§2.367εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ σύνοικος ᾖ.
For if this had been said from the beginning by all of you, and from our youth you had persuaded us, we would not be guarding against one another lest we act unjustly, but each would be his own best guardian, fearing lest by acting unjustly he should dwell with the greatest evil.
ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ.
These things, Socrates, and perhaps even more than these, Thrasymachus or someone else might say concerning justice and injustice, vulgarly turning their powers upside down, as it seems to me at least.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τἀναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω.
But I—for I have no need to hide anything from you—desiring to hear the opposite from you, speak as stretch-out as I can.
μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτὴν ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν·
Therefore, do not only show us in your argument that justice is better than injustice, but also what each does to its possessor by itself, whereby the one is an evil and the other a good.
τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο.
And remove reputations, as Glaucon directed.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορον.
For if you do not remove the true reputations from both sides and add the false ones, we shall say that you are not praising justice but the appearance of it, nor are you censuring being unjust but the appearance of it, and that you are encouraging one to be unjust and remain hidden, and agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is another's good, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself, but disadvantageous to the weaker.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, καὶ ὅσʼ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει ἀλλʼ οὐ δόξῃ ἐστίν, τοῦτʼ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν·
Therefore, since you have agreed that justice is among the greatest goods, which are worth possessing both for the sake of their results and much more for their own sakes, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and indeed being healthy, and whatever other goods are fruitful by their own nature and not by reputation, praise this very aspect of justice: how by itself it benefits its possessor and how injustice harms him, and leave salaries and reputations to others to praise.
ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις, διότι πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο.
For I might accept it from others when they praise justice and censure injustice in this way, eulogizing and reviling their reputations and rewards, but not from you, unless you should command it, because through all your life you have passed looking at nothing else than this.
μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτήν, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν ἐστι.
Therefore, do not only show us in your argument that justice is better than injustice, but also what each does by itself to its possessor, whether it remains hidden or not from gods and men, the one being a good and the other an evil.
§2.368καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην καὶ εἶπον· οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών—
"
παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός· "
τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν·
And when I heard this, though I had always admired the nature of both Glaucon and Adeimantus, on that occasion too I was indeed very much pleased and said: It was not badly sung of you, O sons of that man, by the lover of Glaucon, at the beginning of his elegies when you distinguished yourselves in the battle at Megara, saying: "Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of an illustrious man." This, my friends, seems to me to be well-said; for you have experienced something truly divine, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, while being able to speak so well on its behalf.
πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι—τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατά γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστουν ἂν ὑμῖν—ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι.
Indeed, you seem to me truly not to be persuaded—and I infer this from your general character, since from the arguments themselves I would have distrusted you—but the more I believe you, the more I am at a loss as to what to do.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι—σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἃ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου—οὔτʼ αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδʼ ὅσιον ᾖ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κακηγορουμένῃ ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι.
For I have no way to help; for I seem to myself to be incapable—and my proof is that what I thought I had demonstrated to Thrasymachus, namely that justice is better than injustice, you did not accept from me—nor on the other hand have I any way not to help; for I fear it may not even be holy to stand by when justice is being defamed and to fail her, failing to help while still breathing and able to speak.
κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ.
It is best, therefore, to succor her in such a way as I can.
ὅ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τἀληθὲς ποτέρως ἔχει.
Glaucon, therefore, and the others begged me in every way to help and not to let the argument go, but to investigate what each of them is and how the truth stands concerning their utility.
εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλʼ ὀξὺ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκῶ μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἶμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσει καθορᾷς; ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ.
I said, therefore, what seemed to me: 'The inquiry we are undertaking is no trivial affair but requires one with sharp sight, as it appears to me.' 'Since, therefore, we are not clever,' I said, 'I think we should make such an inquiry into it as if someone had ordered people who do not have very sharp sight to read small letters from afar, and then someone noticed that the same letters are somewhere else larger and on a larger surface; it would have appeared a godsend, I think, to read those first and then to examine the smaller ones, to see if they happen to be the same.' 'Very much so,' said Adeimantus; 'but what such thing, Socrates, do you discern in the inquiry concerning justice?' 'I will tell you,' I said.
δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
'Justice, we say, belongs to an individual man, and does it not also belong to an entire city?' 'Certainly,' he said.
οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἑνὸς ἀνδρός; μεῖζον, ἔφη.
'Is not a city larger than an individual man?' 'Larger,' he said.