Humanitext Reader

Plato · Laws §9.858-9.859

Laws as Loving Parents and the Relation of Justice and Beauty

Passage 124 of 186 · Greek

Summary

The Athenian points out their good fortune in being able to examine the best laws at leisure, arguing that laws should speak like loving and rational parents rather than a tyrant. He then initiates a discussion on the relation between the beautiful and the just.

§9.858ΑΘ. τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὺς ἐν σκέψει γενομένους περὶ πάσης πολιτείας πειρᾶσθαι κατιδεῖν τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον, τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτο.
ATH. That there is no necessity to legislate, but that we ourselves, having entered into an investigation concerning the whole constitution, should try to see both the best and the most necessary, in what way it would come about if it were to come about.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα, τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον περὶ νόμων· αἱρώμεθα οὖν πότερον δοκεῖ.
And indeed, as it seems, it is possible for us now, if we wish, to examine the best concerning laws, or if we wish, the most necessary; let us choose, therefore, whichever seems good.
ΚΛ. γελοίαν, ὦ ξένε, προτιθέμεθα τὴν αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κατεχομένοις νομοθέταις ὅμοιοι γιγνοίμεθʼ ἂν ὑπὸ μεγάλης τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἤδη νομοθετεῖν, ὡς οὐκέτʼ ἐξὸν εἰς αὔριον·
KLE. We are proposing a ridiculous choice, O Stranger, and we would become altogether like legislators constrained by some great necessity to legislate immediately, as if it were no longer permitted on the morrow.
ἡμῖν δʼ—εἰπεῖν σὺν θεῷ—ἔξεστι, καθάπερ ἢ λιθολόγοις ἢ καί τινος ἑτέρας ἀρχομένοις συστάσεως, παραφορήσασθαι χύδην ἐξ ὧν ἐκλεξόμεθα τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ μελλούσῃ γενήσεσθαι συστάσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἐκλέξασθαι.
But to us—to speak with God’s help—it is permitted, just like stone-masons or those beginning some other construction, to gather together in abundance materials from which we shall select what is suitable for the construction that is to be, and indeed to select them at our leisure.
τιθῶμεν οὖν ἡμᾶς νῦν εἶναι μὴ τοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἰκοδομοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἔτι τὰ μὲν παρατιθεμένους, τὰ δὲ συνιστάντας· ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ μὲν ἤδη τῶν νόμων λέγειν ὡς τιθέμενα, τὰ δʼ ὡς παρατιθέμενα.
Let us assume, then, that we are not those who build out of necessity, but those who, at leisure, are still setting some things aside and assembling others; so that it is correct to speak of some of the laws as already being established, and others as being set aside.
ΑΘ. γένοιτο γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἡ σύνοψις τῶν νόμων.
ATH. In this way, at least, O Cleinias, our overview of the laws would be more natural.
ἴδωμεν γὰρ οὖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ νομοθετῶν.
Let us look, then, by the gods, at the following point concerning legislators.
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
KLE. What sort of point indeed?
ΑΘ. γράμματα μέν που καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰσὶ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι.
ATH. Written words, surely, and discourses in writing, exist for many other people in cities, and the legislator's works are also written words and discourses.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
KLE. How indeed could they not be?
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων συγγράμμασιν, ποιητῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἄνευ μέτρων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων τὴν αὑτῶν εἰς μνήμην συμβουλὴν περὶ βίου κατέθεντο συγγράψαντες, προσέχωμεν τὸν νοῦν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν νομοθετῶν μὴ προσέχωμεν;
ATH. Should we then pay attention to the writings of others, of poets and of all those who, with or without meter, have set down in writing their own counsel concerning life for remembrance, but not pay attention to those of legislators?
ἢ πάντων μάλιστα;
Or should we pay attention to them most of all?
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
KLE. By far the most.
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα οὐ χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην μόνον τῶν γραφόντων περὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων συμβουλεύειν, διδάσκοντα οἷά τέ ἐστι καὶ ὡς ἐπιτηδευτέον αὐτὰ τοῖς μέλλουσιν εὐδαίμοσιν ἔσεσθαι;
ATH. But surely the legislator alone among those who write ought to advise concerning the beautiful, the good, and the just, teaching what they are and how those who are to be happy must practice them?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οὔ;
KLE. How indeed could he not?
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ αἰσχρὸν δὴ μᾶλλον Ὁμήρῳ τε καὶ Τυρταίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς περὶ βίου τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κακῶς θέσθαι γράψαντας, Λυκούργῳ δὲ ἧττον καὶ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅσοι δὴ νομοθέται γενόμενοι γράμματα ἔγραψαν;
ATH. But is it indeed more shameful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and the other poets to have laid down bad principles in writing concerning life and practices, but less so for Lycurgus and Solon and whoever else, having become legislators, wrote written laws?
§9.859ΑΘ. ἢ τό γε ὀρθόν, πάντων δεῖ γραμμάτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι διαπτυττόμενα μακρῷ κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ κατʼ ἐκεῖνα συνεπόμενα, ἢ διαφωνοῦντα αὐτοῖς εἶναι καταγέλαστα;
ATH. Or rather, to be correct, of all the written words in the cities, those written about the laws must appear, when unfolded, to be by far the most beautiful and the best, while those of others either follow in accordance with them, or, if in disagreement with them, are ridiculous?
οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς σχήμασι φιλούντων τε καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων φαίνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα, ἢ κατὰ τύραννον καὶ δεσπότην τάξαντα καὶ ἀπειλήσαντα γράψαντα ἐν τοίχοις ἀπηλλάχθαι;
