§3.688ΑΘ. ναί, καὶ δὴ καὶ πολιτικόν γε ἄνδρα νομοθέτην ὡς ἀεὶ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντα τιθέναι τὰς τάξεις τῶν νόμων, αὐτός τε ἐμνήσθην καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπαναμιμνῄσκω, κατʼ ἀρχὰς εἰ μεμνήμεθα τὰ λεχθέντα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν σφῷν ἦν παρακέλευμα ὡς χρεὼν εἴη τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην πάντα πολέμου χάριν τὰ νόμιμα τιθέναι, τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν πρὸς μίαν ἀρετὴν οὐσῶν τεττάρων κελεύοι τίθεσθαι τοὺς νόμους, δέοι δὲ δὴ πρὸς πᾶσαν μὲν βλέπειν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δʼ εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετʼ ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης.
ATH. "Yes, and indeed that a political man and legislator must always set the arrangements of laws looking to this, I myself mentioned and remind you, if we remember what was said at the beginning—namely, that your recommendation was that the good legislator should establish all legal institutions for the sake of war, whereas my side argued that this was commanding the laws to be set looking to only one virtue out of four, while it was necessary to look to all, and especially and foremost to the first virtue, which is the leader of the whole, and this would be wisdom and intellect and opinion accompanied by love and desire following upon these.
ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτόν, καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω πάλιν ἅπερ τότε, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων, εἰ δʼ, ὡς σπουδάζων, ὅτι δή φημι εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερὸν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένον, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσίν οἱ γίγνεσθαι.
The discourse has indeed come back to the same point, and I, the speaker, say again now the very things as then—either, if you wish, as playing, or, if you wish, as being serious—namely, that I say that for one who does not possess intellect, to use prayer is hazardous, and rather the opposite of his wishes happens to him.
σπουδάζοντα δʼ εἴ με τιθέναι βούλεσθε, τίθετε· πάνυ γὰρ οὖν προσδοκῶ νῦν ὑμᾶς εὑρήσειν, τῷ λόγῳ ἑπομένους ὃν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθε προυθέμεθα, τῆς τῶν βασιλέων τε φθορᾶς καὶ ὅλου τοῦ διανοήματος οὐ δειλίαν οὖσαν τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐδʼ ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἠπίσταντο ἄρχοντές τε καὶ οὓς προσῆκεν ἄρχεσθαι, τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα, καὶ μάλιστα τῇ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἀμαθίᾳ.
If you wish to take me as being serious, do so; for I certainly expect you to find now, following the discourse which we proposed a little earlier, that the cause of the ruin of the kings and of the whole design was not cowardice, nor that the rulers and those who ought to be ruled did not know matters of war, but that they were ruined by all the rest of vice, and especially by ignorance concerning the greatest of human affairs.
ταῦτʼ οὖν ὡς οὕτω γέγονε περὶ τὰ τότε, καὶ νῦν, εἴ που, γίγνεται, καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὐκ ἄλλως συμβήσεται, ἐὰν βούλησθε, πειράσομαι ἰὼν κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ἀνευρίσκειν τε καὶ ὑμῖν δηλοῦν κατὰ δύναμιν ὡς οὖσιν φίλοις. ΚΛ. λόγῳ μὲν τοίνυν σε, ὦ ξένε, ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαχθέστερον, ἔργῳ δὲ σφόδρα ἐπαινεσόμεθα· προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπακολουθήσομεν, ἐν οἷς ὅ γε ἐλεύθερος ἐπαινῶν καὶ μὴ μάλιστʼ ἐστὶν καταφανής.
That these things happened thus concerning those times, and happen now, if anywhere, and will not fall out otherwise in the future, I will try, if you wish, to go along with the subsequent discourse to discover and reveal to you to the best of my power as to friends." CL. "To praise you in word, O stranger, is somewhat burdensome, but we will praise you greatly in deed; for we will eagerly follow what is said, in which a free man shows himself most clearly as praising or not." ME.
ΜΕ. ἄριστʼ, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις.
"Excellent, Clinias, let us do as you say." CL.
ΚΛ. ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
"It shall be so, if God wills.
