§6.510λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ. τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. τίθημι, ἔφη.
"And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and then the appearances in water and in all things that are dense, smooth, and bright, and everything of that sort, if you understand." "Yes, I understand." "Then set down the other segment which this resembles—the animals around us, and all that is planted, and the entire class of manufactured things." "I set it down," he said.
ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.
"Would you also be willing to say," I said, "that it is divided in terms of truth and untruth, so that as the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to that of which it is a likeness?" "I certainly would," he said.
σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ᾗ τμητέον. πῇ; ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δʼ αὖ ἕτερον—τὸ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι διʼ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. ταῦτʼ, ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον.
"Now consider also how the segment of the intelligible is to be cut." "How?" "In this way: in one of its parts, the soul is forced to search from hypotheses, using the things that were previously imitated as images, proceeding not to a beginning but to an end; while in the other part—that which leads to an unhypothetical beginning—it goes from a hypothesis and without the images of the other part, making its inquiry with the forms themselves through them." "I did not quite understand what you mean by this," he said.
ἀλλʼ αὖθις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσῃ.
"Well, let's try again," I said; "for you will understand more easily after these preliminary remarks.
οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθʼ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δʼ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα.
For I think you know that those who busy themselves with geometry, calculations, and such things, having hypothesized the odd and the even, and the figures, and three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each inquiry, assume they know them, and making them hypotheses, they do not think it worth while to give any account of them either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to all; and starting from these, they go through the remaining steps and end consistently at that which they set out to examine." "I certainly know that," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταύτης ἣν γράφουσιν, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. §6.511ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
"Then you also know that they make use of visible forms and argue about them, though they are not thinking about these, but about those things which these resemble, making their arguments for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, and not of this one which they draw; and similarly with the other things. These very things which they model and draw, of which there are shadows and images in water, they use in turn as images, seeking to see those actual things which one could not see otherwise than with the thought." "You speak the truth," he said.
τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δʼ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλʼ εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς διʼ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς.
"This then is what I meant by the intelligible class, but with the soul being forced to use hypotheses in its search for it, not proceeding to a beginning, since it is unable to step out above its hypotheses, but using as images those very things which were copied by the things below, and which, compared to the latter, are opined and honored as being distinct." "I understand," he said, "that you mean what falls under geometry and its sister arts." "Understand then that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic, making its hypotheses not first principles, but truly hypotheses, like stepping-stones and springboards, so that by going as far as the unhypothetical to the beginning of the whole, and grasping it, it turns back and clings to the things that cling to it, and so descends to an end, making use of nothing sensible at all, but of forms themselves, through them, to them, and ending in forms." "I understand," he said, "though not sufficiently—for you seem to me to speak of a massive task—that you wish to distinguish that which is contemplated by the science of dialectic in being and the intelligible as more clear than that contemplated by the so-called arts, for which hypotheses are principles, and where those who contemplate them are forced to do so with thought and not with the senses; but because they do not ascend to a beginning, but examine from hypotheses, they seem to you not to possess intellect about them, although they are intelligible with a first principle.
διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλʼ οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω.
And you seem to me to call the state of those in geometry and such fields thought but not intellect, as if thought were something between opinion and intellect." "You have understood most excellently," I said.
καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφʼ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ συγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.
"And take these four states arising in the soul for the four segments: intellection for the highest, thought for the second, assign trust to the third, and picture-thinking to the last; and arrange them in ratio, holding that as their objects participate in truth, so these states participate in clarity." "I understand," he said, "and I agree and arrange them as you say."