§2.663ΑΘ. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν ὁ τιθέμενος εἴτε νομοθέτης εἴτε καὶ πατὴρ ἄτοπος ἂν οἶμαι καὶ ἄπορος φαίνοιτο τοῦ συμφωνούντως ἑαυτῷ λέγειν·
ATH. In this way, then, he who sets down rules, whether he be a lawgiver or even a father, would, I think, appear absurd and at a loss to speak consistently with himself.
εἰ δʼ αὖ τὸν δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἀποφαίνοιτο βίον εἶναι, ζητοῖ που πᾶς ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, οἶμαι, τί ποτʼ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κρεῖττον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ.
But if, on the other hand, he should declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who hears him, I suppose, would ask what good and beautiful thing, superior to pleasure, is inherent in it that the law praises.
τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο;
For indeed, what good could arise for a just person if he is separated from pleasure?
φέρε, κλέος τε καὶ ἔπαινος πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν ἆρʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν μὲν καὶ καλόν, ἀηδὲς δέ, δύσκλεια δὲ τἀναντία;
Come, are fame and praise from men and gods indeed good and beautiful, but unpleasant, while ill repute is the opposite?
ἥκιστα, ὦ φίλε νομοθέτα, φήσομεν.
"By no means, my dear lawgiver," we shall say.
ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τινὰ ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑπό τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι μῶν ἀηδὲς μέν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἢ καλόν, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα ἡδέα μέν, αἰσχρὰ δὲ καὶ κακά;
But is committing no injustice to anyone nor suffering injustice from anyone indeed unpleasant, but good or beautiful, while the other things are pleasant, but shameful and bad?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
CL. And how could that be?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γʼ, εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τό τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον, ὥστε νομοθέτῃ γε αἴσχιστος λόγων καὶ ἐναντιώτατος ὃς ἂν μὴ φῇ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν·
ATH. Therefore, the argument that does not separate the pleasant, the just, the good, and the beautiful is persuasive, if nothing else, for making someone wish to live a holy and just life; so that for a lawgiver, the most shameful and contrary of arguments is one that denies that these things are so.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἕπεται.
For no one would willingly wish to be persuaded to do that which is not accompanied by more pleasure than pain.
σκοτοδινιᾶν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσίν τε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ παρέχει, νομοθέτης εἰ μὴ δόξαν εἰς τοὐναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ λόγοις ὡς ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα τἀναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφότερα.
Moreover, that which is seen from a distance causes a dizzy blur to almost everyone, and especially to children, unless the lawgiver establishes an opinion to the contrary of this, by removing the darkness, and persuades them somehow or other by habits, praises, and arguments that just and unjust things are like shadow-paintings—the unjust things appearing opposite to the just, and appearing pleasant when viewed from the perspective of an unjust and bad self, while the just things appear most unpleasant, but from the perspective of the just, everything is completely the opposite in both respects.
ΚΛ. φαίνεται.
CL. So it appears.
ΑΘ. τὴν δʼ ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν εἶναι φῶμεν;
ATH. And as for the truth of the judgment, which of the two shall we say is more authoritative?
πότερα τὴν τῆς χείρονος ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίονος;
That of the worse soul, or that of the better?
ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖόν που τὴν τῆς ἀμείνονος.
CL. It is necessary, I suppose, that it is that of the better.
ΑΘ. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὸν ἄδικον βίον οὐ μόνον αἰσχίω καὶ μοχθηρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀηδέστερον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου τε εἶναι καὶ ὁσίου βίου.
ATH. It is necessary, then, that the unjust life is in truth not only more shameful and wretched, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life.
ΚΛ. κινδυνεύει κατά γε τὸν νῦν λόγον, ὦ φίλοι.
CL. It seems likely, at any rate according to the present argument, my friends.
ΑΘ. νομοθέτης δὲ οὗ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ᾕρηχʼ ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὅτι τούτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν ἐψεύσατό ποτε καὶ δυνάμενον μᾶλλον ποιεῖν μὴ βίᾳ ἀλλʼ ἑκόντας πάντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια;
ATH. But as for a lawgiver who is of even the slightest use, even if this were not as the argument has now shown it to be, if indeed he had dared to tell a lie to the young for their good, is there any lie more useful than this, or more capable of making everyone do all just things, not by force, but willingly?
ΚΛ. καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.
CL. Truth is a beautiful thing, my guest, and lasting; yet it seems not to be easy to persuade.
ΑΘ. εἶεν·
ATH.
τὸ μὲν τοῦ Σιδωνίου μυθολόγημα ῥᾴδιον ἐγένετο πείθειν, οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;
Well now, was the myth of the Sidonian easy to persuade, though being so improbable, and ten thousand other things?
ΚΛ. ποῖα;
CL. Which ones?