§6.504πρέπει γέ τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν.
"Indeed, we must look at it in this way," he said.
ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα; μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι συνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη. μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; τὸ ποῖον δή; ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τʼ εἴη προσάψαι.
"But what kinds of studies do you say are the greatest?" "You remember, surely," I said, "that after dividing the soul into three parts, we drew conclusions about what each of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom is?" "If I did not remember," he said, "it would be just for me not to hear the rest." "And do you also remember what was said before them?" "What was that?" "We were saying, surely, that to see them in the finest possible way, there was another longer way around, which, when traversed, would make them clear, but that it was possible to attach proofs that follow from what had been said before.
καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον.
And you said that it was sufficient, and so it was spoken then in a way that was, as it seemed to me, lacking in exactness; but whether it was to your liking, you would say." "For me, at least," he said, "it was moderate; and indeed, it seemed so to the others as well." "But, my friend," I said, "a measure of such things that falls short of what is in any way whatsoever does not become altogether moderate; for nothing that is incomplete is a measure of anything.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν. τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων. εἰκός, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
But it sometimes seems to some that they already have enough and that there is no need to seek further." "And indeed," he said, "very many experience this through laziness." "But of this condition," I said, "a guardian of the city and of the laws has least of all any need." "Likely so," he said.
τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἤ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλʼ ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν; καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,·
"The longer way around, therefore, my companion," I said, "must be traversed by such a person, and he must labor no less in learning than in physical training; otherwise, as we were saying just now, he will never reach the end of the greatest and most fitting study." "Are these not, then, the greatest," he said, "but is there something still greater than justice and those things we went through?" "Indeed, there is something greater," I said, "and even of these very things we must not contemplate a mere outline as we do now, but we must not pass over the most complete finish." "Or is it not ridiculous, while in other matters of little value we do everything, straining ourselves so that they will be as exact and pure as possible, not to deem the greatest things worthy of the greatest exactness as well?" "Very much so," he said.
ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τινʼ ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν; οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. §6.505πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοῇ ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος.
"However, as to what the greatest study is and what you say it is about, do you think," he said, "any one would let you go without asking what it is?" "Not at all," I said, "but you too, ask." "At any rate, you have heard it not a few times, but now either you do not understand, or again you intend to cause me trouble by objecting.
οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ᾗ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.
I think the latter is more likely; since that the idea of the good is the greatest study, you have often heard, by which indeed both justice and the other things, by employing it further, become useful and beneficial.
καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθʼ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ εἰ κεκτῄμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
"And now you know almost that I am going to say this, and in addition to this, that we do not know it sufficiently; and if we do not know it, and without this we should know the other things as much as possible, you know that it is of no benefit to us, just as if we possessed something without the good.
ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν;
"Or do you think there is any advantage in possessing every possession, if it is not good?
ἢ πάντα τἆλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
Or in understanding all other things without the good, but understanding nothing fine and good?" "By Zeus, not I," he said.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις. πῶς δʼ οὔ; καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως.
"But surely you also know this, that to the many, pleasure seems to be the good, and to the more refined, prudence." "How could I not?" "And indeed, my friend, those who hold this are unable to show what prudence it is, but are forced in the end to say that it is prudence of the good." "And indeed, very ridiculously," he said.
πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν;
"For how not," I said, "if, while reproaching us because we do not know the good, they speak again as if we knew it?
φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
For they say it is prudence of the good, as if we in turn understood what they say when they utter the name of the good." "Most truly," he said.
τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι;
"And what about those who define pleasure as the good?
μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων;
Are they not full of no less error than the others?
ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς; σφόδρα γε. συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἶμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἦ γάρ; τί μήν;
Or are they too not forced to admit that there are bad pleasures?" "Very much so." "It happens then, I think, that they admit that the same things are both good and bad.
οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τί δέ;
Is it not so?" "Of course." "It is clear, then, that there are great and many disputes about it?" "How could it not be?" "But what?
τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἴη, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
Is this not clear, that while many would choose what seems to be just and fine, even if they are not, nevertheless to do and possess them and seem to be so, yet as for the good, it no longer satisfies anyone to possess what seems so, but they seek what is, and here everyone already despises what seems?" "Very much so," he said.
ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἆλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;
"This, then, which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything, divining that it is something, but being in doubt and unable to grasp sufficiently what it is, nor to use a stable trust such as it has about other things, and because of this it misses also whatever benefit there was in other things—about something of this kind and of such great importance, shall we say that even those best men in the city, to whom we shall entrust everything, must be thus in the dark?"