʼ οὗ κατηγορεῖται (εἰ γὰρ τῷ Β μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ Ζ ὑπάρχειν, ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ Β οὐκέτι ἔσται τὸ ἀδύνατον).
But the impossible must be connected with the original terms; for in this way it will be because of the hypothesis, as for example to one who takes the continuous downward, it must be connected with the predicate of the terms (for if it is impossible for A to belong to Δ, when A is removed the falsehood will no longer exist); and to one who takes it upward, it must be connected with that of which it is predicated (for if it is not possible for Ζ to belong to B, when B is removed the impossible will no longer exist).
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῶν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ὄντων.
And similarly also when the syllogisms are negative.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἀδυνάτου μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρους ὄντος οὐ παρὰ τὴν θέσιν συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος.
It is clear, then, that when the impossible is not directed towards the original terms, the falsehood does not occur because of the thesis.
ἢ οὐδʼ οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔσται τὸ ψεῦδος;
Or will the falsehood not always be because of the hypothesis even in this way?
καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ τῷ Β ἀλλὰ τῷ Κ ἐτέθη τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Κ τῷ Γ καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Δ, καὶ οὕτω μένει τὸ ἀδύνατον (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω λαμβάνοντι τοὺς ὅρους), ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος τούτου συμβαίνει τὸ ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἄν εἴη παρὰ τὴν θέσιν.
For indeed, if A were assumed to belong not to B but to K, and K to Γ and Γ to Δ, the impossible remains in this way too (and similarly also to one who takes the terms upward), so that since the impossible occurs whether this exists or does not exist, it would not be because of the thesis.
ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄντος τούτου μηδὲν ἧττον γίνεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον ὥστʼ ἄλλου τιθεμένου συμβαίνειν τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἀφαιρεθέντος τούτου διὰ τῶν λοιπῶν προτάσεων ταὐτὸ περαίντηται ἀδύνατον, ἐπεὶ ταὐτό γε ψεῦδος συμβαίνειν διὰ πλειόνων ὑποθέσεων οὐδὲν ἴσως ἄτοπον, οἶον τὰς παραλλήλους συμπίπτειν καὶ εἰ μείων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντὸς τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει πλείους ὀρθὰς δυεῖν;
Or should "the falsehood occurring nonetheless when this does not exist" be taken not in such a way that the impossible occurs when another assumption is made, but rather when, this being removed, the same impossible is concluded through the remaining premises? For it is perhaps not at all absurd that the same falsehood should occur through several hypotheses, as for example that parallel lines meet both if the interior angle is less than the exterior and if a triangle has more than two right angles.