Should we think that the writing of laws for cities must be thus, that the written laws appear in the fashion of a father and mother who love and possess intellect, rather than like a tyrant and master who, having commanded and threatened, and having written on walls, departs?
σκοπῶμεν οὖν δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμεῖς πότερα ταύτῃ πειρώμεθα λέγειν διανοηθέντες περὶ νόμων, εἴτʼ οὖν δυνάμεθα εἴτε μή, ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι· καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἰόντες, ἂν ἄρα τι καὶ δέῃ πάσχειν, πάσχωμεν.
Let us then consider now too, whether we are trying to speak, having this in mind concerning laws, whether indeed we are able or not, but at least showing our zeal; and going along this way, if indeed we must suffer anything, let us suffer it.
ἀγαθὸν δʼ εἴη τε, καὶ ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ταύτῃ.
May it be good, and if God wills, it would turn out this way.
ΚΛ. καλῶς εἴρηκας, ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.
KLE. Well said, and let us do as you say.
ΑΘ. διασκεπτέον ἄρα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν, ἀκριβῶς τὸν περὶ τῶν τε ἱεροσυλούντων καὶ κλοπῆς πάσης πέρι καὶ ἀδικημάτων συμπάντων, καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον εἰ μεταξὺ νομοθετοῦντες τὰ μὲν ἔθεμεν, τῶν δʼ ἔτι διασκοποῦμεν πέρι· νομοθέται γὰρ γιγνόμεθα ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐσμέν πω, τάχα δὲ ἴσως ἂν γενοίμεθα.
ATH. First, then, as we attempted, we must examine precisely the law concerning temple-robbers, and concerning all theft, and concerning all offenses, and we must not be vexed if, in the midst of legislating, we have established some things while we are still examining others; for we are becoming legislators, but we are not yet so, though perhaps we might soon become so.
εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ περὶ ὧν εἴρηκα ὡς εἴρηκα σκοπεῖσθαι, σκοπώμεθα.
If indeed it seems good to examine the things I have spoken of in the way I have spoken, let us examine them.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
KLE. By all means indeed.
ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων συμπάντων πειρώμεθα κατιδεῖν τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν νῦν καὶ ὅπῃ διαφερόμεθα ἡμεῖς τε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, οἳ δὴ φαῖμεν ἂν προθυμεῖσθαί γε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, διαφέρειν τῶν πλείστων, οἱ πολλοί τε αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς αὖ.
ATH. Concerning all beautiful and just things, let us try to see this sort of point: in what way indeed we agree now and in what way we differ, both we ourselves with ourselves—who would claim to be eager, if nothing else, to differ from most people—and the many again in turn with themselves.
ΚΛ. τὰς ποίας δὲ δὴ διαφορὰς ἡμῶν ἐννοηθεὶς λέγεις;
KLE. What sort of differences of ours do you have in mind when you say this?
ΑΘ. ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράζειν.
ATH. I will try to explain.
περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅλως καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ πράξεων πάντες πως συνομολογοῦμεν πάντα εἶναι ταῦτα καλά, ὥστε οὐδʼ εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες αἰσχροὶ τὰ σώματα, κατʼ αὐτό γε τὸ δικαιότατον ἦθος ταύτῃ παγκάλους εἶναι, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἂν λέγων οὕτω πλημμελῶς δόξειε λέγειν.
Concerning justice as a whole, and just men and things and actions, we all somehow agree that all these are beautiful; so that even if someone were to assert that just men, even if they happen to be ugly in their bodies, are altogether beautiful in respect to their very just character in this regard, almost no one, speaking thus, would seem to speak incorrectly.
ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;
KLE. Is that not correct?
ΑΘ. ἴσως·
ATH.
ἴδωμεν δὲ ὡς, εἰ πάντʼ ἐστὶν καλὰ ὅσα δικαιοσύνης ἔχεται, τῶν πάντων τοι καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἡμῖν ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἴσα.
Perhaps; but let us see how, if all things that hold to justice are beautiful, are all our sufferings too, then, almost equal to the actions?
ΚΛ. τί οὖν δή;
KLE. What do you mean indeed?
ΑΘ. ποίημα μέν, ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ δίκαιον, σχεδὸν ὅσονπερ ἂν τοῦ δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχον ἐστί.
ATH. An action, which may be just, almost in as much as it shares in the just, to that extent also participates in the beautiful.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
KLE. How indeed could it not?

Notes

  1. 858aτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι νομοθετεῖν — An accusative infinitive clause with an article, explaining the specific content of the 'fortune of our present situation' mentioned in the previous turn, functioning as an answer to Cleinias' question.
  2. 858dποιητῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἄνευ μέτρων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων... — The genitive noun `ποιητῶν` and the relative clause introduced by `ὅσοι` are placed in apposition, specifying and restricting the preceding dative phrase `τῶν ἄλλων συγγράμμασιν` (writings of others).
  3. 859cκαὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον εἰ... — The impersonal verbal adjective `δυσχεραντέον` is followed by an `εἰ` clause. This `εἰ` clause functions not as a hypothetical condition, but as a factual noun clause (similar to a `ὅτι` clause) explaining the ground of vexation.
  4. 859eτῶν πάντων τοι καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἡμῖν ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἴσα — A contrast is drawn between `παθήματα` (sufferings/passive experiences) and `ποιήμασιν` (deeds/active creations). This provides the philosophical basis for discussing the relationship between undergoing punishment and performing an action in a legal context.

Cite this passage

Plato, Laws §9.858-9.859. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg034.humanitext-grc2:9.858-9.859

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