§6.508οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις τῶν ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.
"Then it is by no small form," I said, "that the sense of seeing and the power of being seen have been yoked together by a more honorable yoke than the other couplings, if indeed light is not without honor." "Indeed, it is far from being without honor," he said.
τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι; ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. ἆρʼ οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; πῶς; οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτʼ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλʼ ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. πολύ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δʼ ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπʼ αὐτῆς ταύτης; οὕτως, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"Whom then of the gods in heaven can you hold responsible as the master of this, whose light makes our sight see as beautifully as possible and the things seen to be seen?" "The very one you and the others would," he said; "for it is clear that you are asking about the sun." "Is sight, then, naturally related to this god in this way?" "How?" "Sight is not the sun, neither itself nor that in which it comes to be, which we call the eye." "Surely not." "But it is, I think, the most sun-like of the organs of sense." "By far." "Does it not also possess the power it has as something dispensed from this, like an influx?" "Entirely so." "Then is the sun also not sight, but being its cause, is seen by this very sight?" "That is so," he said.
τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. πῶς; ἔφη·
"Therefore," I said, "say that I mean this is the offspring of the good, which the good begot analogous to itself: what the good itself is in the intelligible region with respect to intellect and the things intellected, this the sun is in the visible region with respect to sight and the things seen." "How?" he said.
ἔτι δίελθέ μοι. ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
"Go through it further for me." "You know," I said, "that eyes, when one no longer turns them toward those things whose colors the light of day holds, but toward those which the gleams of night hold, grow dim and appear nearly blind, as if clear sight were not in them?" "Very much so," he said.
ὅταν δέ γʼ οἶμαι ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. τί μήν; οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. ἔοικε γάρ. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι·
"But when, I think, they are turned toward things that the sun illuminates, they see clearly, and sight appears to be in these very same eyes." "Of course." "In this way, then, understand also the soul: when it fixes itself upon that which truth and being illuminate, it intellects and knows it, and appears to have intellect; but when it fixes on that which is mixed with darkness, that which comes into being and perishes, it opines and grows dim, shifting its opinions up and down, and in turn seems not to have intellect." "So it seems." "Therefore, say that this which provides truth to the things known and gives the power to the knower is the idea of the good.
αἰτίαν δʼ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ·
Conceive of it as being the cause of knowledge and of truth as being known; yet, beautiful as both are—knowledge and truth—if you believe that it is something other than these and still more beautiful than them, you will believe correctly.
§6.509ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δʼ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλʼ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δʼ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. εὐφήμει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. πῶς; τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα. πῶς γάρ; καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
Just as in the other case it is right to deem light and sight sun-like, but to believe them to be the sun is not right, so here it is right to deem both of these—knowledge and truth—good-like, but to believe either of them to be the good is not right, but the state of the good is to be honored still more highly." "An unspeakable beauty you speak of," he said, "if it provides knowledge and truth, and is itself beyond them in beauty; for surely you do not say it is pleasure." "Hush!" I said, "but consider its image still further in this way." "How?" "You will say, I think, that the sun provides to the things seen not only the power of being seen, but also generation, growth, and nourishment, though it is not itself generation." "For how could it be?" "Therefore, say that to the things known, not only their being known is present from the good, but also their existence and essence are added to them by it, though the good is not essence, but still beyond essence, exceeding it in dignity and power." "And Glaucon, quite comically, said, "Apollo!
καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς. σὺ γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. καὶ μηδαμῶς γʼ, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.
What a demonic excess!" "You are the cause," I said, "by forcing me to state what seems to me about it." "And by no means stop," he said, "or if nothing else, go through again the likeness with the sun, in case you are leaving anything out." "But indeed," I said, "I am leaving out a great deal." "Do not omit even a small thing, then," he said.
ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω. μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς. οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ· ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω. μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.
"I think," I said, "I shall omit much; but nevertheless, as far as is possible in the present, I will not willingly leave anything out." "Do not, indeed," he said.
νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δʼ αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα.
"Conceive then," I said, "as we say, that there are these two, and that the one rules over the intelligible class and region, and the other over the visible, lest by saying 'heaven' I should seem to you to play word-tricks with the name.
ἀλλʼ οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν; ἔχω. ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες—
At any rate, you grasp these two classes, the visible and the intelligible?" "I do." "Take, then, as it were, a line cut into two unequal segments, and cut each segment again in the same ratio, both that of the visible class and that of the intelligible, and you will have them in relation to one another in terms of clarity and obscurity; in the visible segment, one of the segments is images—