§6.486καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. τὸ ποῖον; μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.
"And indeed, I suppose, this too must be considered," I said, "whenever you are to judge a nature that is philosophical and one that is not." "What sort of thing?" "Lest it escape your notice that it participates in illiberality; for pettiness is surely most opposed to a soul that is ever to stretch out toward the whole and the all, both divine and human." "Very true," he said.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; ἀδύνατον, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"Then, to whichever mind greatness of thought and the contemplation of all time and all reality belong, do you think it is possible for human life to seem any great thing to this person?" "Impossible," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος; ἥκιστά γε. δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. τί οὖν;
"Will such a person then also not think death to be anything terrible?" "Least of all." "Then a cowardly and illiberal nature, as it seems, would have no share in true philosophy." "It does not seem so to me." "What then?
ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδʼ ἀνελεύθερος μηδʼ ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθʼ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο; οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. τὸ ποῖον; εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής.
Can the orderly person, who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor a boaster, nor cowardly, in any way become difficult to deal with or unjust?" "It is impossible." "And this indeed, in examining a philosophical and non-philosophical soul, you will inspect straight from youth: whether it is just and gentle, or unsociable and savage." "By all means." "Nor indeed will you omit this, I think." "What sort of thing?" "Whether it is quick at learning or slow.
ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. τί δʼ εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σῴζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως;
Or do you ever expect anyone to love anything sufficiently which he does while suffering and accomplishing only a little with difficulty?" "It could not happen." "What if he could preserve nothing of what he learned, being full of forgetfulness?
ἆρʼ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; καὶ πῶς; ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἴει ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν; πῶς δʼ οὔ; ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν. τί μήν; ἀλήθειαν δʼ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγῇ συγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ; ἐμμετρίᾳ. ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. πῶς δʼ οὔ; τί οὖν;
Would he be able not to be empty of knowledge?" "How could he?" "Then, laboring to no profit, do you not think he will be forced in the end to hate both himself and such activity?" "Of course." "A forgetful soul, then, let us never class among those that are sufficiently philosophical, but let us seek that it must be of a good memory." "Completely so." "But indeed, we would say that the uncultivated and graceless nature draws nowhere else than toward lack of proportion." "Of course." "And do you think truth is akin to lack of proportion or to proportion?" "To proportion." "Let us then seek, in addition to the other things, a mind by nature proportioned and graceful, whose innate disposition will make it easily led toward the idea of each real being." "Of course." "What then?
μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι; §6.487ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Do we seem to you in any way to have gone through things that are not necessary and following from one another for the soul that is to share in reality sufficiently and completely?" "Most necessary indeed," he said.
ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψῃ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή ποτʼ ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; οὐδʼ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν.
"Is there then any way you can find fault with such an pursuit, which no one would ever be able to pursue sufficiently unless he were by nature mindful, quick at learning, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and temperance?" "Not even Momus," he said, "could find fault with such a thing." "But," I said, "to such people when they are perfected by education and age, would you not trust the city to them alone?" And Adeimantus said, "O Socrates, to these things indeed no one would be able to contradict you.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται διʼ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρʼ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἁθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλʼ ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν.
But those who hear what you say on each occasion suffer something like this: they think that, through inexperience in asking and answering, they are led astray a little by the argument at each question, and when these Littles are gathered together at the end of the discussion, a great fall appears, contrary to their first assertions; and just as by those who are clever at playing draughts the unskilful are finally blocked and have nowhere to move, so they too are finally blocked and have nothing to say by this other kind of draughts, not played with counters but with words; though the truth is not at all the more in this way.
λέγω δʼ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας.
I say this looking at the present situation.
νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθʼ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἕνεκα ἁψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δʼ ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι. ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως διʼ εἰκόνος λεγομένης. σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὐκ εἴωθας διʼ εἰκόνων λέγειν.
For now someone might say to you that in word he cannot oppose you at each question asked, but in deed he sees that as many as start out upon philosophy—not touching it when young for the sake of being educated and then leaving it, but spending a longer time in it—most of them become completely eccentric, not to say utterly depraved, while those who seem most decent nevertheless suffer this very thing from the pursuit you praise: they become useless to cities." And I, having heard this, said, "Do you think then that those who say these things are lying?" "I do not know," he said, "but I would gladly hear your opinion." "You would hear that they seem to me to speak the truth." "How then," he said, "is it right to say that cities will not cease from evils before the philosophers rule in them, whom we agree are useless to them?" "You ask," I said, "a question that needs an answer given through an image." "And you, indeed," he said, "I suppose, are not accustomed to speak through images!"