§2.361πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω—οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πῃ σφαλῇ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι—οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι.
First, then, let the unjust man act like clever artisans—just as a top navigator or doctor discerns both what is impossible and what is possible in his art, and attempts the latter while letting the former go; and further, if he happens to make a slip, he is capable of correcting it—so also let the unjust man, when attempting his injustices in the right way, escape detection, if he is to be extremely unjust.
τὸν ἁλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
The one who is caught must be deemed a failure; for the extreme of injustice is to seem to be just when one is not.
δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλʼ ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὑτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληταί τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας.
We must, therefore, grant to the perfectly unjust man the most perfect injustice, and not take anything away, but allow him, while committing the greatest injustices, to have prepared for himself the greatest reputation for justice, and if he should make any slip, to be able to correct it, both being capable of speaking so as to persuade, if any of his injustices are disclosed, and of using force in whatever requires force, through courage and strength and through his provision of friends and wealth.
τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρʼ αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατʼ Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλʼ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα.
Having set this man up as such, let us in our argument place the just man beside him in turn, a simple and noble man, wanting, as Aeschylus says, not to seem but to be good.
ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν.
We must, indeed, take away the seeming.
εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη.
For if he is thought to be just, he will have honors and gifts because he is thought to be such; it would then be unclear whether he is such for the sake of justice or for the sake of the gifts and honors.
γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ᾖ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὢν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.
He must, indeed, be stripped of everything except justice and be made to be in the opposite condition to the former; for though doing no injustice let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that he may be tested as to his justice by not being softened by bad reputation and its consequences, but let him go on unshaken until death, seeming to be unjust through life, though being just, so that both having reached the extreme, the one of justice, the other of injustice, they may be judged as to which of them is happier.
βαβαῖ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν. ὡς μάλιστʼ, ἔφη, δύναμαι.
"Good heavens," I said, "my dear Glaucon, how vigorously you polish up each of the two men, just like a statue, for the judgment!" "As much as I can," he said.
ὄντοιν δὲ τοιούτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ οἷος ἑκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει.
"And since they are such, it is no longer difficult, I think, to go through in argument what kind of life awaits each of them.
λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. §2.362ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τὠφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν.
It must, then, be told; and indeed, even if it is told rather coarsely, do not think that I am saying it, Socrates, but those who praise injustice before justice." For they will say this: that in such a condition, the just man will be whipped, stretched on the rack, bound, have both his eyes burned out, and finally, after suffering every evil, he will be impaled, and will know that one must want not to be just but to seem so.
τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου.
And the saying of Aeschylus was, then, much more correct to say of the unjust man.
τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλʼ εἶναι ἐθέλειν,
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βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
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ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα,
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πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, συμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν·
For they will say that in truth the unjust man, inasmuch as he practices a thing close to truth and does not live for reputation, wants not to seem unjust but to be so, "reaping a deep furrow through his mind, from which trustworthy counsels sprout." First, he rules in the city because he is thought to be just; next, he marries from wherever he wants, gives in marriage to whomever he wants, makes contracts and partners with whomever he wants, and besides all this, profits by gaining because he has no qualms about doing injustice.
εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τούς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον.
Moreover, when entering into contests, both private and public, he gets the better and has the advantage over his enemies; and by having the advantage, he gets rich, and does good to his friends and harms his enemies; and he offers sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods sufficiently and magnificently, and serves the gods and whichever of men he wants far better than the just man does, so that it is reasonable that he should also be more loved by the gods than the just man is.
οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.
Thus, Socrates, they say that from gods and from men a better life is prepared for the unjust man than for the just.
ταῦτʼ εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν αὖ ἐν νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, οὔ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον.
When Glaucon had said these things, I was, for my part, thinking of saying something in reply, but his brother Adeimantus said, "Do you really think, Socrates, that enough has been said about the argument?" "Why, what else?" I said.
αὐτό, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη·
"The very thing," he said, "has not been said which most needed to be said." "Well then," I said, "as the saying goes, let a brother stand by a man.
ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε.
So you too, if this man has left anything out, come to his aid.
καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ. καὶ ὅς, οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις·
And yet, as for me, even what was said by him is enough to throw me down and make it impossible to help justice." And he said, "Nonsense!
ἀλλʼ ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε.
But listen to this as well.
δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οἳ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵνʼ ᾖ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων.
For we must also go through the arguments opposite to what he said, which praise justice and censure injustice, so that what I think Glaucon wants may be clearer."