§12.963ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν τό γʼ ἡμέτερον, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη πάλαι τιθέμενον;
CLE. Then, Stranger, would our principle not have been correctly established long ago?
πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθʼ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντʼ εἶναι, τοῦτο δʼ ἀρετήν που συνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.
For we said that all things belonging to the laws must always look to one single thing, and we agreed, surely quite correctly, that this is called virtue.
ΑΘ. ναί.
ATH. Yes.
ΚΛ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρετὴν τέτταρα ἔθεμέν που.
CLE. And we established, I believe, that virtue is four things.
ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ATH. Entirely so.
ΚΛ. νοῦν δέ γε πάντων τούτων ἡγεμόνα, πρὸς ὃν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ τούτων τὰ τρία δεῖ βλέπειν.
CLE. And indeed, intellect as the leader of all these, to which all other things and the other three of these must look.
ΑΘ. κάλλιστʼ ἐπακολουθεῖς, ὦ Κλεινία. καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ συνακολούθει.
ATH. You follow most beautifully, Cleinias; and now follow along with the rest too.
νοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικὸν εἴπομεν εἰς τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο οἷ δεῖ βλέπειν, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐλέγχοντες ἐνταῦθʼ ἐσμὲν νῦν, καὶ καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἐπανερωτῶντες εἴποιμεν ἄν· ὦ θαυμάσιε, σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖ σκοπεῖς;
For we stated indeed where the steering, medical, and generalship intellects must look to that single thing, but we are now here examining the political intellect, and we might speak as if questioning a man again: 'O wonderful man, where indeed are you looking?
τί ποτʼ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὃ δὴ σαφῶς ὁ μὲν ἰατρικὸς νοῦς ἔχει φράζειν, σὺ δʼ ὢν δὴ διαφέρων, ὡς φαίης ἄν, πάντων τῶν ἐμφρόνων, οὐχ ἕξεις εἰπεῖν; ἢ σύ γε, Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία, ἔχετον διαρθροῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φράζειν πρὸς ἐμὲ τί ποτέ φατε εἶναι τοῦτο, καθάπερ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς συχνῶν διωριζόμην;
What on earth is that single thing which the medical intellect indeed is able to state clearly, but you, though you would say you excel all wise men, will not be able to state?' Or can you two, Megillus and Cleinias, state on its behalf by distinguishing clearly to me what on earth you say this is, just as I defined concerning many other things to you?
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε.
CLE. Not at all, Stranger.
ΑΘ. τί δʼ ὅτι δεῖ προθυμεῖσθαί τε συνιδεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν οἷς;
ATH. And what about the fact that we must be eager both to discern it and in what things it is?
ΚΛ. οἷον ἐν τίσι λέγεις;
CLE. For example, in what things do you mean?
ΑΘ. οἷον ὅτε τέτταρα ἐφήσαμεν ἀρετῆς εἴδη γεγονέναι, δῆλον ὡς ἓν ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη φάναι, τεττάρων γε ὄντων.
ATH. For example, when we said that there have come to be four forms of virtue, it is clear that we must say each of them is one, since they are indeed four.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
CLE. How indeed?
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἅπαντα ταῦτα προσαγορεύομεν.
ATH. And yet we address all of these by one name.
ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰ δύο τἆλλα, ὡς ὄντως ὄντα οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλʼ ἓν τοῦτο μόνον, ἀρετήν.
For we say that courage is virtue, and wisdom is virtue, and the other two likewise, as actually being not many but this one thing only, virtue.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CLE. Entirely so.
ΑΘ. ἧι μὲν τοίνυν διαφέρετον αὐτοῖν τούτω τὼ δύο καὶ δύʼ ὀνόματα ἐλαβέτην καὶ τἆλλα, οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· ᾗ δὲ ἓν ἀμφοῖν ἐπωνομάσαμεν, ἀρετήν, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἔτι.
ATH. Now, in what way these two indeed differ from each other and received two names, and so with the others, is not at all difficult to say; but in what way we called both of them, and the others too, by one name, 'virtue', is no longer easy.
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
CLE. How do you mean?
ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ὃ λέγω δηλῶσαι.
ATH. It is not difficult to clarify what I mean.
διανειμώμεθα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὴν ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν.
Let us divide the question and answer between us.
ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ φράζεις;
CLE. How do you mean again?
ΑΘ. ἐρώτησόν με τί ποτε ἓν προσαγορεύοντες ἀρετὴν ἀμφότερα, δύο πάλιν αὐτὰ προσείπομεν, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρείαν, τὸ δὲ φρόνησιν.
ATH. Ask me why on earth, calling both of them by one name, virtue, we again spoke of them as two, the one as courage and the other as wisdom.
ἐρῶ γάρ σοι τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ μέν ἐστιν περὶ φόβον, οὗ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέχει, τῆς ἀνδρείας, καὶ τά γε τῶν παίδων ἤθη τῶν πάνυ νέων· ἄνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή, ἄνευ δὲ αὖ λόγου ψυχὴ φρόνιμός τε καὶ νοῦν ἔχουσα οὔτʼ ἐγένετο πώποτε οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὐδʼ αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεται, ὡς ὄντος ἑτέρου.
For I will tell you the reason: that the one, courage, is about fear, in which even beasts share, and the characters of very young children; for without reason and by nature a soul becomes courageous, but on the other hand, without reason a wise and intellect-possessing soul never has come to be, nor is, nor ever will be hereafter, because they are indeed different.
ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
CLE. You speak the truth.