§2.661ΑΘ. καὶ
οὔτʼ ἂν μνησαίμην,
φησὶν ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς λέγει,
οὔτʼ ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην,
ὃς μὴ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα καλὰ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράττοι καὶ κτῷτο, καὶ δὴ
καὶ δηΐων
τοιοῦτος ὢν
ὀρέγοιτο ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος,
ἄδικος δὲ ὢν μήτε τολμῷ
ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα
μήτε νικῷ θέων
Θρηίκιον Βορέην,
μήτε ἄλλο αὐτῷ μηδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν γίγνοιτό ποτε. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενʼ ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται.
ATH. And, "Neither would I mention," says the poet to you, if indeed he speaks correctly, "nor would I hold a man in account, who does not practice and acquire all the so-called beautiful things with justice; and indeed even if, being such a man, he should reach out against the enemies, standing close, but if he is unjust, let him neither dare to look upon bloody slaughter, nor win by running the Thracian Boreas, nor let any other of the so-called goods ever belong to him." For the things called goods by the many are not correctly spoken of.
λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μυρία δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τυραννοῦντα ὅτι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ τὸ δὴ τέλος ἁπάσης μακαριότητος εἶναι τὸ πάντα ταῦτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὅτι τάχιστα.
For it is said that to be healthy is best, second is beauty, third is wealth, and ten thousand other goods are spoken of; for indeed to see and hear sharply and to have all the senses functioning well, and further even to do whatever one desires as a tyrant, and indeed the end of all blessedness is, having acquired all these things, to become immortal as quickly as possible.
ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι σύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα σύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ παράπαν ζῆν μέγιστον μὲν κακὸν τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον ἀθάνατον ὄντα καὶ κεκτημένον πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πλὴν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης, ἔλαττον δέ, ἂν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζώῃ.
But you and I, I suppose, say this: that all these are the best possessions for just and holy men, but for the unjust they are all the worst, beginning from health; and indeed even seeing and hearing and perceiving and altogether living is the greatest evil for all time for one who is immortal and possesses all the so-called goods except justice and all virtue, but less of an evil if such a person should survive for the shortest possible time.
ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν, οἶμαι, τοὺς παρʼ ὑμῖν ποιητάς, ἅπερ ἐγώ, πείσετε καὶ ἀναγκάσετε, καὶ ἔτι τούτοις ἑπομένους ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας ἀποδιδόντας παιδεύειν οὕτω τοὺς νέους ἡμῶν.
These indeed, I think, you will persuade and compel the poets among you to say, just as I do, and further to educate our young people in this way by rendering rhythms and harmonies that follow these.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ὁρᾶτε.
Consider.
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ λέγω σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὄντως ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά·
For I say clearly that the so-called evils are goods to the unjust, but to the just, evils, while the goods are to the good truly goods, but to the bad, evils.
ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην, ἆρα συμφωνοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἢ πῶς;
Therefore, what I asked indeed, do we agree, you and I, or how?
ΚΛ. τὰ μὲν ἔμοιγε φαινόμεθά πως, τὰ δʼ οὐδαμῶς.
CL. In some things we seem to, but in others by no means.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὑγίειάν τε κεκτημένον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους—καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι ὑμῖν ἰσχὺν διαφέρουσαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν μετʼ ἀθανασίας, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο αὐτῷ τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν εἶναι γιγνόμενον—ἀδικίαν δὲ καὶ ὕβριν ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ μόνον, τὸν οὕτω ζῶντα ἴσως ὑμᾶς οὐ πείθω μὴ οὐκ ἄρα εὐδαίμονα ἀλλʼ ἄθλιον γίγνεσθαι σαφῶς;
ATH. Well then, one who possesses health and wealth and tyranny to the end—and I further add for you exceptional strength and courage with immortality, and let no other of the so-called evils happen to him—but having injustice and insolence alone in himself, do I perhaps not persuade you that one who lives in this way is not after all happy but clearly becomes wretched?
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
CL. You speak most truly.
§2.662ΑΘ. εἶεν·
ATH.
τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ἡμᾶς χρεών;
Well then, what indeed are we required to say after this?
ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ καλὸς καὶ πλούσιος, καὶ ποιῶν ὅτιπερ ἐπιθυμοῖ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, οὐχ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ, εἴπερ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὑβριστής, ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰσχρῶς ἂν ζῆν;
For a man courageous, strong, beautiful, and rich, and doing whatever he desires for his whole life, does he not seem to you, if indeed he should be unjust and insolent, of necessity to live basely?
