§9.580οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὑτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐδείς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε, βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν. ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις.
"Therefore, in addition to these things, we shall also assign to the man what we said before: that it is necessary for him, both to be and still more to become than before, because of his rule, envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, and a host and nourisher of all vice; and as a result of all these things, to be himself most unfortunate of all, and then also to make those near him such as himself." "No one with sense," he said, "will contradict you." "Come then," I said, "now, just as the judge who has seen all pronounces, you too do so: who is first in your opinion in happiness, and who second, and judge the others in order, being five in all—the kingly, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical." "But the judgment is easy," he said.
καθάπερ γὰρ εἰσῆλθον ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος ὑὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δʼ εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὑτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὢν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅτι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως; ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη.
"For as they entered, I judge them like choruses, in virtue and vice, and in happiness and its opposite." "Shall we then hire a herald," I said, "or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston has judged the best and most just to be the happiest, and that this is the one who is most kingly and rules over himself, and the worst and most unjust to be the most miserable, and that this in turn happens to be the one who, being most tyrannical, tyrannizes over himself most of all and over the city?" "Let it be so announced by you," he said.
ἦ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, ἐάντε λανθάνωσιν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάντε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς; προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη.
"Shall I then add to the announcement," I said, "whether they escape the notice of all men and gods or not?" "Add it to the announcement," he said.
εἶεν δή, εἶπον·
"Very well," I said.
αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μία ἂν εἴη, δευτέραν δὲ ἰδὲ τήνδε, ἐάν τι δόξῃ εἶναι. τίς αὕτη; ἐπειδή, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διῄρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριχῇ, δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν. τίνα ταύτην; τήνδε.
"This would be one proof for us, but look at this second one, if it seems to be anything." "What is this?" "Since, just as a city," I said, "is divided into three classes, so also the soul of each individual is divided in three ways, it will admit, as it seems to me, another proof as well." "What is that?" "This one.
τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί. πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.
Since there are three parts, there appear to me to be three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each one; and likewise desires and ruling principles." "How do you mean?" he said.
τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἦν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἑνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὃ μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν· §9.581ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν τε περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δή, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι. καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ, ἔφη.
"One part, we say, was that by which a man learns, another that by which he is spirited, and the third, because of its many forms, we were unable to call by a single name peculiar to itself, but we named it by what was greatest and strongest in it." "For we called it the desiring part because of the intensity of its desires for food, drink, sex, and all other things that follow these; and also money-loving, because such desires are accomplished chiefly through money." "And rightly so," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστʼ ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὁπότε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν; ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη.
"Would we then speak most correctly if we said that its pleasure and love are for gain, so as to rest our argument on one main point, so as to make something clear to ourselves whenever we speak of this part of the soul, and would we be right in calling it money-loving and gain-loving?" "It seems so to me at least," he said.
τί δέ;
"And what of the spirited part?
τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμὲν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀεὶ ὅλον ὡρμῆσθαι; καὶ μάλα. εἰ οὖν φιλόνικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἦ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει. πολύ γε. φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν μὲν τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὁπότερον ἂν τύχῃ; οὕτως, ἔφη.
Do we not say that it is always wholly directed toward ruling, conquering, and being of good repute?" "Very much so." "If then we should call it victory-loving and honor-loving, would it be suitable?" "Most suitable indeed." "But as for that by which we learn, it is clear to everyone that it is always directed entirely toward knowing where the truth lies, and of these parts, this one cares least for money and reputation." "By far." "Would we then be speaking appropriately if we called it learning-loving and wisdom-loving?" "How could we not?" "Is it not so then," I said, "that in the souls of some people this part rules, while in others one of those other two, whichever it happens to be?" "So it is," he said.
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές; κομιδῇ γε. καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἴδη, ὑποκείμενον ἓν ἑκάστῳ τούτων; πάνυ γε. οἶσθʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ ʼθέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἥδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὅ τε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ; ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
"And for this reason, we say that the primary classes of men are three: the wisdom-loving, the victory-loving, and the gain-loving?" "Quite so." "And also three kinds of pleasure, one underlying each of these?" "Yes, indeed." "Do you know, then," I said, "that if you wished to ask three such men in turn, each one of them which of these lives is the pleasantest, each will praise his own life most of all?" "The money-maker, in comparison with gaining, will say that the pleasure of being honored or that of learning is worth nothing, unless some money is made from them?" "True," he said.
τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"And what of the honor-lover?" I said.
οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικήν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅτι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν; οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.
"Does he not think the pleasure from money is vulgar, and again that from learning, unless the learning brings honor, is smoke and nonsense?" "So it is," he said.
τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα;
"And as for the philosopher," I said, "where do we suppose he thinks the other pleasures stand in comparison with that of knowing how the truth is, and of always being in some such state while learning?
οὐ πάνυ πόρρω;
Not very far off?
καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν; εὖ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι;
And doesn't he call them in reality 'necessary,' as he would have no need of the others if there were no necessity?" "Know it well," he said.