Humanitext Reader

Plato · Republic §2.382-2.383

The True Lie and the Principle That God Does Not Deceive

Passage 33 of 153 · Greek

Summary

Socrates explains that while the "true lie" (ignorance in the soul about reality) is hated by both gods and men, the "lie in words" is only useful for humans under specific conditions. Since God is perfectly simple and true, having no reason to lie, Socrates establishes the second pattern: that the gods do not deceive humans through sorcery or falsehood.

§2.382τί δέ;
"What about this?" I said.
ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων; οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"Would a god wish to lie, either in word or in deed, by presenting a phantom?" "I do not know," he said.
οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
"Do you not know," I said, "that the true lie, if one may call it that, is hated by all gods and men?" "How do you mean?" he said.
οὕτως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι. οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μανθάνω. οἴει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. πολύ γε, ἔφη.
"In this way," I said, "that to lie in the most sovereign part of themselves and about the most sovereign things is what no one willingly wishes, but rather everyone fears most of all to possess it there." "Even now," he said, "I do not yet understand." "For you think," I said, "that I am saying something solemn; but I mean that to lie and to have been deceived in the soul about the things that are, and to be ignorant, and to have and possess the lie there, is what everyone would least accept, and they hate it most of all in such a case." "Very much so," he said.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γʼ ἄν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου·
"But indeed, most correctly, as I was just saying, this would be called the true lie: the ignorance in the soul of the one who has been deceived.
ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.
For the lie in words is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, and an image that arises later, not a completely unmixed lie.
ἢ οὐχ οὕτω; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. δοκεῖ μοι.
Or is it not so?" "Entirely so." "Then the lie in reality is hated not only by gods but also by men." "So it seems to me." "What then about the lie in words?
τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις; πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους;
When and for whom is it useful, so as not to be deserving of hatred?
ἆρʼ οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται;
Is it not against enemies, and with those called friends, when through madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad, that it then becomes useful as a preventive medicine?
καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.
And in those mythologies we were just speaking of, because of our not knowing where the truth lies concerning ancient things, by making the lie as like the truth as possible, do we not make it useful in this way?" "Very much so," he said.
κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον;
"In which of these ways, then, is the lie useful to God?
πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο; γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ἔφη.
Would He lie because of not knowing ancient things, by making an imitation?" "That would be ridiculous," he said.
ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλὰ διʼ οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν; ἀλλʼ οὐδείς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής.
"Then there is no lying poet in God." "I do not think so." "But would He lie because of fearing His enemies?" "Far from it." "But because of the folly or madness of His own?" "But no one who is foolish or mad is dear to the gods," he said.
οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο. οὐκ ἔστιν. πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
"There is then no reason for which a god would lie." "There is not." "Therefore, the demonic and the divine is altogether free from falsehood." "Entirely so," he said.
§2.383κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθʼ ὕπαρ οὐδʼ ὄναρ. οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος. συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ; συγχωρῶ. πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῇ ἡ Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὑτῆς γάμοις ᾄδοντα "ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἑὰς εὐπαιδίας" — " νόσων τʼ ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους, ξύμπαντά τʼ εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας παιᾶνʼ ἐπηυφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.
"Altogether, then, God is simple and true both in deed and in word, and He neither changes Himself nor deceives others, neither by phantoms nor by words nor by sending signs, neither awake nor in dreams." "So it seems to me too," he said, "as you speak." "Do you agree then," I said, "that this is the second pattern in accordance with which we must speak and compose concerning the gods, namely that they are not sorcerers who change themselves, nor do they mislead us with falsehoods in word or in deed?" "I agree." "While we praise many things in Homer, then, we shall not praise this, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor that of Aeschylus, when Thetis says that Apollo, singing at her wedding: ' welcomed her happy offspring, free from sickness and living long lives, and having spoken of all my fortunes as dear to the gods, he sang a paean of blessing, gladdening my heart.
κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ·
And I expected the divine, untruthful mouth of Phoebus to be free from falsehood, teeming with prophetic art; but he, himself singing, himself present at the feast, himself saying these things, is the very one who killed my son.
ὁ δʼ, αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών, αὐτὸς τάδʼ εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν— " ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθʼ ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε. παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῴμην.
' When anyone says such things about the gods, we shall be angry and shall not grant a chorus, nor shall we allow teachers to use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are to be god-fearing and divine, as far as it is possible for a human being to be." "Entirely," he said, "I agree with these patterns, and I would use them as laws."

Notes

  1. 382aτῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν — A dative of respect or sphere ("in the most sovereign part of themselves"). The genitive ἑαυτῶν is a reflexive pronoun referring back to the plural subjects. The "most sovereign part" implicitly refers to the soul (ψυχή).
  2. 382bἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου — The masculine singular genitive of the perfect passive participle of ψεύδομαι (substantivized with the article). It carries a perfective aspect emphasizing the persistent state of "one who has been deceived" or holds a false belief.
  3. 382cπότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον — The word τῷ is the Attic contracted form of the dative interrogative pronoun τίνι. It means "when and for whom (or in what respect) is it useful?" The dative is understood as a dative of interest (reference).
  4. 383bἐνδατεῖσθαι — Present infinitive. Derived from the root meaning "to divide or distribute," in poetic usage it transfers to "to dwell upon in words," "to detail," or "to celebrate at length." Here, it refers to Apollo detailing the happy prospects of Thetis's offspring.

Cite this passage

Plato, Republic §2.382-2.383. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:2.382-2.383

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