λέγε μόνον. ΑΘ. φαμὲν δή νυν, καθʼ ὁδὸν ἰόντες τὴν λοιπὴν τοῦ λόγου, τὴν μεγίστην ἀμαθίαν τότε ἐκείνην τὴν δύναμιν ἀπολέσαι καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, ὥστε τόν γε νομοθέτην, εἰ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, πειρατέον ταῖς πόλεσιν φρόνησιν μὲν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν, τὴν δʼ ἄνοιαν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξαιρεῖν.
Only speak." ATH. "We say now, then, going along the remaining path of the discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time and is naturally fit to do this very same thing now; so that the legislator, if this is so, must try to implant as much wisdom as possible in the cities, and to remove folly as much as possible." CL.
ΚΛ. δῆλον.
"Clear." ATH.
§3.689ΑΘ. τίς οὖν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;
"What, then, would be rightly called the greatest ignorance?
σκοπεῖτε εἰ συνδόξει καὶ σφῷν λεγόμενον· ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ τὴν τοιάνδε τίθεμαι.
Consider if it will also seem agreeable to both of you when spoken; for I, indeed, propose it as follows." CL.
ΚΛ. ποίαν;
"What kind of thing?" ATH.
ΑΘ. τὴν ὅταν τῴ τι δόξαν καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴ φιλῇ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μισῇ, τὸ δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλῇ τε καὶ ἀσπάζηται.
"Namely, when to someone something seems to be beautiful or good, yet he does not love this but hates it, while what seems to be wicked and unjust he loves and embraces.
ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν.
This discord of pain and pleasure with opinion in accordance with reason, I say is the ultimate and greatest ignorance, because it belongs to the majority of the soul; for that part of it which feels pain and pleasure is what the populace and majority of a city is.
ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω, πόλεώς τε, ὅταν ἄρχουσιν καὶ νόμοις μὴ πείθηται τὸ πλῆθος, ταὐτόν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας ἔγωγʼ ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν, εἰ ἄρα μου καταμανθάνετε, ὦ ξένοι, ὃ λέγω.
When, therefore, the soul opposes knowledges or opinions or reason, which are by nature rulers, this I call folly; just as in a city, when the majority does not obey the rulers and the laws, the same is true; and indeed in a single man, whenever beautiful reasons being in the soul do nothing more but indeed all the opposite to these, all these ignorances I would set as the most discordant both of a city and of each one of the citizens, but not those of the artisans, if indeed you understand what I say, O strangers." CL.
ΚΛ. μανθάνομέν τε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.
"We understand, O friend, and agree with what you say." ATH.
ΑΘ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω κείσθω δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτʼ ἀμαθαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενον καὶ ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον, ἂν καὶ πάνυ λογιστικοί τε ὦσι καὶ πάντα τὰ κομψὰ καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα διαπεπονημένοι ἅπαντα, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων ὡς σοφούς τε προσρητέον, ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δοτέον ὡς ἔμφροσιν.
"Let this, then, be laid down as agreed and spoken: that to those of the citizens who are ignorant in these things, nothing pertaining to rule is to be entrusted, and they must be reproached as ignorant, even if they are very calculating and have thoroughly labored through all the clever things and whatever is naturally fit for swiftness of the soul; but those who possess the opposite of these must be addressed as wise, even if, as the saying goes, they know neither letters nor how to swim, and the offices must be given to them as to the wise.
πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτʼ ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος;
For how, O friends, without concord could there be even the smallest form of wisdom?
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιότατʼ ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, ἧς ὁ μὲν κατὰ λόγον ζῶν μέτοχος, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος οἰκοφθόρος καὶ περὶ πόλιν οὐδαμῇ σωτὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀμαθαίνων εἰς ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε φανεῖται.
There is none; but the most beautiful and greatest of concords would most justly be called the greatest wisdom, of which he who lives according to reason is a partaker, whereas he who falls short will always appear to be a destroyer of the household and in no way a savior concerning the city, but on the contrary, ignorant in these things.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἄρτι, λελεγμένα τεθήτω ταύτῃ.
These things, then, as we said just now, let them be laid down as spoken in this way." CL.
ΚΛ. κείσθω γὰρ οὖν.
"Let them indeed be so laid down." ATH.
ΑΘ. ἄρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀρχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναί που.
"And surely it is necessary that there be rulers and ruled in the cities, is it not?" CL.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
"Of course."