§7.344κακῶς δὲ ἂν φυῇ, ὡς ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς εἴς τε τὸ μαθεῖν εἴς τε τὰ λεγόμενα ἤθη πέφυκεν, τὰ δὲ διέφθαρται, οὐδʼ ἂν ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἰδεῖν ποιήσειεν τοὺς τοιούτους.
But if the soul is by nature bad—as the disposition of the soul in the majority of men is by nature both for learning and for the so-called character, or if some parts are ruined—not even Lynceus could make such people see.
ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, τὸν μὴ συγγενῆ τοῦ πράγματος οὔτʼ ἂν εὐμάθεια ποιήσειέν ποτε οὔτε μνήμη— τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις ἕξεσιν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται—ὥστε ὁπόσοι τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα καλὰ μὴ προσφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ συγγενεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλων εὐμαθεῖς ἅμα καὶ μνήμονες, οὐδʼ ὅσοι συγγενεῖς, δυσμαθεῖς δὲ καὶ ἀμνήμονες, οὐδένες τούτων μήποτε μάθωσιν ἀλήθειαν ἀρετῆς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲ κακίας.
In a single word, neither ease of learning nor memory will ever make one who is not akin to the matter understand it—for to begin with, it does not arise in alien dispositions—so that as many as are not by nature suited and akin to the just things and all other things that are beautiful, though some are quick at learning and of good memory in other matters, and as many as are akin but slow to learn and forgetful, none of these will ever learn the truth of virtue or of vice, so far as possible.
ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἅμα καὶ ἀληθὲς τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας, μετὰ τριβῆς πάσης καὶ χρόνου πολλοῦ, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχαῖς εἶπον·
For it is necessary to learn them together, both the falsehood and the truth of the whole of existence, with all diligence and over a long time, as I said in the beginning.
μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν χρωμένων, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστʼ εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην.
And only when these elements—names and definitions, visual images and sensations—are rubbed against one another, tested in well-meaning refutations, and examined with questions and answers without malice, does intelligence and intellect concerning each thing flash forth, stretching as far as human power can reach.
διὸ δὴ πᾶς ἀνὴρ σπουδαῖος τῶν ὄντων σπουδαίων πέρι πολλοῦ δεῖ μὴ γράψας ποτὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰς φθόνον καὶ ἀπορίαν καταβαλεῖ.
For this very reason, every serious man, when dealing with serious matters, will far from writing about them among men, lest he throw them into envy and difficulty.
ἑνὶ δὴ ἐκ τούτων δεῖ γιγνώσκειν λόγῳ, ὅταν ἴδῃ τίς του συγγράμματα γεγραμμένα εἴτε ἐν νόμοις νομοθέτου εἴτε ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν ἅττʼ οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἦν τούτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαιότατα, εἴπερ ἔστʼ αὐτὸς σπουδαῖος, κεῖται δέ που ἐν χώρᾳ τῇ καλλίστῃ τῶν τούτου·
In a single word, therefore, one must know from these things, whenever one sees anyone's written treatises, whether the laws of a legislator or any other writings whatsoever, that these were not his most serious concerns, if he is himself serious, but that they lie somewhere in the most beautiful region of his possession.
εἰ δὲ ὄντως αὐτῷ ταῦτʼ ἐσπουδασμένα ἐν γράμμασιν ἐτέθη,
ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα,
θεοὶ μὲν οὔ, βροτοὶ δὲ
φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ τε καὶ πλάνῳ ὁ συνεπισπόμενος εὖ εἴσεται, εἴτʼ οὖν Διονύσιος ἔγραψέν τι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων εἴτε τις ἐλάττων εἴτε μείζων, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀκηκοὼς οὐδὲ μεμαθηκὼς ἦν ὑγιὲς ὧν ἔγραψεν κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον·
But if these were really written down by him in characters as things studied in earnest, 'then indeed, surely, not the gods, but mortals themselves have destroyed their own wits.' And whoever follows this tale and wandering will know well, whether Dionysius wrote anything about the highest and first principles of nature, or anyone else, whether lesser or greater, that according to my account he had heard or learned nothing sound of what he wrote.
ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐσέβετο ἐμοί, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐτόλμησεν εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν καὶ ἀπρέπειαν ἐκβάλλειν.
