§2.668ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ πᾶσαν μίμησιν φαῖμεν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἥκιστα ἡδονῇ προσήκειν κρίνεσθαι καὶ δόξῃ μὴ ἀληθεῖ—καὶ δὴ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰσότητα· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δοκεῖ ἢ μή τις χαίρει τῳ, τό γε ἴσον ἴσον οὐδὲ τὸ σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη σύμμετρον ὅλως—ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ πάντων μάλιστα, ἥκιστα δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ;
ATH. Then, from what has just been said, should we not say that all imitation is least of all suited to be judged by pleasure and untrue opinion—and indeed, the same applies to all equality; for it is not because it seems so to someone, or because someone is pleased with something, that the equal would be equal or the symmetrical symmetrical at all—but rather by truth, most of all, and least of all by any other thing?
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
CL. Quite so, indeed.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν;
ATH. Therefore, do we not say that all music is both likeness-making and imitative?
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
CL. Of course.
ΑΘ. ἥκιστʼ ἄρα ὅταν τις μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ φῇ κρίνεσθαι, τοῦτον ἀποδεκτέον τὸν λόγον, καὶ ζητητέον ἥκιστα ταύτην ὡς σπουδαίαν, εἴ τις ἄρα που καὶ γίγνοιτο, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι.
ATH. Least of all, then, when someone says that music is judged by pleasure, should this statement be accepted, and least of all should we seek this music as serious, if indeed such a thing should ever exist, but rather that other music which possesses likeness to the imitation of the beautiful.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
CL. Most true.
ΑΘ. καὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῖς τὴν καλλίστην ᾠδήν τε ζητοῦσι καὶ μοῦσαν ζητητέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐχ ἥτις ἡδεῖα ἀλλʼ ἥτις ὀρθή· μιμήσεως γὰρ ἦν, ὥς φαμεν, ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μιμηθὲν ὅσον τε καὶ οἷον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο.
ATH. And for those who seek the most beautiful song and music, it seems they must seek not what is pleasant, but what is correct; for correctness of imitation consisted, as we say, in the imitated object being completed as to both its size and quality.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
CL. To be sure.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτήν ἐστιν ποιήματα μίμησίς τε καὶ ἀπεικασία· καὶ τοῦτό γε μῶν οὐκ ἂν σύμπαντες ὁμολογοῖεν ποιηταί τε καὶ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ὑποκριταί;
ATH. And indeed, everyone would agree on this concerning music: that all works concerning it are imitation and representation; and would not all poets, audience, and performers agree on this as well?
ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.
CL. Very much so.
ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστόν γε, ὡς ἔοικε, γιγνώσκειν τῶν ποιημάτων ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι· μὴ γὰρ γιγνώσκων τὴν οὐσίαν, τί ποτε βούλεται καὶ ὅτου ποτʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως, σχολῇ τήν γε ὀρθότητα τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ καὶ ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ διαγνώσεται.
ATH. It is necessary, then, it seems, for anyone who is not going to make a mistake in a work of art to know what it is in each case; for if he does not know its essence—what it intends to be and of what it is really an image—he will hardly discern the correctness or even the error of its intention.
ΚΛ. σχολῇ· πῶς δʼ οὔ;
CL. Scarcely; how could he?
ΑΘ. ὁ δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς μὴ γιγνώσκων ἆρʼ ἄν ποτε τό γε εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς δυνατὸς εἴη διαγνῶναι;
ATH. But would one who does not know what is correct ever be able to discern what is well or poorly done?
λέγω δὲ οὐ πάνυ σαφῶς, ἀλλʼ ὧδε σαφέστερον ἴσως ἂν λεχθείη.
I am not speaking very clearly, but perhaps it might be stated more clearly in this way.
ΚΛ. πῶς;
CL. How?
ΑΘ. εἰσὶν δήπου κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἡμῖν ἀπεικασίαι μυρίαι.
ATH. Surely, there are countless representations in our sight.
ΚΛ. ναί.
CL. Yes.
ΑΘ. τί οὖν εἴ τις καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοοῖ τῶν μεμιμημένων ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων;
ATH. What then if, even among these, someone should be ignorant of what each of the imitated bodies is?
ἆρʼ ἄν ποτε τό γε ὀρθῶς αὐτῶν εἰργασμένον γνοίη;
Would he ever know what is correctly executed among them?
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν τὰς θέσεις εἰ ἔχει, ὅσοι τέ εἰσιν καὶ ὁποῖα παρʼ ὁποῖα αὐτῶν κείμενα τὴν προσήκουσαν τάξιν ἀπείληφεν—καὶ ἔτι δὴ χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα—ἢ πάντα ταῦτα τεταραγμένως εἴργασται·
I mean something like this: whether the work possesses the proportions of the body and the positions of each of its parts, how many they are and what kind of things placed next to what other things have received their proper order—and furthermore, both colors and shapes—or whether all these have been executed in a confused manner.
μῶν δοκεῖ ταῦτʼ ἄν ποτε διαγνῶναί τις τὸ παράπαν ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μεμιμημένον ζῷον;
Do we think that one who is altogether ignorant of what the imitated animal is could ever discern these things?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
CL. How could he?