§9.582ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει; οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
"Then indeed," I said, "since the pleasures of each class and the life itself are disputed, not as to living more nobly and basely, nor worse and better, but with respect to the very pleasantest and most painless, how should we know which of them speaks most truly?" "I cannot say at all," he said.
ἀλλʼ ὧδε σκόπει· τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι;
"But look at it this way: by what must things that are going to be judged well be judged?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ;
Is it not by experience, prudence, and reason?
ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον; καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη.
Or could anyone have a better criterion than these?" "How could he?" he said.
σκόπει δή· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν;
"Look then: of the three men, who is most experienced in all the pleasures we mentioned?
πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν; πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει.
Does the gain-lover, in learning what the truth itself is, seem to you to be more experienced in the pleasure of knowing than the philosopher is in that of gaining?" "There is a great difference," he said.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδʼ ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν. πολὺ μέντοι.
"For the former is forced to taste the other pleasures starting from childhood; but for the gain-lover, in learning how things really are, there is no necessity to taste this pleasure of learning, to see how sweet it is, nor to become experienced in it; rather, even if he were eager to do so, it would not be easy." "By far, then," I said, "does the philosopher differ from the gain-lover in his experience of both pleasures." "Very much so, indeed." "And what about compared to the honor-lover?
τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἆρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μέν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἕπεται—καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ σοφός—ὥστε ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι·
Is the philosopher more inexperienced in the pleasure of being honored than the honor-lover is in that of understanding?" "But honor, indeed," he said, "if they accomplish what each has set out for, follows them all—for both the rich man is honored by many, and the brave man, and the wise man—so that, as far as being honored is concerned, everyone is experienced in what kind of pleasure it is.
τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος. πολύ γε. καὶ μὴν μετά γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται. τί μήν; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διʼ οὗ γε δεῖ ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. τὸ ποῖον; διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι.
But as for the contemplation of what is, what kind of pleasure it holds, it is impossible for anyone to have tasted it except the philosopher." "For the sake of experience, then," I said, "this man judges best of all the men." "Very much so." "And indeed, he alone will have become experienced along with prudence." "How could it be otherwise?" "Moreover, as for the instrument through which judgment must be made, this is not the instrument of the gain-lover, nor of the honor-lover, but of the philosopher." "What kind of instrument is that?" "We said, I believe, that judgment must be made through arguments.
ἦ γάρ; ναί. λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον. πῶς δʼ οὔ; οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο τὰ κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῄνει ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. πολλή γε. εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἆρʼ οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ φιλόνικος; δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.
Is that not so?" "Yes." "And arguments are especially the instrument of this man." "How could they not be?" "Therefore, if the things to be judged were judged best by wealth and gain, the things which the gain-lover praised and blamed would necessarily be most true." "Very much so." "And if by honor, victory, and courage, would it not be the things which the honor-lover and victory-lover praised?" "Clearly." "But since it is by experience, prudence, and reason?" "Necessarily," he said, "the things which the philosopher and the lover of reason praises are most true."