§987ΑΘ. παλαιὸς γὰρ δὴ τρόπος ἔθρεψεν τοὺς πρώτους ταῦτα ἐννοήσαντας διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς θερινῆς ὥρας, ἣν Αἴγυπτός τε Συρία θʼ ἱκανῶς κέκτηται, φανεροὺς μὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀστέρας ἀεὶ σύμπαντας καθορῶντας, ἅτε νεφῶν καὶ ὑδάτων ἀπόπροσθεν ἀεὶ τοῦ κόσμου κεκτημένους, ὅθεν καὶ πανταχόσε καὶ δεῦρʼ ἐξήκει, βεβασανισμένα χρόνῳ μυριετεῖ τε καὶ ἀπείρῳ.
ATHENIAN: For indeed, an ancient way of life nurtured those who first thought of these things, because of the beauty of the summer season, which Egypt and Syria possess sufficiently, as they observe, so to speak, always all the stars clearly visible, inasmuch as they possess a world always far removed from clouds and rains. From where also it has reached everywhere and here, having been tested by a time of ten thousand years and infinite.
διὸ θαρροῦντα χρὴ ταῦτα εἰς νόμους θέσθαι—τὸ γὰρ μὴ τίμια τὰ θεῖα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τίμια, σαφῶς οὐκ ἐμφρόνων—ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἔσχηκεν, τήν γε αἰτίαν χρὴ λέγεσθαι ταύτην.
Therefore, one must establish these things into laws with confidence—for that the divine things should not be honored, while other things are, is clearly not the part of intelligent men—but as to why they have not obtained names, this cause must be stated.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπωνυμίαν εἰλήφασιν θεῶν·
But indeed they have received the names of gods.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἑωσφόρος ἕσπερός τε ὢν αὑτὸς ἀφροδίτης εἶναι σχεδὸν ἔχει λόγον καὶ μάλα Συρίῳ νομοθέτῃ πρέπον, ὁ δʼ ὁμόδρομος ἡλίῳ τε ἅμα καὶ τούτῳ σχεδὸν Ἑρμοῦ.
For the morning star, which is the same as the evening star, has virtually a claim to belong to Aphrodite, and this is very fitting for a Syrian lawgiver; and the one running on a course similar to both the sun and this star belongs to Hermes.
τρεῖς δʼ ἔτι φορὰς λέγωμεν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πορευομένων μετὰ σελήνης τε καὶ ἡλίου.
And let us speak of three other motions of those journeying to the right, along with the moon and the sun.
ἕνα δὲ τὸν ὄγδοον χρὴ λέγειν, ὃν μάλιστά τις ἂν κόσμον προσαγορεύοι, ὃς ἐναντίος ἐκείνοις σύμπασιν πορεύεται, οὐκ ἄγων τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥς γε ἀνθρώποις φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ὀλίγα τούτων εἰδόσιν.
And one must speak of the eighth as single, which one might most of all address as "cosmos," which journeys opposite to all of those, not leading the others, as indeed it would appear to men who know little of these things.
ὅσα δὲ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν, ἀνάγκη λέγειν καὶ λέγομεν· ἡ γὰρ ὄντως οὖσα σοφία ταύτῃ πῃ φαίνεται τῷ καὶ σμικρὰ συννοίας ὀρθῆς θείας τε μετειληφότι.
But as many things as we know sufficiently, we must speak of, and we do speak of; for the wisdom that really exists appears in this way to one who has partaken even in a small measure of correct and divine reflection.
λοιποὶ δὴ τρεῖς ἀστέρες, ὧν εἷς μὲν βραδυτῆτι διαφέρων αὐτῶν ἐστι, Κρόνου δʼ αὐτόν τινες ἐπωνυμίαν φθέγγονται· τὸν δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον βραδυτῆτι λέγειν χρὴ Διός, Ἄρεως δὲ ὁ μετὰ τοῦτον, πάντων δὲ οὗτος ἐρυθρώτατον ἔχει χρῶμα.
Now there remain three stars, of which one is outstanding in its slowness, and some call it by the name of Cronus; and the one after this in slowness must be said to belong to Zeus, and the one after this to Ares, and this one has the reddest color of all.
χαλεπὸν δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων κατανοῆσαί τινα φράζοντός τινος, ἀλλὰ μαθόντα, ὡς λέγομεν, ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ.
And it is not at all difficult for anyone to understand these things when someone explains them, but having learned, as we say, one must believe.
τόδε γε μὴν διανοηθῆναι χρὴ πάντʼ ἄνδρα Ἕλληνα, ὡς τόπον ἔχομεν τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς σχεδὸν ἄριστον·
Yet this indeed every Greek man must think: that we possess a place for the Greeks that is virtually the best in relation to virtue.
τὸ δʼ ἐπαινετὸν αὐτοῦ χρὴ λέγειν ὅτι μέσος ἂν εἴη χειμώνων τε καὶ τῆς θερινῆς φύσεως, ἡ δʼ ὑστεροῦσα ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ θερινὸν φύσις τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ὕστερον αὐτοῖς παραδέδωκεν τὸ τούτων τῶν θεῶν τοῦ κόσμου κατανόημα.
