§7.342ἀλλʼ οὔτε ἀνθρώποις ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην ἀγαθόν, εἰ μή τισιν ὀλίγοις ὁπόσοι δυνατοὶ ἀνευρεῖν αὐτοὶ διὰ σμικρᾶς ἐνδείξεως, τῶν τε δὴ ἄλλων τοὺς μὲν καταφρονήσεως οὐκ ὀρθῆς ἐμπλήσειεν ἂν οὐδαμῇ ἐμμελῶς, τοὺς δὲ ὑψηλῆς καὶ χαύνης ἐλπίδος, ὡς σέμνʼ ἄττα μεμαθηκότας.
But neither do I consider the attempt made concerning them, when addressed to men, to be a good thing, except for some few who are capable of discovering them for themselves through a slight indication; and as for the rest, it would fill some with an improper and entirely unsuitable contempt, and others with a lofty and vain hope, as if they had learned some grand things.
ἔτι δὲ μακρότερα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν νῷ μοι γέγονεν εἰπεῖν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν περὶ ὧν λέγω σαφέστερον ἂν εἴη λεχθέντων αὐτῶν.
Furthermore, it has come into my mind to speak at greater length about them; for perhaps what I am saying would be clearer once they themselves have been stated.
ἔστι γάρ τις λόγος ἀληθής, ἐναντίος τῷ τολμήσαντι γράφειν τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ καὶ πρόσθεν ῥηθείς, ἔοικεν δʼ οὖν εἶναι καὶ νῦν λεκτέος.
For there is a certain true doctrine, opposed to the one who has dared to write anything at all about such matters, which has been often stated by me before, but it seems it must be stated now as well.
ἔστιν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστῳ, διʼ ὧν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγκη παραγίγνεσθαι, τρία, τέταρτον δʼ αὐτή—πέμπτον δʼ αὐτὸ τιθέναι δεῖ ὃ δὴ γνωστόν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ὄν—ἓν μὲν ὄνομα, δεύτερον δὲ λόγος, τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἴδωλον, τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη.
For each of existing things, there are three instruments through which knowledge must come, the fourth is knowledge itself, and as the fifth one must place that which is indeed the object of knowledge and truly existing: first, the name; second, the definition; third, the image; fourth, knowledge.
περὶ ἓν οὖν λαβὲ βουλόμενος μαθεῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, καὶ πάντων οὕτω πέρι νόησον.
Take, therefore, one example, wishing to understand what is now being said, and conceive of all things in the same way.
κύκλος ἐστίν τι λεγόμενον, ᾧ τοῦτʼ αὐτό ἐστιν ὄνομα ὃ νῦν ἐφθέγμεθα.
There is something called 'circle', which has this very name which we have just uttered.
λόγος δʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ δεύτερον, ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων συγκείμενος· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἴσον ἀπέχον πάντῃ, λόγος ἂν εἴη ἐκείνου ᾧπερ στρογγύλον καὶ περιφερὲς ὄνομα καὶ κύκλος.
And its definition is the second, composed of nouns and verbs; for 'that which has its extremities everywhere equally distant from its center' would be the definition of that very thing to which 'round', 'circumference', and 'circle' are names.
τρίτον δὲ τὸ ζωγραφούμενόν τε καὶ ἐξαλειφόμενον καὶ τορνευόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον· ὧν αὐτὸς ὁ κύκλος, ὃν πέρι πάντʼ ἐστὶν ταῦτα, οὐδὲν πάσχει, τούτων ὡς ἕτερον ὄν.
And third is that which is drawn and erased, or turned on a lathe and destroyed; none of which affects the circle itself, about which all these things are, since it is different from them.
τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ἀληθής τε δόξα περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ ἓν τοῦτο αὖ πᾶν θετέον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς οὐδʼ ἐν σωμάτων σχήμασιν ἀλλʼ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὂν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν.
And fourth is knowledge and intellect and true opinion concerning these things; and this whole class must be placed as one, existing not in vocal sounds nor in shapes of bodies but in souls, whereby it is clearly different from both the nature of the circle itself and from the three previously mentioned.
τούτων δὲ ἐγγύτατα μὲν συγγενείᾳ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τοῦ πέμπτου νοῦς πεπλησίακεν, τἆλλα δὲ πλέον ἀπέχει.
And of these, intellect has approached closest to the fifth in kinship and similarity, while the others are more distant.
ταὐτὸν δὴ περί τε εὐθέος ἅμα καὶ περιφεροῦς σχήματος καὶ χρόας, περί τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου, καὶ περὶ σώματος ἅπαντος σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος, πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ζῴου σύμπαντος πέρι καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἤθους, καὶ περὶ ποιήματα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα·
And the same holds true for straight as well as spherical shapes, and colors, for the good and the beautiful and the just, and for every body, whether manufactured or produced according to nature, of fire and water and all such things, and concerning every living being, and character in souls, and all actions and passions.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν τούτων μή τις τὰ τέτταρα λάβῃ ἁμῶς γέ πως, οὔποτε τελέως ἐπιστήμης τοῦ πέμπτου μέτοχος ἔσται.
