§6.484οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον. οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου. τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν; τί δʼ ἄλλο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἑξῆς;
"So, Glaucon," I said, "the philosophers and those who are not, through a rather long discourse, have with some difficulty finally been revealed as to who each group is." "Yes, for perhaps," he said, "it is not easy through a short one." "So it seems," I said; "at any rate, it still seems to me that it would have been revealed better if we had to speak about this alone, and did not have to go through many remaining things in order to see how the just life differs from the unjust." "What then," he said, "is next for us?" "What else," I said, "than what follows?
ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλʼ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι; πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν; ὁπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
Since philosophers are those who are able to grasp that which always remains in the same state in the same way, while those who cannot, but wander among many things that are in every sort of way, are not philosophers, which of the two should be leaders of the city?" "How then should we speak of it," he said, "to speak moderately?" "Whichever of the two," I said, "appear able to guard the laws and practices of cities, these we should establish as guardians." "Correct," he said.
τόδε δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν; καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;
"And is this clear," I said, "whether a blind keeper or one with sharp sight should guard anything?" "Of course it is clear," he said.
ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει. τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας; ἄτοπον μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν. §6.485οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὃ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. πῶς; τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι ὡμολογήσθω ἡμῖν ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. ὡμολογήσθω. καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
"Do they seem then to differ at all from the blind, those who are truly deprived of the knowledge of each real being, and have no vivid pattern in their soul, nor are able, looking like painters to the truest thing and always referring back there and contemplating it as accurately as possible, so indeed to establish the conventional rules here about beautiful, just, and good things, if there is need to establish them, and to preserve and guard those that are established?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "they do not differ much at all." "Shall we then set these as guardians rather than those who have known each real being, and are in no way inferior to them in experience, nor fall behind in any other part of virtue?" "It would indeed be strange," he said, "to choose others, if indeed they do not fall short in other things; for in this very thing, which is nearly the greatest, they would excel." "Shall we then state this, in what way the same people will be able to have both those and these?" "By all means." "As we were saying at the beginning of this discourse, we must first understand their nature; and I think, if we agree sufficiently on that, we shall also agree that the same people are able to have both, and that there should be no other leaders of cities than these." "How?" "Concerning the philosophical natures, let this be agreed by us, that they are always in love with learning which reveals to them that reality which always is and does not wander under generation and destruction." "Let it be agreed." "And indeed," I said, "also that they love all of it, and do not willingly give up any part, whether small or greater, or more honorable or more dishonorable, just as we went through previously concerning those who are ambitious and those who are in love." "You speak correctly," he said.
τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἳ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἵους ἐλέγομεν. τὸ ποῖον; τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δʼ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη.
"Consider then next after this whether those who are to be such as we were saying must also have this in their nature." "What sort of thing?" "Truthfulness, and never willingly to accept falsehood but to hate it, and to cherish the truth." "It is likely," he said.
οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
"Not only likely, my friend, but also completely necessary that one who is by nature passionately in love with something should cherish all that is kindred and kindred-related to the beloved." "Correct," he said.
ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις; καὶ πῶς; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"Could you then find anything more kindred to wisdom than truth?" "Of course not," he said.
ἦ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ φιλοψευδῆ; οὐδαμῶς γε. τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅτι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. παντελῶς γε. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. τί μήν; ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθʼ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλʼ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη. μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. οὕτω.
"Is it then possible for the same nature to be both a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?" "In no way." "The true lover of learning, then, must from youth stretch out as much as possible toward all truth." "Completely so." "But indeed, we know, I suppose, that for whomsoever desires flow strongly toward one thing, they are weaker toward other things, like a stream diverted there." "Of course." "Then, for those whose desires have flowed toward learning and all such things, they would be concerned, I think, with the pleasure of the soul itself by itself, and would abandon those through the body, if indeed one is not a counterfeit but a true philosopher." "Greatly necessary." "Moreover, such a person is temperate and in no way a lover of money; for the things for which money is sought with great expense belong to anyone else to be zealous about rather than this person." "So it is."