§2.365βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθʼ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.
And they produce a bustle of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according to which they perform sacrifices, persuading not only private individuals but also cities that indeed redemptions and purifications from injustices through sacrifices and pleasurable play exist both for the living and for the dead, which indeed they call rites, which release us from the evils over there, while for those who do not sacrifice, terrible things remain in store.
ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι;
"My dear Socrates," he said, "when all these things are said, of such a kind and so great in number, concerning virtue and vice, and how men and gods esteem them, what do we think they do to the souls of the young people who hear them—those who are naturally gifted and capable, as if flitting over all the things said, to gather from them what sort of person one should be and in what way one should journey through life to pass through it best?
λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὑτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ
"πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς"
καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ;
For he would likely say to himself, according to Pindar, that: 'Shall I by justice or by crooked deceits ascend a loftier wall,' and having thus fortified myself, live out my life?
τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασμένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται.
For according to what is said, if I am just, but do not also seem so, they say there is no benefit, but rather visible labors and losses; but for the unjust man who has secured a reputation for justice, a wondrous life is promised.
οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ
τὸ δοκεῖν
, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί,
"καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται"
καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως·
Therefore, since 'seeming,' as the wise men show me, 'forces even the truth' and is master of happiness, I must turn to this entirely.
πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλʼ ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει.
I must draw around myself a shadow-painting of virtue as a vestibule and facade, but behind me I must trail the profitable and crafty fox of the most wise Archilochus." "But," someone says, "it is not easy to remain hidden always when one is wicked." "Neither is anything else easy, we shall say, of the great things; but nevertheless, if we are to be happy, we must go this way, as the tracks of the arguments lead.
ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν;
For to remain hidden we shall form conspiracies and factions, and there are teachers of persuasion who impart wisdom for public speaking and law courts, by which we shall persuade in some cases and use force in others, so that while overreaching we do not pay the penalty." "But surely it is impossible to hide from the gods or to force them." "Therefore, if they do not exist, or if they care nothing for human affairs, why should we care about remaining hidden?
εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ
"εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν"
καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι, οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. §2.366εἰ δʼ οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων.
But if they do exist and do care, we know of them and have heard of them from no other source than the laws and the poets who wrote the genealogies; and these very poets say that they are such as to be turned aside, being persuaded by sacrifices and 'gentle prayers' and votive offerings, both of which we must believe, or neither." "If, then, we must believe them, we should act unjustly and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our injustices.
δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἳ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν. κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροίμεθʼ ἄν, ἣν ἐὰν μετʼ εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος;
For if we are just, we shall only go unpunished by the gods, but we shall lose the profits from injustice; whereas if we are unjust, we shall gain those profits, and by supplicating them when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them and escape unpunished." "But we shall pay the penalty in Hades for the injustices we commit here, either we ourselves or our children's children." ""But, my friend," he will say, calculating, "the rites in turn have great power, and the liberating gods, as the greatest cities declare, and the children of gods who became poets and prophets of the gods, who reveal that these things are so." "For what reason, then, should we still choose justice before the greatest injustice, which if we acquire with a counterfeit outward appearance, we shall fare according to our mind both with gods and with men, living and dead, as the argument of the many and the eminent says?
ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δή τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλʼ οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρως ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν οἷός τʼ ᾖ.
From all that has been said, what means is there, Socrates, for someone to be willing to honor justice, if he possesses some power of soul, or of wealth, or of body, or of birth, rather than laugh when he hears it praised?" "For indeed, if anyone is able to prove that what we have said is false, and has fully grasped that justice is best, he surely has great sympathy and is not angry with the unjust, but knows that except for someone who by a divine nature loathes acting unjustly or by having acquired knowledge abstains from it, no one else is willingly just, but rather because of cowardice or old age or some other weakness, they censure injustice, being unable to do it." "And that this is clear is shown by the fact that the first of such people to come to power is the first to do injustice, to the extent that he is able.
καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησεν καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι
ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδʼ ἐπῄνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας·
And of all this, nothing else is the cause than that which initiated this entire argument of his and mine to you, Socrates, namely: 'O amazing Socrates, of all of you who say you are praisers of justice—beginning from the heroes of old whose arguments have been left behind, down to the people of today—no one has ever censured injustice or praised justice otherwise than for the reputations, honors, and gifts that come from them.
αὐτὸ δʼ ἑκάτερον τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει τί δρᾷ, τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν, καὶ λανθάνον θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτʼ ἐν ποιήσει οὔτʼ ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν.
But as to what each of them does by its own power, being present in the soul of the one who possesses it, and hidden from both gods and men, no one has ever sufficiently set forth in poetry or in private speech the argument that injustice is the greatest of evils that a soul holds within itself, and justice the greatest good.'"