For unless one grasps the four of these in some way or other, he will never completely participate in the knowledge of the fifth.
§7.343πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις ταῦτα οὐχ ἧττον ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ ἕκαστον δηλοῦν ἢ τὸ ὂν ἑκάστου διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές·
For in addition to these, these four attempt to show the 'of what sort' concerning each thing no less than the 'what it is' of each, owing to the weakness of language.
ὧν ἕνεκα νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ποτὲ εἰς αὐτὸ τιθέναι τὰ νενοημένα ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετακίνητον, ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις.
For which reason no one possessing intellect will ever dare to commit the things conceived by him to it, and that too to an unalterable medium, which is indeed the case with things written in characters.
τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον δεῖ μαθεῖν.
And this which is now said must be understood in turn.
κύκλος ἕκαστος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι γραφομένων ἢ καὶ τορνευθέντων μεστὸς τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐστὶν τῷ πέμπτῳ—τοῦ γὰρ εὐθέος ἐφάπτεται πάντῃ—αὐτὸς δέ, φαμέν, ὁ κύκλος οὔτε τι σμικρότερον οὔτε μεῖζον τῆς ἐναντίας ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ φύσεως.
Every circle drawn or even turned on a lathe in practical actions is full of the opposite of the fifth—for it touches the straight everywhere—but the circle itself, we say, contains in itself nothing either smaller or greater of the opposite nature.
ὄνομά τε αὐτῶν φαμεν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ βέβαιον εἶναι, κωλύειν δʼ οὐδὲν τὰ νῦν στρογγύλα καλούμενα εὐθέα κεκλῆσθαι τά τε εὐθέα δὴ στρογγύλα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον βεβαίως ἕξειν τοῖς μεταθεμένοις καὶ ἐναντίως καλοῦσιν.
And we say that no name of theirs is permanent for anything, and there is nothing to prevent the things now called 'round' from being called 'straight', and the 'straight' 'round', and they will be no less stable for those who have changed them and call them by the opposite names.
καὶ μὴν περὶ λόγου γε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἴπερ ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σύγκειται, μηδὲν ἱκανῶς βεβαίως εἶναι βέβαιον·
And indeed, concerning the definition, the same account holds, since it is composed of nouns and verbs, that nothing in it is sufficiently permanently fixed.
μυρίος δὲ λόγος αὖ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν τεττάρων ὡς ἀσαφές, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος, οὐ τὸ ποιόν τι, τὸ δὲ τί, ζητούσης εἰδέναι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ μὴ ζητούμενον ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων προτεῖνον τῇ ψυχῇ λόγῳ τε καὶ κατʼ ἔργα, αἰσθήσεσιν εὐέλεγκτον τό τε λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἀεὶ παρεχόμενον ἕκαστον, ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀσαφείας ἐμπίμπλησι πάσης ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντʼ ἄνδρα.
And there is a countless further argument about each of the four, showing how obscure they are; but the greatest thing, which we mentioned a little before, is that while there are two things, the 'being' and the 'of what sort', and the soul seeks to know not the 'of what sort' but the 'what', each of the four, offering to the soul what is not sought, both in word and in deed, and presenting each thing as always easily refuted by the senses whether in speech or in display, fills almost every man with all difficulty and obscurity.
ἐν οἷσι μὲν οὖν μηδʼ εἰθισμένοι τὸ ἀληθὲς ζητεῖν ἐσμεν ὑπὸ πονηρᾶς τροφῆς, ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ τὸ προταθὲν τῶν εἰδώλων, οὐ καταγέλαστοι γιγνόμεθα ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, οἱ ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐρωτώντων, δυναμένων δὲ τὰ τέτταρα διαρρίπτειν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν·
In those matters, therefore, where we are not even accustomed to seek the truth because of bad training, but the offered image is sufficient, we do not make ourselves ridiculous to one another—we who are questioned by those who question us—when they are able to dissect and refute the four.
ἐν οἷς δʼ ἂν τὸ πέμπτον ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ δηλοῦν ἀναγκάζωμεν, ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν δυναμένων ἀνατρέπειν κρατεῖ. καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἐν λόγοις ἢ γράμμασιν ἢ ἀποκρίσεσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων δοκεῖν μηδὲν γιγνώσκειν ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ γράφειν ἢ λέγειν, ἀγνοούντων ἐνίοτε ὡς οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ γράψαντος ἢ λέξαντος ἐλέγχεται, ἀλλʼ ἡ τῶν τεττάρων φύσις ἑκάστου, πεφυκυῖα φαύλως.
But in cases where we compel them to answer and reveal the fifth, anyone who wishes and is able to overturn the argument prevails, and makes the one who explains in speech or writing or answers seem to the majority of listeners to know nothing of what he attempts to write or say; for they are sometimes ignorant of the fact that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is refuted, but the nature of each of the four, which is deficient by nature.
ἡ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγή, ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσα ἐφʼ ἕκαστον, μόγις ἐπιστήμην ἐνέτεκεν εὖ πεφυκότος εὖ πεφυκότι·
But the passage through all of them, moving up and down to each one, barely generates knowledge of what is well-constituted in a well-constituted mind.