§9.585θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν, πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται; μὰ Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει. ὧδέ γʼ οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσιν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως; τί μήν; ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἆρʼ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ γῆς περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως; μάλα γε. οὐκοῦν πληροῖτʼ ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων; πῶς δʼ οὔ; πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον. πότερα οὖν ἡγῇ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ συμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ συλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.
"Would you then wonder if those who are inexperienced in truth also have unhealthy opinions about many other things, and are so disposed toward pleasure, pain, and the middle between them, that whenever they are carried toward the painful, they both think truly and are really in pain, but whenever they are carried from pain to the middle, they strongly think they are at fulfillment and in pleasure, and just as those who look from black to gray in their inexperience of white, are they not likewise deceived, looking from pain to the painless in their inexperience of pleasure?" "By Zeus," he said, "I would not wonder, but much rather if it were not so." "Consider it then in this way," I said: "are not hunger, thirst, and the like certain emptyings of the state of the body?" "Of course." "And are not ignorance and folly, on the other hand, an emptiness of the state of the soul?" "Very much so." "Would not, then, both the one who partakes of nourishment and the one who gets intellect be filled?" "How could they not?" "And is the truer filling that of the less existing or that of the more existing?" "Clearly of the more existing." "Which kinds, then, do you think partake more of pure essence—those of bread, drink, relish, and all nourishment in general, or the form of true opinion, knowledge, intellect, and, in short, all virtue?" "Judge in this way: does that which holds to what is always the same, immortal, and true, being itself of such a character and arising in such a thing, seem to you to exist more, or does that which holds to what is never the same and mortal, being itself of such a character and arising in such a thing?" "That of what is always the same differs by far," he said.
ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; οὐδαμῶς. τί δʼ; ἀληθείας; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει; πολύ γε. σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὕτως; ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὂν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἧττον ὄν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη.
"Does, then, the essence of what is always the same partake of essence any more than of knowledge?" "In no way." "And what about truth?" "Nor of that either." "And if it partakes less of truth, does it not also partake less of essence?" "Necessarily." "In general, then, do not the kinds concerned with the care of the body partake less of truth and essence than the kinds concerned with the care of the soul?" "By far." "And do you not think the same of the body itself in relation to the soul?" "I do." "Therefore, does not that which is filled with things that exist more, and which itself exists more, get really more filled than that which is filled with things that exist less, and which itself exists less?" "How could it not?" "If, then, to be filled with what is naturally appropriate is pleasant, that which is really filled with things that exist, and is filled with them more, would make one rejoice more really and truly with a true pleasure; whereas that which partakes of things that exist less would be filled less truly and securely, and would partake of a less reliable and less true pleasure." "Most necessarily," he said.
§9.586οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ συνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονταί τε καὶ ταύτῃ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες, καὶ ἕνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὁπλαῖς ἀποκτεινύασι διʼ ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρησμῳδεῖς βίον. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς συνεῖναι μεμειγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρʼ ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἑκατέρας φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἴδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορός φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;
"Those, then, who are inexperienced in wisdom and virtue, but always keep company with feasts and the like, are carried down, as it seems, and back again to the middle, and wander in this way through life. They never pass beyond this to look up at what is truly above, nor are they ever carried there, nor are they ever really filled with what exists, nor do they taste secure and pure pleasure. Instead, like cattle, always looking down and bending toward the earth and tables, they feed, fattening themselves and copulating; and for the sake of getting more of these things, kicking and butting one another with iron horns and hooves, they kill each other out of greediness, inasmuch as they do not fill with things that exist either their own existing part or their retaining vessel." "Completely, Socrates," Glaucon said, "do you describe the life of the many like an oracle." "Must they not, then, also keep company with pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure and shadow-painted ones, colored by their juxtaposition to one another, so that each appears intense, and engendering mad loves of themselves in the foolish and being fought over, just as Stesichorus says the image of Helen was fought over by those in Troy in their ignorance of the truth?" "It is highly necessary," he said, "for it to be something of this kind." "And what about the spirited part?
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι. τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; τοιαῦτα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι.
Is it not necessary for other such things to happen to it, whenever anyone works out this very part, either through envy for the sake of honor, or violence for the sake of victory, or anger for the sake of discontent, pursuing a surfeit of honor, victory, and anger without calculation and intellect?" "Such things," he said, "are necessary about this part as well." "What then?" I said.
τί οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἳ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον; ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε.
"May we boldly say that also concerning the gain-loving and the victory-loving parts, all the desires that follow knowledge and argument, and pursue together with these the pleasures which the prudent part guides, will receive the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to receive true ones, inasmuch as they follow truth, and also those that are their own and appropriate, if indeed what is best for each is also most appropriate?" "But indeed," he said, "it is most appropriate."