§9.860ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάθος ὅπερ ἂν δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον γίγνεσθαι καλὸν ὁμολογούμενον, οὐκ ἂν διαφωνοῦντα παρέχοι τὸν λόγον;
ATH. Therefore, if a suffering (passive experience) also, which shares in the just, is agreed to become beautiful to that extent, would this argument not present itself as consistent?
ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ.
KLE. True.
ΑΘ. ἐὰν δέ γε δίκαιον μὲν ὁμολογῶμεν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἶναι πάθος, διαφωνήσει τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλόν, λεχθέντων τῶν δικαίων αἰσχίστων εἶναι.
ATH. But if we agree that a suffering is indeed just, but is ugly, the just and the beautiful will disagree, when just things are said to be most ugly.
ΚΛ. πῶς τοῦτο εἴρηκας;
KLE. How have you said this?
ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ἐννοεῖν·
ATH. It is not at all difficult to understand.
οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν τεθέντες ἡμῖν νόμοι πάντων ἐναντιώτατα παραγγέλλειν δόξειαν ἂν τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις.
For the laws we established a little while ago would seem to command things most opposite to what is now being said.
ΚΛ. ποίοις;
KLE. Which ones?
ΑΘ. τὸν ἱερόσυλόν που ἐτίθεμεν δικαίως ἂν ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τὸν τῶν εὖ κειμένων νόμων πολέμιον, καὶ μέλλοντες δὴ νόμιμα τοιαῦτα τιθέναι πάμπολλα ἐπέσχομεν, ἰδόντες ὡς ταῦτα ἐστὶν μὲν ἄπειρα παθήματα πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεσιν, δικαιότατα δὲ πάντων παθημάτων καὶ συμπάντων αἴσχιστα.
ATH. We established, surely, that the temple-robber would justly die, as well as the enemy of the well-established laws, and we held back though we were about to establish very many such regulations, seeing that these are indeed infinite sufferings in number and magnitude, but the most just of all sufferings and at the same time the most ugly of all.
μῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἡμῖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ταὐτὰ σύμπαντα, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐναντιώτατα φανεῖται;
Will not, then, the just and the beautiful appear to us sometimes as entirely the same, and sometimes as most opposite?
ΚΛ. κινδυνεύει.
KLE. It is likely.
ΑΘ. τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς οὕτω περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀσυμφώνως τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια διερριμμένα προσαγορεύεται.
ATH. To the many, then, the beautiful and the just are spoken of in this discordant and scattered way concerning such things.
ΚΛ. φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ ξένε.
KLE. It appears so, at least, O Stranger.
ΑΘ. τὸ τοίνυν ἡμέτερον, ὦ Κλεινία, πάλιν ἴδωμεν πῶς αὖ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔχει τῆς συμφωνίας.
ATH. Let us look again, then, O Cleinias, at our own position, to see how it stands in turn with respect to agreement about these very things.
ΚΛ. ποίας δὴ πρὸς ποίαν;
KLE. What sort of agreement indeed with what?
ΑΘ. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις οἶμαι διαρρήδην ἐμὲ εἰρηκέναι πως, εἰ δʼ οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὡς λέγοντα τίθετε—
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ATH. In the previous discourses I believe I said in some way explicitly—but if not before, at least assume me to be saying so now— KLE. Saying what?
ΑΘ. ὡς οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί· τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀνάγκη που τούτῳ συνέπεσθαι τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον.
ATH. That all bad men are in all respects bad involuntarily; and this being so, it is necessary, I suppose, that the following argument should accompany this.
ΚΛ. τίνα λέγεις;
KLE. What argument do you mean?
ΑΘ. ὡς ὁ μὲν ἄδικός που κακός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων τοιοῦτος.
ATH. That the unjust man is surely bad, and the bad man is involuntarily so.
ἀκουσίως δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαί ποτε λόγον·
But for an involuntary thing to be done voluntarily never makes sense.
ἄκων οὖν ἐκείνῳ φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ἀδικεῖν ὁ ἀδικῶν τῷ τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀκούσιον τιθεμένῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁμολογητέον ἐμοί· σύμφημι γὰρ ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας—εἰ καί τις φιλονικίας ἢ φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα ἄκοντας μὲν ἀδίκους εἶναί φησιν, ἀδικεῖν μὴν ἑκόντας πολλούς, ὅ γʼ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐκεῖνος ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὗτος—τίνα οὖν αὖ τρόπον ἔγωγε συμφωνοίην ἂν τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ λόγοις;
Therefore, the one who commits injustice would appear to commit injustice involuntarily to him who posits injustice as involuntary, and indeed now I must agree to this; for I agree that all commit injustice involuntarily—even if someone, out of love of contention or love of honor, says that while men are indeed unjust involuntarily, many commit injustice voluntarily, my argument is indeed the former but not the latter—in what way indeed, in turn, could I agree with my own arguments?
εἴ με, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἐρωτῷτε· εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν, ὦ ξένε, τί συμβουλεύεις ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας τῇ τῶν Μαγνήτων πόλει;
If you, O Cleinias and Megillus, were to ask me: "If indeed these things are so, O Stranger, what do you advise us concerning legislation for the city of the Magnates?
