§12.962ΑΘ. οὐδὲν δὴ πολλῶν δεῖ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παραδειγμάτων· ἀλλʼ οἷον περὶ στρατοπέδων νοήσωμεν τίνα θέμενοι στρατηγοὶ σκοπὸν καὶ ἰατρικὴ ὑπηρεσία πᾶσα στοχάζοιτʼ ἂν τῆς σωτηρίας ὀρθῶς.
ATH. There is indeed no need of many examples concerning such matters; but, for instance, in the case of armies, let us consider what mark generals and the whole medical service set before themselves to aim rightly at preservation.
ἆρʼ οὐχ ἡ μὲν νίκην καὶ κράτος πολεμίων, ἡ δὲ ἰατρῶν τε καὶ ὑπηρετῶν ὑγιείας σώματι παρασκευήν;
Is it not that the former aims at victory and mastery over enemies, and the latter, of doctors and assistants, at providing health for the body?
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
CLE. How could it be otherwise?
ΑΘ. ἰατρὸς δὴ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοῶν, ὃ προσείπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἢ νίκην στρατηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα δὴ διήλθομεν, ἔσθʼ ὅπως ἂν νοῦν περί τι τούτων ἂν ἔχων φαίνοιτο;
ATH. If a doctor is ignorant of that which concerns the body, which we just called health, or a general of victory, or any of the others of the things we went through, is there any way he could appear to have intellect about any of these things?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
CLE. How indeed?
ΑΘ. τί δὲ δὴ περὶ πόλιν;
ATH. And what about a city?
εἴ τις τὸν σκοπὸν οἷ βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν φαίνοιτο ἀγνοῶν, ἆρα ἄρχων μὲν πρῶτον δικαίως ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο, εἶτα σῴζειν ἂν δυνατὸς εἴη τοῦτο οὗ τὸν σκοπὸν τὸ παράπαν μηδʼ εἰδείη;
If someone should appear to be ignorant of the mark to which the statesman must look, would he, in the first place, be justly called a ruler, and secondly, would he be able to preserve that of which he does not know the mark at all?
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;
CLE. How indeed?
ΑΘ. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ μέλλει τέλος ὁ κατοικισμὸς τῆς χώρας ἡμῖν ἕξειν, εἶναί τι τὸ γιγνῶσκον ἐν αὐτῷ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν, τὸν σκοπόν, ὅστις ποτὲ ὁ πολιτικὸς ὢν ἡμῖν τυγχάνει, ἔπειτα ὅντινα τρόπον δεῖ μετασχεῖν τούτου καὶ τίς αὐτῷ καλῶς ἢ μὴ συμβουλεύει, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων·
ATH. It is necessary then also now, as it seems, if our settlement of the territory is to have its completion, that there should be some element in it which knows, first, this which we call the mark, whatever the political mark happens to be for us, and secondly, in what way one must share in this and who counsels him well or poorly regarding it, first among the laws themselves, and then among men.
εἰ δʼ ἔσται τοῦ τοιούτου κενή τις πόλις, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἄνους οὖσα καὶ ἀναίσθητος εἰ πράξει τὸ προστυχὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐν ἑκάσταις τῶν πράξεων.
But if some city is empty of such an element, it would be no wonder if, being without intellect and without sense, it acts on whatever happens to turn up in each of its actions.
ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
CLE. You speak the truth.
ΑΘ. νῦν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν ἢ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἔστιν ἱκανὸν κατεσκευασμένον ὁτιοῦν τοιοῦτον φυλακτήριον;
ATH. Now, then, in which of the parts or institutions of our city is there any such protective guard sufficiently established?
ἔχομεν φράζειν;
Can we tell?
ΚΛ. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, σαφῶς γε· εἰ δʼ οὖν τοπάζειν δεῖ, δοκεῖ μοι τείνειν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ὃν εἶπες νυνδὴ νύκτωρ δεῖν συνιέναι.
CLE. Not clearly, indeed, Stranger; but if one must guess, this discourse seems to me to tend toward the assembly which you said just now must meet at night.
ΑΘ. κάλλισθʼ ὑπέλαβες, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τοῦτον, ὡς ὁ νῦν παρεστηκὼς ἡμῖν λόγος μηνύει, πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν·
ATH. You have understood most beautifully, Cleinias; and indeed this assembly, as the discourse now standing before us indicates, must possess every virtue.
ἧς ἄρχει τὸ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι πρὸς πολλὰ στοχαζόμενον, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἓν βλέποντα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα οἷον βέλη ἀφιέναι.
The rule of this virtue is not to wander aiming at many things, but looking to one single mark, to shoot all things, like arrows, always toward this.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
CLE. Entirely so, indeed.
ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ μαθησόμεθα ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πλανᾶσθαι τὰ τῶν πόλεων νόμιμα, ὅτι πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλη βλέπει τῶν νομοθεσιῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστῃ.
ATH. Now indeed we shall learn that it is no wonder that the laws of cities wander, because different legislations in each city look toward different things.
καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τὸ τοῖς μὲν τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τῶν δικαίων ὅπως ἄρξουσί τινες ἐν τῇ πόλει, εἴτʼ οὖν βελτίους εἴτε χείρους τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, τοῖς δʼ, ὅπως πλουτήσουσιν, εἴτʼ οὖν δοῦλοί τινων ὄντες εἴτε καὶ μή, τῶν δʼ ἡ προθυμία πρὸς τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ βίον ὡρμημένη·
And in most cases, it is no wonder that for some, the limit of what is just is that certain persons should rule in the city, whether they happen to be better or worse; for others, how they shall grow rich, whether they happen to be slaves of someone or not; for others, their eagerness is directed toward a free life.
οἱ δὲ καὶ σύνδυο νομοθετοῦνται, πρὸς ἄμφω βλέποντες, ἐλεύθεροί τε ὅπως ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἔσονται δεσπόται, οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι, ὡς οἴονται, πρὸς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα, εἰς ἓν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζειν εἰς ὃ τἆλλʼ αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν.
Others legislate even for two of these together, looking to both—how they may be free and also become masters of other cities. And those who are the wisest, as they think, look to these and all such things together, but they are unable to state any single, outstandingly honored mark to which all other things must look for them.