§1.2.16Τὸ δʼ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐστὶ μέν, ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν, ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει πολλαχῶς·
To beg and assume the original question is, to take it generally, to fail to prove the point at issue, and this happens in several ways.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὅλως μὴ συλλογίζεται, καὶ εἰ διʼ ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ ὁμοίως ἀγνώστων, καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρότερον· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ πιστοτέρων τε καί προτέρων ἐστίν, τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς·
For it occurs if one does not syllogize at all, and if one syllogizes through things less known or equally unknown, and if one syllogizes the prior through the posterior; for demonstration is from things more credible and prior. None of these, then, is begging the original question.
ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν διʼ αὐτῶν πέφυκε γνωρίζεσθαι τὰ δὲ διʼ ἄλλων (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ διʼ αὑτῶν, τὰ δʼ ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διʼ ἄλλων), ὅταν μὴ τὸ διʼ αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν διʼ αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύναι, τότʼ αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
But since some things are by nature known through themselves, and others through other things (for principles are known through themselves, and what is under principles through other things), whenever someone attempts to prove through itself that which is not known through itself, then he begs the original question.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι μὲν οὕτω ποιεῖν ὥστ’ εὐθὺς ἀξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάντας ἐπʼ ἄλλα ἄττα τῶν πεφυκότων διʼ ἐκείνου δείκνυσθαι διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύναι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δεικνύοιτο διὰ τοῦ Β, τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ πεφυκὸς εἴη δείκνυσθαι διὰ τοῦ Α· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτὸ διʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ Α δεικνύναι τοὺς οὕτω συλλογιζομένους.
And it is possible to do this so as to demand the point at issue immediately, but it is also possible to pass to certain other things which are by nature proved through that, and through these to prove the original question, as for example, if A were proved through B, and B through Γ, and Γ were by nature to be proved through A; for it results that those who syllogize in this way prove A through itself.
ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὰς παραλλήλους οἰόμενοι γράφειν· λανθάνουσι γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοιαῦτα λαμβάνοντες ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν παραλλήλων.
This is what those who think they describe parallel lines actually do; for they escape their own notice by assuming such things as cannot be proved unless parallel lines exist.
ὥστε συμβαίνει τοῖς οὕτω συλλογιζομένοις ἕκαστον εἶναι λέγειν, εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον· οὕτω δʼ ἅπαν ἔσται διʼ αὑτοῦ γνωστόν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
So it results for those who syllogize in this way that they say each thing is, if each thing is; and in this way everything will be known through itself, which is impossible.
Εἰ οὖν τις ἀδήλου ὄντος ὅτι τὸ ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῷ Β, αἰτοῖτο τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α, οὔπω δῆλον εἰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀποδείκνυσι, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως τὸ ὁμοίως ἄδηλον.
If, then, when it is unclear that A belongs to Γ, and similarly also that it belongs to B, someone should demand that A belongs to B, it is not yet clear whether he begs the original question, but it is clear that he does not prove it; for that which is equally unclear is not a principle of demonstration.
εἰ μέντοι τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Γ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀντιστρέφουσιν, ἢ ἐνυπάρχει θάτερον θατέρῳ, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται.
If, however, B is so related to Γ as to be identical, or it is clear that they convert, or one is in the other, he begs the original question.
καὶ γὰρ ἄν ὅτι τῷ Β τὸ Α ὑπάρχει διʼ ἐκείνων δεικνύοι, εἰ ἀντιστρέφοι (νῦν δὲ τοῦτο κωλύει, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ τρόπος).
For indeed, he would prove that A belongs to B through those terms, if they convert (but now this prevents it, and not the method).
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῖ, τὸ εἰρημένον ἄν ποιοῖ καὶ ἀντιστρέφοι διὰ τριῶν.
And if he should do this, he would do what has been said and convert through three terms.
ὡσαύτως δὲ κἄν εἰ τὸ Β τῷ Γ λαμβάνοι ὑπάρχειν, ὁμοίως ἄδηλον ὂν καὶ εἰ τὸ Α, οὔπω τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀποδείκνυσιν.
And similarly, even if he should assume that B belongs to Γ, when this is equally unclear as that A does, he does not yet beg the original question, but he does not prove it.
ἐὰν δὲ ταὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ Α καὶ Β ἢ τῷ ἀντιστρέφειν ἢ τῷ ἕπεσθαι τῷ Β τὸ Α, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖται διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί δύναται, εἴρηται ἡμῖν, ὅτι τὸ διʼ αὑτοῦ δεικνύναι τὸ μὴ διʼ αὐτοῦ δῆλον.
But if A and B are identical, either by converting or by A following B, he begs the original question for the same reason; for what begging the original question means has been stated by us, namely, to prove through itself that which is not clear through itself.
Εἰ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ διʼ αὐτοῦ δεικνύναι τὸ μὴ διʼ αὐτοῦ δῆλον, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ δεικνύναι, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἀδήλων ὄντων τοῦ δεικνυμένου καὶ διʼ οὗ δείκνυσιν ἢ τῷ ταὐτὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἢ τῷ ταὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μὲν τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι καὶ τρίτῳ ἀμφοτέρως ἄν ἐνδέχοιτο τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, ἐν δὲ κατηγορικῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔν τε τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ.
If, then, begging the original question is to prove through itself that which is not clear through itself, and this is to fail to prove, when both the thing proved and that through which one proves are equally unclear, either because the same things belong to the same thing or the same thing belongs to the same things, in the middle and third figures it would be possible in both ways to beg the original question, and in an affirmative syllogism in the third and first figures.
ὅταν δʼ ἀποφατικῶς, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι αἱ προτάσεις (ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ), διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τοὺς ὅρους κατὰ τοὺς ἀποφατικοὺς συλλογισμούς.
But in negative syllogisms, when the same things are denied of the same thing; and both premises are not in the same way (and similarly also in the middle figure), because terms do not convert in negative syllogisms.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι τὰ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὰ κατὰ δόξαν.
And begging the original question is, in demonstrations, what is so in truth, and in dialectic, what is so according to opinion.