πότερον νομοθετεῖν ἢ μή; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φήσω.
Whether to legislate or not?" "How indeed should we not?" I shall say.
§9.861ΑΘ.
διοριεῖς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀκούσιά τε καὶ ἑκούσια ἀδικήματα, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἑκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων τε καὶ ἀδικημάτων μείζους τὰς ζημίας θήσομεν, τῶν δʼ ἐλάττους;
ATH. "Will you then distinguish for them involuntary and voluntary offenses, and shall we place larger penalties for voluntary errors and offenses, and smaller for the others?
ἢ πάντων ἐξ ἴσης, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων ἀδικημάτων τὸ παράπαν ἑκουσίων; ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ ξένε·
Or shall we treat all equally, on the ground that there are no voluntary offenses at all?" KLE.
καὶ τούτοις δὴ τί χρησόμεθα τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις;
You speak rightly indeed, O Stranger; and what shall we do with these things now being said?
ΑΘ. καλῶς ἤρου.
ATH. You ask well.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖς τόδε χρησώμεθα.
First, then, let us use them in this way.
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
KLE. In what way?
ΑΘ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὡς ἔμπροσθεν νυνδὴ καλῶς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι περὶ τὰ δίκαια εἴη παμπόλλη τις ἡμῶν ταραχή τε καὶ ἀσυμφωνία.
ATH. Let us remember how we were saying well just now, in what went before, that concerning just things there is a very great confusion and discord among us.
τοῦτο δὲ λαβόντες πάλιν ἐρωτῶμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἆρʼ οὖν περὶ τὴν τούτων ἀπορίαν οὔτʼ ἐξευπορήσαντες οὔτε διορισάμενοι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, ἃ δὴ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν πάντων τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ὡς δύο εἴδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταύτῃ καὶ νομοθετεῖται· ὁ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος, ὥσπερ παρὰ θεοῦ λεχθείς, τοσοῦτον μόνον εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάξεται, δοὺς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηκεν, κατανομοθετήσει τινὰ τρόπον; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη πως ταῦτα ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νομοθετεῖν δηλῶσαι δύο τε ὄντα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἄλλην, ἵνα, ὅταν ἑκατέρῳ τις τὴν δίκην ἐπιτιθῇ, πᾶς ἐπακολουθῇ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δυνατὸς ᾖ τό τε πρεπόντως τεθὲν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ κρῖναι καὶ τὸ μή.
Taking this, let us ask ourselves again: "Shall we then, having neither found a way out concerning the difficulty of these things, nor having distinguished what indeed these are as differing from one another—which indeed in all cities by all legislators who have ever been are legislated on this very basis, as there being two kinds of offenses, the voluntary and the involuntary—shall our argument just now spoken, as if spoken by a god, depart having said only this much, and having given no account of how it has spoken rightly, impose laws in some way?" It is not possible, but it is necessary somehow to show, before legislating, that these are two and that their difference is other, so that, whenever someone imposes a penalty on either, everyone may follow what is said and be able to judge that which is fittingly established in some way, and that which is not.
ΚΛ. καλῶς ἡμῖν φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ ξένε·
KLE.
δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἡμᾶς χρεών, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ὡς πάντα ἀκούσια τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἢ τοῦτο ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηται πρῶτον διορίσαντας δηλῶσαι.
You seem to us to speak well, O Stranger; for one of two things is necessary for us: either not to say that all offenses are involuntary, or having first distinguished this as rightly spoken, to show it.
ΑΘ. τούτοιν τοίνυν τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοὶ πάντως που γίγνεσθαι, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν, οὕτως οἰόμενον ἔχειν τἀληθές—οὐ γὰρ ἂν νόμιμον οὐδʼ ὅσιον ἂν εἴη—κατὰ τίνα δὲ τρόπον ἐστὸν δύο, εἰ μὴ τῷ τε ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τῷ ἑκουσίῳ διαφέρετον ἑκάτερον;
ATH. Of these two, then, the one is indeed altogether unacceptable for me to do—namely, not to say it, believing as I do that the truth is so—for it would be neither lawful nor holy—but in what way are they two, if each does not differ by the involuntary and the voluntary?
ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δή ποτε πειρατέον ἁμῶς γέ πως δηλοῦν.
Rather, we must try to make it clear in some other way somehow.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως πως ἡμᾶς διανοηθῆναι.
KLE. By all means, indeed, O Stranger, it is not possible for us to think of this in any other way.
ΑΘ. ταῦτα ἔσται.
ATH. This shall be done.
φέρε δή, βλάβαι μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλήλων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις τε καὶ ὁμιλίαις πολλαὶ γίγνονται, καὶ τό γε ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον ἐν αὐταῖς ἄφθονόν ἐστι.
Come then, damages, as it seems, of the citizens to one another in their associations and intercourse are many, and the voluntary and the involuntary are abundant in them.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
KLE. How indeed could they not be?