§5.477ὄν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη; ἱκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὂν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον; ἱκανώτατα.
"What is; for how could something that is not be known?" "Do we then hold this sufficiently, even if we were to consider it in many ways: that what completely is is completely knowable, and what in no way is is in every way unknowable?" "Most sufficiently." "Very well.
εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δή τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος; μεταξύ. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἆρʼ οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν; ἄλλην. ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς. οὕτω. οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; —μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι. πῶς; φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.
But if something is in such a condition as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between what purely is and what, on the other hand, in no way is?" "Between." "Therefore, while knowledge was over what is, and ignorance of necessity over what is not, must not some intermediate between ignorance and knowledge be sought over this intermediate, if there happens to be any such thing?" "Entirely so." "Do we then say that opinion is something?" "How could we not?" "Is it a different power from knowledge, or the same?" "Different." "Then opinion is set over one thing and knowledge over another, each according to its own power." "So it is." "Then is knowledge by nature over what is, to know what is as it is? —Or rather, it seems to me to be necessary first to distinguish in this way." "How?" "Shall we say that powers are a class of things that are, by which we too are able to do what we are able to do, and every other thing does whatever it is able to do? For example, I say sight and hearing are among powers, if you indeed understand the form I wish to speak of." "Yes, I understand," he said.
ἄκουσον δὴ ὅ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν.
"Hear then what seems to me about them.
δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρʼ ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα·
For in the case of a power, I see neither any color nor shape, nor any of such things as I do in many other things, looking to which I distinguish some to be one thing and some another in my own mind.
δυνάμεως δʼ εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφʼ ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην.
But in the case of a power, I look only to that over which it is and what it accomplishes, and in this way I have called each of them a power; and that which is set over the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same power, and that which is set over a different thing and accomplishes a different thing I call different.
τί δὲ σύ;
What about you?
πῶς ποιεῖς; οὕτως, ἔφη.
How do you do?" "In that way," he said.
δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε.
"Come back here then, my excellent friend," I said.
ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῂς εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τιθεῖς; εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην. τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;
"Do you say that knowledge itself is a certain power, or in what class do you place it?" "In this one," he said, "as the most robust of all powers." "What about opinion?
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὡμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη; §5.478καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν. ἕτερον. ἐφʼ ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν; ἀνάγκη. ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὂν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει; ναί. δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν; ναί.
Shall we bring it into power or into another form?" "By no means," he said; "for that by which we are able to opine is nothing other than opinion." "But yet a little while before you agreed that knowledge and opinion are not the same." "For how," he said, "could anyone with mind place the infallible and the not infallible as the same?" "Excellent," I said, "and it is clear that opinion is agreed by us to be different from knowledge." "Different." "Then each of them is by nature over a different thing, having a different power?" "Necessarily." "Knowledge, I suppose, is over what is, to know what is as it is?" "Yes." "And opinion, we say, is to opine?" "Yes." "Is it the same thing that knowledge knows?
ἦ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γιγνώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τὸ αὐτό;
And will the knowable and the opinable be the same?
ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων·
Or is it impossible?" "Impossible," he said, "from what has been agreed.
εἴπερ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ ἄλλη δύναμις πέφυκεν, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφότεραί ἐστον, δόξα τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστὸν καὶ δοξαστὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὂν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὂν εἴη; ἄλλο.
If a different power is by nature over a different thing, and both are powers, opinion and knowledge, and each is different, as we say, then from these indeed it is not allowed for the knowable and the opinable to be the same." "Then if what is is knowable, would the opinable be something other than what is?" "Something other." "Does it then opine what is not?
ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τό γε μὴ ὄν;
Or is it impossible even to opine what is not?
ἐννόει δέ.
Consider it.
οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν;
Does not the one who opines direct his opinion toward something?
ἢ οἷόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλʼ ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων; ναί. ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο; πάνυ γε. μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν; ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
Or is it possible on the other hand to opine, but to opine nothing?" "Impossible." "But the one who opines opines some one thing at least?" "Yes." "But surely what is not would be most correctly called not some one thing, but nothing?" "Entirely so." "Yet to what is not we assigned ignorance of necessity, and to what is knowledge?" "Correctly," he said.
οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει; οὐ γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη; οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἄρʼ οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γνῶσιν σαφηνείᾳ ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφείᾳ; οὐδέτερα. ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, γνώσεως μέν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον; καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη.
"Then it opines neither what is nor what is not?" "No indeed." "Then opinion would be neither ignorance nor knowledge?" "It does not seem so." "Is it then outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in clarity or ignorance in obscurity?" "Neither." "But then," I said, "does opinion seem to you to be darker than knowledge, but brighter than ignorance?" "And very much so," he said.
ἐντὸς δʼ ἀμφοῖν κεῖται; ναί. μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοιν δόξα. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κεῖσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὖ φανὲν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης; ὀρθῶς. νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοιν ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν; πέφανται. ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν εὑρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες.
"And does it lie within both?" "Yes." "Then opinion would be between these two?" "By all means." "Then did we not say in what went before that, if something should appear such as to be and not to be at the same time, such a thing would lie between what purely is and what is altogether not, and there would be neither knowledge nor ignorance over it, but what appeared in turn between ignorance and knowledge?" "Correctly." "And now indeed has that which we call opinion appeared between these two?" "It has appeared." "What would indeed be left for us to find, as it seems, is that which participates in both—in being and not being—and which could not correctly be addressed as either of them purely, so that, if it should appear, we may justly address it as the opinable, assigning the extremes to the extremes and the intermediates to the intermediates.
ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω.
Or is it not so?" "It is so."