Humanitext Reader

Plato · Republic §2.378-2.379

Limits on Myth and God as the Cause of Only Good

Passage 31 of 153 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues for the exclusion of myths depicting divine cruelty and discord, such as those of Uranus and Cronus, from the city, and establishes the first principle of myth-making: that God is essentially good and the cause of only good things, not of evil.

§2.378πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανός τε ἠργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν.
"First," I said, "the greatest falsehood about the greatest things was lied not finely by the one who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did, and how Cronus in turn punished him.
τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑέος, οὐδʼ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτως λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, διʼ ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι. καὶ γάρ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί. καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γʼ, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει.
But the deeds of Cronus and what he suffered at the hands of his son, even if they were true, I should not think ought to be told so easily to the foolish and young; rather, they should be kept silent most of all, but if there were some necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secret by as few as possible, after sacrificing not a pig but some great and hard-to-come-by victim, so that it might happen to as few as possible to hear them." "For indeed," he said, "these stories are troublesome." "And they must not be told, I said, Adeimantus, in our city.
οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδʼ αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῴη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.
Nor must it be told to a young listener that in committing the ultimate injustice he would be doing nothing surprising, nor again in punishing his father who commits injustice in every way, but that he would be doing just what the first and greatest of the gods did." "No, by Zeus," he said, "neither to myself do they seem suitable to be told." "Nor indeed," I said, "is it to be said at all that gods war against gods, and conspire and fight—for indeed it is not true—if, at least, those who are to guard the city for us must consider it most shameful to be easily hostile to one another.
οὐδέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ—εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάξειν αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι—πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν—ἀλλʼ εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδʼ ἔστιν τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί, καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν.
Far from it, we must not tell them myths about giant-battles or embroider them, nor about many other various enmities of gods and heroes against their own kinsmen and relatives. But if we are somehow to persuade them that no citizen was ever hostile to another and that this is not holy, such things rather must be told to children right from the start by both old men and old women, and as they grow older, the poets must be compelled to compose stories close to these.
Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ ὑέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτʼ ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν.
But Hera's bindings by her son, and Hephaestus's flinging by his father when he was about to defend his mother who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has composed must not be admitted into the city, whether they are composed with allegographical undercurrents or without them.
ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλʼ ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι·
For the young person is not able to judge what is undercurrent and what is not, but whatever opinions he receives at that age tend to become hard to wash out and unalterable.
ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν. ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.
For these very reasons, perhaps, we must make it of the utmost importance that the first things they hear should be myths told in the finest possible way with a view to virtue." "Yes, that makes sense," he said.
ἀλλʼ εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῴη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα τʼ ἐστὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν; §2.379καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ οἰκισταὶ πόλεως·
"But if someone in turn should ask us about these things, what they are and which myths they are, which ones should we say?" And I said, "Adeimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city.
οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρʼ οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους. ὀρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; τοιοίδε πού τινες, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάντέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.
And for founders, it is fitting to know the patterns within which the poets must tell their myths, and which they must not be permitted to go against if they compose them, but it is not indeed for the founders themselves to compose myths." "Rightly so," he said; "but this very thing, what would be the patterns concerning theology?" "Something like this, I suppose," I said: "such as God happens to be, so He must always, surely, be represented, whether one composes about Him in epic poetry, or in lyric songs, or in tragedy.
δεῖ γάρ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω; τί μήν; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἦ γάρ; οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὃ μὴ βλαβερὸν βλάπτει; οὐδαμῶς. ὃ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακόν τι ποιεῖ; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ οὐδʼ ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον; πῶς γάρ; τί δέ;
For it is necessary." "Then is God really good, and must He be said to be so?" "Of course." "But indeed, nothing that is good is harmful, is it?" "I do not think so." "Does that which is not harmful do harm?" "By no means." "And does that which does no harm do any evil?" "Neither that." "And that which does no evil would not be the cause of any evil, would it?" "How could it be?" "What then?
ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; ναί. αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας; ναί. οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. παντελῶς γʼ, ἔφη.
Is the good beneficial?" "Yes." "Is it then the cause of well-being?" "Yes." "Then the good is not the cause of all things, but the cause of things that are in a good state, while of evil things it is guiltless." "Entirely so," he said.
οὐδʼ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος·
"Then," I said, "God, since He is good, would not be the cause of all things, as the many say, but the cause of few things for human beings, and guiltless of many.
πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλʼ ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν θεόν. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὁμήρου οὔτʼ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος— " ὡς δοιοί τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὃ δειλῶν· " καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μείξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῷ ἀμφοτέρων, " ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δʼ ἐσθλῷ· " ᾧ δʼ ἂν μή, ἀλλʼ ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα, " τὸν δὲ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει·
For our good things are much fewer than our evils, and for the good things no one else must be held responsible, but for the evils we must seek other causes, and not God." "You seem to me," he said, "to speak most truly." "Then," I said, "we must not accept either from Homer or from any other poet this error concerning the gods, foolishly erring and saying: "Two jars lie on the floor of Zeus, full of fates, the one of good things, the other of wretched ones; ""and to whom Zeus gives them mixed, combining both," "at one time he meets with evil, at another with good; ""but to whom he does not, but gives the other unmixed," "him a wretched hunger drives over the divine earth; ""nor that Zeus has been established for us as the dispenser" "both of good and of evil.
" οὐδʼ ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς— " ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται. "
"

Notes

  1. 378cπολλοῦ δεῖ — An impersonal idiomatic expression meaning 'far from it' or 'by no means'. In this context, building on the preceding argument that guardians must avoid mutual hostility, it strongly prohibits telling myths such as giant-battles, indicating that such actions are entirely out of the question.
  2. 378dοὐ παραδεκτέον — An impersonal neuter singular usage of the verbal adjective παραδεκτέος ('to be accepted'), which takes its direct objects in the accusative (Ἥρας δεσμούς, Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις, θεομαχίας ὅσας). It expresses obligation or prohibition, meaning 'must not be admitted'.
  3. 379aοἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν — A construction of τυγχάνω with the participle ὤν, meaning 'such as God actually happens to be'. Although τυγχάνω originally denotes happenstance ('to happen to be'), in prose it is frequently used to emphasize the objective fact or essence of being ('actually is').

Cite this passage

Plato, Republic §2.378-2.379. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:2.378-2.379

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