§9.862ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τις τὰς βλάβας πάσας ἀδικίας τιθείς, οὕτως οἴηται καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἐν αὐταῖσι ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι διπλᾶ, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια δή, τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια—βλάβαι γὰρ ἀκούσιοι τῶν πάντων οὔτʼ ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε μεγέθεσιν ἐλάττους εἰσὶ τῶν ἑκουσίων—σκοπεῖσθε δὲ εἴτε τι λέγω λέγων ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, εἴτε καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν.
ATH. Therefore, let no one, by positing all damages as injustice, think that unjust acts are also in this way doubled among them, namely some being indeed voluntary and others involuntary—for involuntary damages of all kinds are not less, either in numbers or in magnitude, than the voluntary ones—but consider whether I am saying something of value in saying what I am about to say, or indeed nothing at all.
οὐ γάρ φημι ἔγωγε, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, εἴ τίς τινά τι πημαίνει μὴ βουλόμενος ἀλλʼ ἄκων, ἀδικεῖν μέν, ἄκοντα μήν, καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ νομοθετήσω, τοῦτο ὡς ἀκούσιον ἀδίκημα νομοθετῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἀδικίαν τὸ παράπαν θήσω τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην, οὔτε ἂν μείζων οὔτε ἂν ἐλάττων τῳ γίγνηται·
For I, O Cleinias and Megillus, do not assert that if someone harms someone in some way without wishing to but involuntarily, he is committing injustice, albeit involuntarily, and that I shall legislate in this way, enacting this as an involuntary offense; rather, I shall not posit such damage as injustice at all, whether it becomes larger or smaller for someone.
πολλάκις δὲ ὠφελίαν οὐκ ὀρθὴν γενομένην τὸν τῆς ὠφελίας αἴτιον ἀδικεῖν φήσομεν, ἐὰν ἥ γʼ ἐμὴ νικᾷ.
On the other hand, if my opinion at least prevails, we shall often say that the cause of a benefit commits injustice when a benefit is done which is not right.
σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὔτʼ εἴ τίς τῳ δίδωσίν τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτʼ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἄδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἤθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτό ἐστιν τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην, καὶ τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγιὲς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τό τε ἀπολόμενον σῴζοντα καὶ τὸ πεσὸν ὑπό του πάλιν ἐξορθοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθέν, ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν τοῖς δρῶσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ἑκάστας τῶν βλάψεων, ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλίαν πειρατέον ἀεὶ καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.
For almost, O friends, neither if someone gives someone something of his belongings nor if, on the contrary, he takes it away, should such a thing be spoken of as simply just or unjust; but rather, if someone benefits or damages someone using a certain character and a just manner, this is what the legislator must observe, and he must look to these two indeed: to injustice and to damage. And that which is damaged must be made whole by the laws as far as possible, by preserving what is lost and setting upright again what has been cast down by someone, and making whole what has been killed or wounded; and by having each of the damages appeased with compensation between those who do and those who suffer them, one must always try to establish friendship out of disagreement by means of the laws.
ΚΛ. καλῶς ταῦτά γε.
KLE. These things indeed are good.
ΑΘ. τὰς τοίνυν ἀδίκους αὖ βλάβας καὶ κέρδη δέ, ἐάν τις ἀδικῶν τινα κερδαίνειν ποιῇ, τούτων ὁπόσα μὲν ἰατά, ὡς οὐσῶν ἐν ψυχῇ νόσων, ἰᾶσθαι·
ATH. As for unjust damages and gains, then, if someone by acting unjustly causes another to gain, of these, as many as are curable, since they are diseases in the soul, we must cure; and we must say that the cure of injustice for us should incline in this direction.
τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰάσεως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀδικίας τῇδε ῥέπειν χρὴ φάναι.
KLE.
ΚΛ. πῇ;
In what direction?
ΑΘ. ὅπως ὅτι τις ἂν ἀδικήσῃ μέγα ἢ σμικρόν, ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν διδάξει καὶ ἀναγκάσει τὸ παράπαν εἰς αὖθις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ μηδέποτε ἑκόντα τολμῆσαι ποιεῖν ἢ διαφερόντως ἧττον πολύ, πρὸς τῇ τῆς βλάβης ἐκτίσει.
ATH. In such a way that, whatever injustice someone commits, whether great or small, the law will teach and compel him altogether for the future either never voluntarily to dare to do such a thing, or to do it to a significantly lesser degree, in addition to the payment of the damage.
ταῦτα εἴτε ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις, ἢ μεθʼ ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἢ τιμῶν ἢ ἀτιμιῶν, καὶ χρημάτων ζημίας ἢ καὶ δώρων, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ποιήσει τις μισῆσαι μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν, στέρξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ μισεῖν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν, αὐτό ἐστιν τοῦτο ἔργον τῶν καλλίστων νόμων.
