§5.479τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστὸς ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω.
"With these things indeed assumed," I shall say, "let that excellent man speak and answer me, who holds that there is no beauty itself or any idea of beauty itself always remaining in the same state in the same way, but who believes in many beautiful things—that lover of sights who can in no way endure if anyone says that the beautiful is one, and the just, and the other things likewise.
τούτων γὰρ δή, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται;
"For indeed, my excellent friend," we shall say, "of these many beautiful things, is there any that will not appear ugly?
καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον;
And of the just things, any that will not appear unjust?
καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐρωτᾷς. τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια;
And of the holy things, any that will not appear unholy?" "No, but it is necessary," he said, "for them to appear in some way both beautiful and ugly, and all the other things you ask about." "And what about the many doubles?
ἧττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; οὐδέν. καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία; οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ἀεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται. πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο ὃ ἄν τις φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι; τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικεν, καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου, τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφʼ οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτʼ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. ἔχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι χρήσῃ, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι;
Do they appear any less halves than doubles?" "Not at all." "And the things we call great and small, light and heavy—will they be addressed by these names any more than by their opposites?" "No, but each," he said, "will always participate in both." "Is then each of the many things any more than it is not that which anyone says it is?" "They are like the double-meaning jokes at banquets," he said, "and the children's riddle about the eunuch, concerning his throwing at the bat, with what and upon what they riddle that he struck it; for these things too have a double meaning, and it is impossible to understand any of them fixedly either as being or as not being, or as both or as neither." "Do you know then," I said, "what to do with them, or where you will place them in a better position than between being and not being?
οὔτε γάρ που σκοτωδέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
For surely they will not appear darker than what is not, so as not to be any more, nor brighter than what is, so as to be more." "Most true," he said.
ηὑρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. ηὑρήκαμεν. προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλʼ οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητὸν ἁλισκόμενον. ὡμολογήκαμεν. τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας μηδʼ ἄλλῳ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἕπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μή, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
"We have found indeed, as it seems, that the many conventional notions of the many people about beauty and the other things roll around somewhere between what is not and what purely is." "We have found it." "And we agreed beforehand that, if any such thing should appear, it must be said to be opinable but not knowable, the intermediate wanderer being captured by the intermediate power." "We agreed." "Those indeed who look at many beautiful things, but do not see beauty itself nor are able to follow another who leads them to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and all things likewise, we shall say that they opine all things, but know nothing of what they opine." "Necessarily," he said.
τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα;
"And what on the other hand of those who look at each of the things themselves that always remain in the same state in the same way?
ἆρʼ οὐ γιγνώσκειν ἀλλʼ οὐ δοξάζειν; ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα. §5.480οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν ἐφʼ οἷς γνῶσίς ἐστιν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφʼ οἷς δόξα;
Do they not know and not opine?" "This too is necessary." "Shall we not then say that these welcome and love the things over which knowledge is, and those the things over which opinion is?
ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χρόας καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτʼ ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδʼ ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι ὄν; μεμνήμεθα. μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους;
Or do we not remember that we said they love and look at beautiful sounds and colors and such things, but do not even endure beauty itself as being anything?" "We remember." "Shall we then commit any error if we call them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom?
καὶ ἆρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν; οὔκ, ἄν γέ μοι πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις. τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὂν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
And will they be very angry with us if we speak thus?" "No, if they are persuaded by me," he said; "for it is not lawful to be angry with the truth." "Must we then call those who welcome each thing itself that is, lovers of wisdom, and not lovers of opinion?" "By all means."