§9.583τριῶν ἄρʼ οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ μανθάνομεν ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἥδιστος; πῶς δʼ οὐ μέλλει;
"Then, since there are three pleasures, would the pleasure of this part of the soul by which we learn be the pleasantest, and would the life of the person in whom this part rules us be the pleasantest?" "How could it not be?" he said.
ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος. τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονήν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι; δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. ὑστάτην δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν. τί μήν; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"For the prudent man, being an authoritative praiser, praises his own life." "And which life," I said, "and which pleasure does the judge say is second?" "Clearly that of the warrior and honor-lover; for it is closer to him than that of the money-maker." "And the last is that of the gain-lover, as it seems." "How could it be otherwise?" he said.
ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δύʼ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δὶς νενικηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλʼ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι.
"These two things, then, would thus be in succession, and the just man has twice defeated the unjust; and for the third, in Olympic fashion to the Savior and Olympic Zeus, look at the fact that the pleasure of the others is not even entirely true nor pure, but is a kind of shadow-painting, as I think I have heard from one of the wise.
καίτοι τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις; ὧδʼ, εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα. Ἐρώτα δή, ἔφη.
And yet this would be the greatest and most sovereign of the falls." "Very much so; but how do you mean?" "In this way," I said, "I shall find out, while seeking together as you answer." "Ask then," he said.
λέγε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην ἡδονῇ; καὶ μάλα. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι; εἶναι μέντοι. μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὂν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς;
"Tell me then," I said: "do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?" "Very much so." "And is there not also a state of neither rejoicing nor feeling pain?" "There is indeed." "Being in the middle between both of these, a certain quietude of the soul concerning these things?
ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις; οὕτως, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Or do you not say so?" "I do say so," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν; ποίους; ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὄν. μέμνημαι, ἔφη.
"Do you then remember," I said, "the speeches of the sick, which they say when they are sick?" "What kind?" "That there is indeed nothing more pleasant than being healthy, but it had escaped them, before they were sick, that it was the pleasantest." "I remember," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνίᾳ τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον; ἀκούω. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε οἶμαι πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνῃ γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται. ἴσως, ἔφη.
"And do you not also hear those who are held by some extreme pain saying that nothing is more pleasant than to cease from being in pain?" "I do hear them." "And in many other such circumstances, I think, you perceive people experiencing this, where, when they are in pain, they praise the state of not being in pain and this quietude as the pleasantest, not rejoicing." "For indeed," he said, "quietude then becomes perhaps pleasant and beloved." "And when someone ceases to rejoice, then," I said, "the quietude of the pleasure will be painful." "Perhaps," he said.
ὃ μεταξὺ ἄρα νυνδὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. ἔοικεν. ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν· ἢ οὔ; ναί. §9.584τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοιν ἐφάνη ἄρτι; ἐφάνη γάρ. πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.
"That which we said just now was between both, then—namely quietude—will at some times be both, pain and pleasure." "It seems so." "Is it indeed possible for that which is neither to become both?" "It does not seem so to me." "And indeed, the pleasant and the painful arising in the soul are both a kind of motion, are they not?" "Yes." "But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be quietude and in the middle of these?" "It did indeed." "How then is it correct to think that not suffering pain is pleasant, or that not rejoicing is painful?" "In no way." "This is not so, then, but," I said, "the quietude then appears pleasant beside the painful, and painful beside the pleasant, and there is nothing healthy in these appearances with respect to the truth of pleasure, but they are a kind of magic." "At least as the argument indicates," he said.
ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῇς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς. ποῦ δή, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις; πολλαὶ μέν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δʼ εἰ ʼθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς.
"Look then," I said, "at pleasures which are not from pains, so that you may not think, as often happens, in the present case that this is how it is by nature—that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure." "Where then," he said, "and what kind do you mean?" "There are many others indeed," I said, "but especially, if you wish to consider, the pleasures concerning smells.
αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
For these, without any prior pain, suddenly become incalculably great, and when they cease, they leave no pain behind." "Very true," he said.
μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς. μὴ γάρ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσταί τε καὶ μέγισται, τούτου τοῦ εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινες ἀπαλλαγαί. εἰσὶ γάρ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν; κατὰ ταὐτά. οἶσθʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσιν καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα ἐοίκασιν; τῷ; ἔφη.
"Let us then not be persuaded that the release from pain is pure pleasure, nor that the release from pleasure is pain." "Indeed not." "But yet," I said, "those pleasures that extend through the body to the soul and are called pleasures, almost the most and greatest of them, are of this kind, namely certain releases from pains." "They are indeed." "And do not the anticipations of pleasure and pain that arise from expectation before these future things have the same character?" "The very same." "Do you know then," I said, "what they are like and what they most resemble?" "What?" he said.
νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον; ἔγωγε. οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι;
"Do you think," I said, "that there is in nature an up, a down, and a middle?" "I do." "Do you think, then, that anyone carried from the down to the middle would think anything other than that he is being carried up?
καὶ ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; μὰ Δίʼ, οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀλλʼ εἰ πάλιν γʼ, ἔφην, φέροιτο, κάτω τʼ ἂν οἴοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; δῆλον δή.
And standing in the middle, looking down to where he was carried from, would he believe he is anywhere other than in the up, not having seen the truly up?" "By Zeus, not I," he said, "I do not think such a person would think otherwise." "But if he were carried back again," I said, "would he think he is being carried down, and would he think truly?" "How could he not?" "Would he not suffer all this because of his lack of experience of what is truly up, in the middle, and down?" "Clearly so."