Whether by deeds or words, or by means of pleasures or pains, or honors or dishonors, and fines of money or indeed gifts, or altogether by whatever way someone can make them hate injustice and love—or at least not hate—the nature of the just, this very thing is the work of the most beautiful laws.
ὃν δʼ ἂν ἀνιάτως εἰς ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἴσθηται νομοθέτης, δίκην τούτοισι καὶ νόμον θήσει τίνα;
But for the one whom the legislator perceives to be incurably disposed in these matters, what penalty and law shall he establish for them?
§9.863ΑΘ. γιγνώσκων που τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσιν ὡς οὔτε αὐτοῖς ἔτι ζῆν ἄμεινον, τούς τε ἄλλους ἂν διπλῇ ὠφελοῖεν ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τοῦ βίου, παράδειγμα μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι, ποιοῦντες δὲ ἀνδρῶν κακῶν ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν, οὕτω δὴ τῶν τοιούτων πέρι νομοθέτῃ κολαστὴν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων θάνατον ἀνάγκη νέμειν, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
ATH. Knowing, surely, for all such people that it is no longer better even for themselves to live, and that by departing from life they would benefit others in a twofold way—by becoming an example of not committing injustice to others, and by making the city empty of bad men—thus concerning such people, it is necessary for the legislator to assign death as the chastiser of their errors, and in no other way.
ΚΛ. ἔοικε μέν πως λέγεσθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ μάλα μετρίως, ἥδιον δʼ ἂν ἔτι σαφέστερον ἀκούσαιμεν ταῦτα ῥηθέντα, τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεποίκιλται.
KLE. What you say seems somehow to be spoken indeed very reasonably, but we would gladly hear these things stated still more clearly—the difference between injustice and damage, and how the voluntary and the involuntary are distinguished in these cases.
ΑΘ. πειρατέον τοίνυν ὡς κελεύετε δρᾶν, καὶ λέγειν.
ATH. I must try, then, to do and to speak as you command.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοσόνδε γε περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λέγετε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀκούετε, ὡς ἓν μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὢν ὁ θυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἀλογίστῳ βίᾳ πολλὰ ἀνατρέπει.
For it is clear that you both say to one another and hear about the soul at least this much: that one thing in its nature—whether it is some passion or some part—namely anger, being an inborn possession prone to strife and hard to fight, overturns many things with irrational force.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
KLE. How indeed not?
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμεν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν, πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ.
ATH. And furthermore, we do not call pleasure the same thing as anger, but we say that, ruling from an opposite power, it does everything that its will wishes by means of persuasion along with violent deceit.
ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.
KLE. Quite so.
ΑΘ. τρίτον μὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο·
ATH. Third indeed, if one were to speak of ignorance as a cause of errors, one would not speak falsely.
διχῇ μὴν διελόμενος αὐτὸ ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν βελτίων εἴη, τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν αὐτοῦ κούφων ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον ἡγούμενος, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν, μετὰ μὲν ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης ἑπομένης μεγάλων καὶ ἀμούσων ἁμαρτημάτων τιθεὶς αἴτια τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀσθενείας δὲ ἑπομένης, παίδειά τε ἁμαρτήματα καὶ πρεσβυτέρων γιγνόμενα θήσει μὲν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν νόμους τάξει, πρᾳοτάτους γε μὴν πάντων καὶ συγγνώμης πλείστης ἐχομένους.
Yet the legislator would be better off by dividing it in two: considering the simple kind of it as a cause of light errors, but the double kind—when someone is ignorant, being held not only by ignorance but also by an opinion of wisdom, as if knowing perfectly about things which he in no way knows—when accompanied by strength and power, he will posit such things as the causes of great and rough errors, but when accompanied by weakness, he will set them down as childish errors and those occurring to elders, and will establish laws as for those who err, but indeed the mildest of all and holding the most forgiveness.
ΚΛ. εἰκότα λέγεις.
KLE. You speak reasonably.
ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ θυμοῦ λέγομεν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὡς ὁ μὲν κρείττων ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστίν· καὶ ἔχει ταύτῃ.
ATH. Now indeed, concerning pleasure and anger, almost all of us say that the one is stronger than us, and the other is weaker; and it is so.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
KLE. By all means indeed.
ΑΘ. ἀγνοίας δέ γε ὡς ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κρείττων, ὁ δὲ ἥττων, οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν πώποτε.
ATH. But of ignorance indeed, that the one is stronger than us, and the other is weaker, we have never heard at any time.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
KLE. Most true.
ΑΘ. πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταῦτά φαμεν εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον ἕκαστον εἰς τἀναντία πολλάκις ἅμα.
ATH. And indeed we say that all these things urge each person on, pulling him towards his own will, often into opposites at the same time.
ΚΛ. πλειστάκις μὲν οὖν.
KLE. Very often indeed.