For otherwise he would have revered them just as I do, and would not have dared to cast them out into discordance and impropriety.
οὔτε γὰρ ὑπομνημάτων χάριν ἔγραψεν—οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν μή τις αὐτὸ ἐπιλάθηται, ἐὰν ἅπαξ τῇ ψυχῇ περιλάβῃ· πάντων γὰρ ἐν βραχυτάτοις κεῖται— §7.345φιλοτιμίας δὲ αἰσχρᾶς, εἴπερ, ἕνεκα, εἴθʼ ὡς αὑτοῦ τιθέμενος εἴθʼ ὡς παιδείας δὴ μέτοχος ὤν, ἧς οὐκ ἄξιος ἦν ἀγαπῶν δόξαν τὴν τῆς μετοχῆς γενομένης. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς συνουσίας Διονυσίῳ τοῦτο γέγονεν, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη, γέγονεν δʼ οὖν ὅπως,
ἴττω Ζεύς,
φησὶν ὁ Θηβαῖος· διεξῆλθον μὲν γὰρ ὡς εἶπόν τε ἐγὼ καὶ ἅπαξ μόνον, ὕστερον δὲ οὐ πώποτε ἔτι. ἐννοεῖν δὴ δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὅτῳ μέλει τὸ περὶ αὐτὰ γεγονὸς εὑρεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ γέγονεν, τίνι πότʼ αἰτίᾳ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον, πλεονάκις τε οὐ διεξῇμεν· πότερον Διονύσιος ἀκούσας μόνον ἅπαξ, οὕτως εἰδέναι τε οἴεται καὶ ἱκανῶς οἶδεν, εἴτε αὐτὸς εὑρὼν ἢ καὶ μαθὼν ἔμπροσθεν παρʼ ἑτέρων, ἢ φαῦλα εἶναι τὰ λεχθέντα, ἢ τὸ τρίτον οὐ καθʼ αὑτόν, μείζονα δέ, καὶ ὄντως οὐκ ἂν δυνατὸς εἶναι φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ζῆν ἐπιμελούμενος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαῦλα, πολλοῖς μάρτυσι μαχεῖται τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσιν, οἳ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάμπολυ Διονυσίου κυριώτεροι ἂν εἶεν κριταί· εἰ δὲ ηὑρηκέναι ἢ μεμαθηκέναι, ἄξια δʼ οὖν εἶναι πρὸς παιδείαν ψυχῆς ἐλευθέρας, πῶς ἄν, μὴ θαυμαστὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος, τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον οὕτως εὐχερῶς ἠτίμασέν ποτʼ ἄν; πῶς δʼ ἠτίμασεν, ἐγὼ φράζοιμʼ ἄν. οὐ πολὺν χρόνον διαλιπὼν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν Δίωνα ἐῶν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ καρποῦσθαι χρήματα, τότε οὐκέτʼ εἴα τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους αὐτοῦ πέμπειν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, καθάπερ ἐπιλελησμένος τῆς ἐπιστολῆς παντάπασιν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὰ οὐ Δίωνος ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὑέος, ὄντος μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ νόμους ἐπιτροπεύοντος. τὰ μὲν δὴ πεπραγμένα μέχρι τούτου ταῦτʼ ἦν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, τούτων δὲ οὕτω γενομένων, ἑωράκη τε ἐγὼ ἀκριβῶς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τὴν Διονυσίου φιλοσοφίας, ἀγανακτεῖν τε ἐξῆν εἴτε βουλοίμην εἴτε μή. ἦν γὰρ θέρος ἤδη τότε καὶ ἔκπλοι τῶν νεῶν· ἐδόκει δὴ χαλεπαίνειν μὲν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ Διονυσίῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς βιασαμένοις ἐλθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸ τρίτον εἰς τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν περὶ τὴν Σκύλλαν,
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ὄφρʼ ἔτι τὴν ὀλοὴν ἀναμετρήσαιμι Χάρυβδιν,
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λέγειν δὲ πρὸς Διονύσιον ὅτι μοι μένειν ἀδύνατον εἴη Δίωνος οὕτω προπεπηλακισμένου.
For he did not write for the sake of keeping memoranda—for there is no fear of anyone forgetting it, if once he grasps it in his soul; for they are contained in the briefest of words—