And what is praeworthy about it must be said to be that it is intermediate between winters and the summer nature; and our nature, which falls short in regard to the summer season compared to the place there, as we said, delivered to them later the understanding of these gods of the cosmos.
λάβωμεν δὲ ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν Ἕλληνες βαρβάρων παραλάβωσι, κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται·
But let us accept that whatever the Greeks receive from the barbarians, they finish this more beautifully in the end.
§988ΑΘ. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ταὐτὸν δεῖ διανοηθῆναι τοῦτο, ὡς χαλεπὸν μὲν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐξευρίσκειν, πολλὴ δʼ ἐλπὶς ἅμα καὶ καλὴ κάλλιον καὶ δικαιότερον ὄντως τῆς ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλθούσης φήμης τε ἅμα καὶ θεραπείας πάντων τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, παιδείαις τε καὶ ἐκ Δελφῶν μαντείαις χρωμένους καὶ πάσῃ τῇ κατὰ νόμους θεραπείᾳ.
ATHENIAN: And indeed, concerning what is now being said, one must think this very same thing: that while it is difficult to find out all such things beyond dispute, there is at the same time a great and beautiful hope that the Greeks will care for all these gods in a more beautiful and more just way than the rumor and worship that came from the barbarians, using education, oracles from Delphi, and all the worship according to the laws.
τόδε δὲ μηδείς ποτε φοβηθῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς οὐ χρὴ περὶ τὰ θεῖά ποτε πραγματεύεσθαι θνητοὺς ὄντας, πᾶν δὲ τούτῳ διανοηθῆναι τοὐναντίον, ὡς οὔτε ἄφρον ἐστίν ποτε τὸ θεῖον οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ που τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀλλʼ οἶδεν ὅτι διδάσκοντος αὐτοῦ συνακολουθήσει καὶ μαθήσεται τὰ διδασκόμενα.
And let no one of the Greeks ever fear this: that mortals ought not to busy themselves with divine things, but let them think the very opposite of this: that the divine is never foolish, nor is it ignorant of human nature, but knows that when it teaches, human nature will follow and learn what is taught.
ὅτι δὲ διδάσκει τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, μανθάνομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀριθμόν τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν, οἶδεν δήπου.
And that it teaches us this very thing, and that we learn both number and how to count, it surely knows.
πάντων γὰρ ἀφρονέστατον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦν· τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ ἂν ὄντως αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἀγνοοῖ, χαλεπαῖνον τῷ δυναμένῳ μανθάνειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ συγχαῖρον ἄνευ φθόνου διὰ θεὸν ἀγαθῷ γενομένῳ.
For it would be the most foolish of all things if it were ignorant of this; for as the saying goes, it would really be ignorant of itself, being angry with the one who is able to learn, and not rejoicing with him without envy for having become good through God.
λόγον δὴ καὶ πολὺν καὶ καλὸν ἔχει, τότε μέν, ὅτε περὶ θεῶν ἦν ἀνθρώποις διανοήματα πρῶτα, ὥς τε ἐγένοντο οἷοί τε ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ οἵας μετεχειρίζοντο πράξεις, μὴ κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς σώφροσιν λέγεσθαι μηδὲ φίλως, μηδʼ ὡς οἱ δεύτεροι, ἐν οἷς πρεσβύτατα μὲν τὰ πυρὸς ἐλέγετο καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ὕστερα δὲ τὰ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ φορὰ κρείττων καὶ τιμιωτέρα, ἣν σῶμα εἴληχεν φέρειν αὐτό τε ἑαυτὸ θερμότητι καὶ ψύξεσιν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλʼ οὐ ψυχὴ σῶμά τε καὶ ἑαυτήν·
It is therefore very reasonable and beautiful that, back then, when there were first thoughts among men about the gods—how they came to be and of what sort they were, and what actions they performed—these things were said not according to the mind of moderate men, nor in a friendly way; nor as the second group said, among whom the things of fire and water and other bodies were said to be the oldest, and the things of the wonderful soul later, and a superior and more honorable motion, which body was allotted to carry both itself and other things by heat and cold and all such things, and not soul carrying both body and itself.
νῦν δʼ ὅτε λέγομεν ψυχὴν μέν, ἄνπερ ἐν σώματι γένηται, θαῦμα οὐδὲν κινεῖν τε καὶ περιφέρειν τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτήν, οὐδʼ ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖ ψυχὴ κατὰ λόγον οὐδένα ὡς βάρος οὐδὲν περιφέρειν δυναμένη. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίαν, νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.
But now when we say that soul, if indeed it comes to be in a body, does not marvelously move and carry both this and itself, and soul does not disbelieve us by any argument as if it were unable to carry any weight; therefore, since we now claim that soul is the cause of the whole, and all good things are of this kind, while bad things on the other hand are of another such kind, it is no wonder that soul is the cause of all passage and motion, and that the passage and motion toward the good belongs to the best soul, and the one toward the opposite belongs to the opposite; it is necessary that the good things have conquered and do conquer those that are not of such a kind.