§5.475καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούντων ἐν ὥρᾳ. εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπʼ ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν. τί δέ; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"And in a word, you make all excuses and utter all voices, so as to reject no one of those in the bloom of youth." "If you wish," he said, "to speak of amorous men, using me as an example, that they act in this way, I grant it for the sake of the argument." "What about this?" I said.
τοὺς φιλοίνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντας ὁρᾷς;
"Do you not see the lovers of wine doing these very same things?
πάντα οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους; καὶ μάλα. καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καθορᾷς ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγῆσαι δύνωνται, τριττυαρχοῦσιν, κἂν μὴ ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. τοῦτο δὴ φάθι ἢ μή· ἆρα ὃν ἄν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μέν, τοῦ δὲ οὔ; παντός, ἔφη.
Welcoming every wine on every pretext?" "Very much so." "And indeed, I think you observe of the lovers of honor that, if they cannot be generals, they serve as captains, and if they cannot be honored by greater and more dignified people, they are satisfied with being honored by smaller and meaner ones, as being overall desirers of honor." "By all means." "Now say this or not: when we say someone is a desirer of something, shall we say he desires the whole of this class, or one part of it and not another?" "The whole," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης; ἀληθῆ. τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστὸν καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῆ οὔτε πεινῆν φαμεν οὔτʼ ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν. τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἁσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δʼ ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον· ἦ γάρ; καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη· πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσονταί σοι τοιοῦτοι.
"Then shall we not also say that the philosopher is a desirer of wisdom, not of one part and not of another, but of all of it?" "True." "Then the one who is squeamish about learning, especially when he is young and does not yet have an account of what is useful and what is not, we shall not say is a lover of learning or a philosopher, just as we say that one who is squeamish about food is neither hungry nor desires food, and is not a lover of food but a bad eater." "And we shall say so correctly." "But the one who is willingly ready to taste of every learning and goes gladly to learning and is insatiable, this one we shall justly say is a philosopher; isn't that so?" And Glaucon said, "Then many and strange people will be of this kind for you.
οἵ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἵ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὥς γʼ ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἳ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἑκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὦτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι.
For all the lovers of sights seem to me to be such because they rejoice in learning, and the lovers of hearing are some of the strangest to place among philosophers, who would not willingly go to arguments and such pastimes, but as if having hired out their ears, run around to all choruses at the Dionysia, missing neither those in the cities nor those in the villages.
τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν μαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν; οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας.
Shall we then say that all these, and others who are learners of some such things and those who love petty arts, are philosophers?" "By no means," I said, "but they are similar to philosophers." "But the true ones," he said, "who do you say they are?" "The lovers of the sight of truth," I said.
καὶ τοῦτο μέν γʼ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις; οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως πρός γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τοιόνδε. τὸ ποῖον; ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρῷ, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι. §5.476πῶς δʼ οὔ; οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον; καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
"That indeed is correct," he said, "but how do you mean it?" "By no means easily to another," I said, "but you, I think, will agree with me on this sort of thing." "What sort of thing?" "Since beautiful is opposite to ugly, they are two." "How could it not be so?" "Then since they are two, is each also one?" "That too." "And indeed about just and unjust, good and bad, and of all the forms, the same account holds: each itself is one, but by the association with actions, bodies, and one another, appearing everywhere, each appears to be many." "You speak correctly," he said.
ταύτῃ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὓς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους. πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
"In this way, then, I divide them," I said, "apart on one side are those you just now called lovers of sights, lovers of arts, and practical men, ""and apart on the other are those about whom the argument is, whom alone one could correctly call philosophers." "How do you mean?" he said.
οἱ μέν που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ἔφη, οὕτως.
"The lovers of hearing and lovers of sights, I suppose," I said, "welcome beautiful voices, colors, shapes, and all things fashioned from such things, but their intellect is unable to see and welcome the nature of the beautiful itself." "For indeed, it is so," he said.
οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθʼ αὑτὸ ἆρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν; καὶ μάλα. ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἄν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἕπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;
"But those who are able to go to the beautiful itself and see it by itself, would they not be rare?" "Very much so." "The one who believes in beautiful things, but does not believe in the beautiful itself, nor is able to follow if someone leads him to the knowledge of it, does he seem to you to live in a dream or awake?
σκόπει δέ.
Look at it.
τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἆρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντʼ ἐγρηγορὼς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν; ἐγὼ γοῦν ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον. τί δέ; ὁ τἀναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.
Is dreaming not this: whether one is asleep or awake, to think that what is similar to something is not similar, but is the very thing itself which it resembles?" "I at least," he said, "would say that such a person is dreaming." "What about the one who holds the opposite of these, who thinks there is a beautiful itself, and is able to see both it and the things that participate in it, and does not think the participating things are it, nor that it is the participating things—does he seem to you to live awake or in a dream?" "Very much awake," he said.
οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί οὖν ἐὰν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνῃ οὗτος, ὅν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλʼ οὐ γιγνώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν;
"Then would we not correctly say that the intellect of this one, as knowing, is knowledge, but that of the other, as opining, is opinion?" "Entirely so." "What then if this person, whom we say opines but does not know, gets angry with us and disputes that we do not speak the truth?
ἕξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἠρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει; δεῖ γέ τοι δή, ἔφη.
Will we have some way to soothe him and gently persuade him, while concealing that he is not in a healthy state?" "It is indeed necessary," he said.
ἴθι δή, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν.
"Come then, consider what we shall say to him.
ἢ βούλει ὧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρʼ αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλʼ ἅσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι.
Or do you wish that we inquire of him in this way, saying that if he knows something, there is no grudge against him, but we would gladly see him knowing something.
ἀλλʼ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τόδε· ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τὶ ἢ οὐδέν;
But tell us this: does the one who knows know something or nothing?
σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου. ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γιγνώσκει τί. πότερον ὂν ἢ οὐκ ὄν;
You, then, answer me on his behalf." "I will answer," he said, "that he knows something." "Is it what is, or what is not?"