§6.506ἥκιστά γʼ, ἔφη.
"Least of all," he said.
οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς. καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.
"At any rate, I think," I said, "that if just and beautiful things are not known in what way they are good, a guardian who is ignorant of this would not be acquired as one of any great value for them; and I divine that no one will know them sufficiently before this." "Indeed, you divine well," he said.
οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
"Will not our constitution, then, be perfectly ordered for us if such a guardian, one who has knowledge of these things, oversees it?" "Necessarily," he said.
ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῂς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;
"But you, Socrates, do you say that the good is knowledge, or pleasure, or something else besides these?" "What a man!" I said.
οὗτος, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δʼ αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. τί δέ;
"It was beautifully clear long ago that you would not be satisfied with what seems to others about them." "For it does not seem just to me, Socrates," he said, "to be able to state the opinions of others, but not one's own, after spending so much time occupied with these things." "What?" I said.
ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; οὐδαμῶς γʼ, ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθʼ ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. τί δέ;
"Does it seem just to you to speak about what one does not know as if one knew it?" "By no means as if one knew it," he said, "but to be willing to state what one thinks as what one thinks." "And what about this?" I said.
εἶπον· οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί;
"Have you not perceived that opinions without knowledge are all ugly?
ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί—ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; οὐδέν, ἔφη.
Of which the best are blind—or do those who opine something true without intellect seem to you to differ at all from blind men going correctly along a road?" "Not at all," he said.
βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρʼ ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὢν ἀποστῇς.
"Do you wish, then, to contemplate ugly, blind, and crooked things, when it is possible to hear bright and beautiful things from others?" "By Zeus, Socrates," Glaucon said, "do not stand aloof as if you were at the end.
ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει·
For it will satisfy us even if you go through the good in the same way you went through justice, temperance, and the other things." "And indeed for me, my companion," I said, "it would satisfy me very much.
ἀλλʼ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω.
But I fear lest I should not be able, and in my eagerness, by behaving unseemly, I shall incur ridicule.
ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν—ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν. ἀλλʼ, ἔφη, λέγε· εἰς αὖθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν. §6.507βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον.
But, my blessed friends, let us dismiss for now what the good itself actually is—for it seems to me to be more than can be reached by our present impulse, at least according to what seems to me now—but I am willing to speak of what appears to be an offspring of the good and most like it, if it is also pleasing to you, and if not, to let it go." "But speak," he said, "for another time you will pay the narrative about the father." "I would wish," I said, "that I were able to pay it and you to receive it, and not, as now, only the interest.
τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε.
At any rate, receive this interest and offspring of the good itself.
εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μή πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. διομολογησάμενός γʼ ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά τʼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα. τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Take care, however, lest I somehow deceive you unwillingly, paying a counterfeit account of the interest." "We shall take care," he said, "as far as we can; but only speak." "At least after coming to an agreement," I said, "and reminding you of what was said in the earlier parts and has already been said often at other times." "What things?" he said.
πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ. φαμὲν γάρ. καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατʼ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες,
ὃ ἔστιν
ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. ἔστι ταῦτα. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δʼ οὔ, τὰς δʼ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δʼ οὔ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὁρώμενα; τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη.
"Many beautiful things," I said, "and many good things, and we say and distinguish in our speech that each of these is so." "For we do say so." "And indeed, a beautiful itself and a good itself, and so concerning all the things we then set down as many, setting them down again according to a single idea of each, as if it were one, we address each as 'that which it is'." "That is so." "And the former things we say are seen, but not intellected, while the ideas are intellected, but not seen." "Entirely so." "With what of ourselves, then, do we see the things that are seen?" "With sight," he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; τί μήν; ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν; οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.
"Therefore," I said, "also with hearing the things that are heard, and with the other senses all the things that are sensed?" "Of course." "Have you, then," I said, "considered how very costly the creator of the senses made the power of seeing and being seen?" "Not very much," he said.
ἀλλʼ ὧδε σκόπει.
"But consider it this way.
ἔστιν ὅτι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούεσθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; οὐδενός, ἔφη.
Is there anything that hearing and sound need of another kind in order for the one to hear and the other to be heard, which if it is not present as a third, the one will not hear and the other will not be heard?" "Nothing," he said.
οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐδʼ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός.
"And indeed, I think," I said, "that not many others, not to say none, need any such thing.
ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Or can you name any?" "Not I," he said.
τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται; πῶς; ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;
"But do you not perceive that the power of sight and the visible do need it?" "How?" "When sight is present in the eyes and he who has it attempts to use it, and color is present in them, if a third kind, naturally suited for this very thing, is not present, you know that sight will see nothing and the colors will be invisible." "Of what do you speak by this?" he said.
ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φῶς. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
"That which you call," I said, "light." "You speak the truth," he said.