§10.894ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξάνεται, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει τότε, ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ, μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς, διʼ ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται.
**ATH.**: And indeed, when combined they increase, and when separated they decrease, at that time when the established state of each remains; but if it does not remain, they are destroyed by both causes.
γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκʼ ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ;
Now, how does the generation of all things come about?
δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις.
Clearly, whenever a starting point, having acquired increase, comes to the second transition, and from this to the next, and having come as far as three, provides perception to those who perceive.
μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν· ἔστιν δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ, μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς.
Thus, by changing and moving in this way, everything comes into being; but it is truly existing when it remains, and when it changes into another state, it is completely destroyed.
ἆρʼ οὖν κινήσεις πάσας εἰρήκαμεν ὡς ἐν εἴδεσιν λαβεῖν μετʼ ἀριθμοῦ, πλήν γε, ὦ φίλοι, δυοῖν; ΚΛ. ποίαιν δή; ΑΘ. σχεδόν, ὠγαθέ, ἐκείναιν ὧν ἕνεκα πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις τὰ νῦν. ΚΛ. λέγε σαφέστερον. ΑΘ. ψυχῆς ἦν ἕνεκά που; ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΑΘ. ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα, ἀεὶ μία τις, ἡ δὲ αὑτήν τʼ ἀεὶ καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε συγκρίσεις ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς ἄλλη μία τις αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων. ΚΛ. ἔστω γὰρ οὖν. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφʼ ἑτέρου θήσομεν ἐνάτην αὖ, τήν τε ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερον, ἐναρμόττουσαν πᾶσιν μὲν ποιήμασι, πᾶσιν δὲ παθήμασι, καλουμένην δὲ ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ταύτην δὲ δεκάτην σχεδὸν ἐροῦμεν. ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΑΘ. τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίνʼ ἂν προκρίναιμεν ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτην τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως; ΚΛ. μυρίῳ ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὐτὴν αὑτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας ὑστέρας. ΑΘ. εὖ λέγεις.
Have we then spoken of all motions so as to grasp them in their classes with their number, except, my friends, for two? **CL.**: Which do you mean? **ATH.**: Almost, my good friend, those two for the sake of which our whole inquiry is being conducted at present. **CL.**: Speak more clearly. **ATH.**: It was surely for the sake of the soul, was it not? **CL.**: Yes, altogether so. **ATH.**: Let one, then, be the motion which is able to move other things but unable to move itself, always a single class, and the other, which is always able to move both itself and other things, acting in combinations and separations, in increases and their opposite, and in generations and destructions, as another single class among all motions. **CL.**: Let it be so, then. **ATH.**: Shall we not then place the one that always moves another and is changed by another as the ninth in turn, and the one that moves itself and another, fitting all actions and all passions, and truly called the change and motion of all existing things, as the tenth, we shall say? **CL.**: Yes, altogether so. **ATH.**: Of these ten motions, which should we judge most correctly to be the strongest of all and preeminently effective? **CL.**: It is necessary, I suppose, to say that the one able to move itself differs by ten thousandfold, and all the others are secondary. **ATH.**: Well said.
ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ῥηθέντων μεταθετέον ἓν ἢ καὶ δύο; ΚΛ. ποῖα φῄς; ΑΘ. τὸ τῆς δεκάτης ῥηθὲν σχεδὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται. ΚΛ. πῇ; ΑΘ. πρῶτον γενέσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ῥώμῃ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν τούτου δεύτερον, ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ἀτόπως ἔνατον. ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἆρα ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον;
Should we then transfer one or two of the things not correctly stated just now? **CL.**: Which do you mean? **ATH.**: What was said of the tenth has been stated somewhat incorrectly. **CL.**: In what way? **ATH.**: It is first both in origin and in power according to reason; and the one after this we have as second to it, which was just now absurdly called the ninth. **CL.**: How do you mean? **ATH.**: In this way: whenever one thing changes another for us, and this latter always changes another, will there ever be among such things any first thing that changes?
καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτʼ ἔσται ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον;
And how, when it is moved by another, will this ever be the first of the things that alter?
ἀδύνατον γάρ.
For it is impossible.
§10.895ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ἄλλο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή; ΚΛ. κάλλιστα εἶπες, συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις. ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν.
**ATH.**: But whenever, indeed, that which has moved itself alters another, and that other alters something else, and thus the things moved become ten thousand times a thousand, will there be any other beginning of all their motion except the change of that which moved itself? **CL.**: You have spoken most excellently, and these things must be agreed to. **ATH.**: Let us say it also in this way, and answer ourselves again.
εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίνʼ ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων;
If all things should somehow come to stand still together, as most of such thinkers dare to say, what first motion among the things mentioned must arise in them?
τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν· ὑπʼ ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μήποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως.
Surely that which moves itself; for it will never be changed beforehand by another, since no change existed among them beforehand.
ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσιν γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὑτὴν κινοῦσαν φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφʼ ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα δευτέραν. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Therefore, we shall say that the self-moving motion, being the beginning of all motions and the first to arise among things at rest and existing among things in motion, is of necessity the oldest and most powerful change of all, while that which is altered by another and moves other things is second. **CL.**: You speak most truly.
ΑΘ. ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα. ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον; ΑΘ. ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ συμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι; ΚΛ. μῶν ἄρα με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ; ΑΘ. ναί. ΚΛ. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΑΘ. τί δέ;
**ATH.**: Since, then, we are at this point in the argument, let us answer this. **CL.**: What kind of thing? **ATH.**: If we should see this arising somewhere in that which is earthy or watery or fiery, whether separate or mixed, what state shall we say exists in such a thing? **CL.**: Are you asking me whether we shall call it 'living' whenever it moves itself? **ATH.**: Yes. **CL.**: 'Living'; for how could it not be? **ATH.**: And what of this?
ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ; ζῆν ὁμολογητέον; ΚΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.
Whenever we see soul in some things, must we agree that it is none other than this very thing, namely, 'living'? **CL.**: None other.
ΑΘ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός·
**ATH.**: Hold now, by Zeus!
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν; ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ ὄνομα·
Would you not wish to conceive three things concerning each thing? **CL.**: How do you mean? **ATH.**: One is the essence, one the definition of the essence, and one the name.
καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο. ΚΛ. πῶς δύο; ΑΘ. τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα.
And indeed, there are two questions concerning all that exists. **CL.**: How two? **ATH.**: Sometimes each of us, proposing the name, demands the definition itself, and sometimes, proposing the definition itself, asks in turn for the name.
ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν; ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
Is it indeed something like this we wish to say now? **CL.**: What kind of thing?
ΑΘ. ἔστιν που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ·
**ATH.**: There is surely that which is divided into two parts, among other things and also in number.
τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δέ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη. ΚΛ. ναί. ΑΘ. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω.
To this, indeed, in the case of number, the name is 'even', and the definition is 'a number divided into two equal parts'. **CL.**: Yes. **ATH.**: I mean something of this sort.
μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἄντε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄντε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, προσαγορεύοντες ταὐτὸν ὄν; ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Do we not then call the same thing by both ways, whether, when asked for the definition, we give the name, or when asked for the name, we give the definition, calling the same existing thing 'even' by name, and 'a number divided into two' by definition? **CL.**: Yes, altogether so.