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσαιτε, τό γε αἰσχρῶς;
Or would you perhaps concede this, at least the living basely?
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CL. Absolutely indeed.
ΑΘ. τί δέ;
ATH. And what of this?
τὸ καὶ κακῶς;
Also living badly?
ΚΛ. οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τοῦθʼ ὁμοίως.
CL. No longer in the same way.
ΑΘ. τί δέ;
ATH. And what of this?
τὸ καὶ ἀηδῶς καὶ μὴ συμφερόντως αὑτῷ;
Also unpleasantly and disadvantageously to himself?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γʼ ἔτι συγχωροῖμεν;
CL. And how could we still concede these things?
ΑΘ. ὅπως;
ATH. How?
εἰ θεὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλοι, δοίη τις συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπᾴδομεν ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων.
If some god, as it seems, my friends, should give us agreement, since now indeed we are singing almost out of tune with one another.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδέ, ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, Κρήτη νῆσος σαφῶς· καὶ νομοθέτης ὢν ταύτῃ πειρῴμην ἂν τούς τε ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζειν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ζημίαν τε ὀλίγου μεγίστην ἐπιτιθείην ἄν, εἴ τις ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φθέγξαιτο ὡς εἰσίν τινες ἄνθρωποί ποτε πονηροὶ μέν, ἡδέως δὲ ζῶντες, ἢ λυσιτελοῦντα μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ καὶ κερδαλέα, δικαιότερα δὲ ἄλλα, καὶ πόλλʼ ἄττʼ ἂν παρὰ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ὑπό τε Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ δήπου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διάφορα πείθοιμʼ ἂν τοὺς πολίτας μοι φθέγγεσθαι.
For to me indeed these things seem so necessary, as not even, my friend Cleinias, the island of Crete is clearly an island; and being a lawgiver, I would try to compel both the poets and all those in the city to utter this, and I would impose almost the greatest penalty if anyone in the land should utter that there are some men who are indeed wicked, but live pleasantly, or that some things are advantageous and profitable, but others are more just, and I would persuade the citizens to utter many other things different from what is now said by the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, as it seems, and doubtless also by other men.
φέρε γάρ, ὦ πρὸς Διός τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἰ τοὺς νομοθετήσαντας ὑμῖν αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐροίμεθα θεούς· ἆρʼ ὁ δικαιότατός ἐστιν βίος ἥδιστος, ἢ δύʼ ἐστόν τινε βίω, οἷν ὁ μὲν ἥδιστος ὢν τυγχάνει, δικαιότατος δʼ ἕτερος; εἰ δὴ δύο φαῖεν, ἐροίμεθʼ ἂν ἴσως αὐτοὺς πάλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐπανερωτῷμεν· ποτέρους δὲ εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρὴ λέγειν, τοὺς τὸν δικαιότατον ἢ τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον διαβιοῦντας βίον; εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον, ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίγνοιτο.
For come, by Zeus and Apollo, O best of men, if we should ask those very gods who legislated for you: "Is the most just life the most pleasant, or are there two distinct lives, of which one happens to be the most pleasant, and the other the most just?" If indeed they should say there are two, we would perhaps ask them again, if indeed we are reinvestigating correctly: "And which of the two should be said to be happier, those who live through the most just life, or those who live through the most pleasant?" If indeed they should say those who live the most pleasant, their speech would become absurd.
βούλομαι δέ μοι μὴ ἐπὶ θεῶν λέγεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πατέρων καὶ νομοθετῶν μᾶλλον, καί μοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἠρωτημένα πατέρα τε καὶ νομοθέτην ἠρωτήσθω, ὁ δʼ εἰπέτω ὡς ὁ ζῶν τὸν ἥδιστον βίον ἐστὶν μακαριώτατος· εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην· ὦ πάτερ, οὐχ ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατά με ἐβούλου ζῆν;
But I wish such a thing not to be said in the case of gods, but rather in the case of fathers and lawgivers, and let my previous questions be asked of a father and a lawgiver, and let him say that the one living the most pleasant life is most blessed; then after this I would say: "O father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible?
ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ διακελευόμενος οὐδὲν ἐπαύου ζῆν με ὡς δικαιότατα.
But you never ceased commanding me always to live as justly as possible."