§2.359πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστʼ ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν συνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτʼ ἀδικεῖν μήτʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι·
For they say that by nature, to do injustice is good, and to suffer injustice is bad, but that to suffer injustice exceeds in its badness the goodness of doing it; so that when men do injustice to one another and suffer it, and experience both, to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other, it seems profitable to make an agreement with one another neither to do injustice nor to suffer it.
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ συνθήκας αὑτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον·
And from this, indeed, they began to set down laws and covenants of their own, and to name the command of the law both lawful and just.
καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ·
And this, indeed, is the origin and essence of justice, being in the middle between the best—which is, if one does injustice without paying the penalty—and the worst, if one suffers injustice and is unable to take revenge.
τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον·
Justice, being in the middle of both of these, is loved, not as a good, but as something honored through weakness in doing injustice.
ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνί ποτε συνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν.
For the man who is able to do it, and is truly a man, would never make an agreement with anyone neither to do injustice nor to suffer it; for he would be mad.
ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.
The nature of justice, then, Socrates, is this and of this kind, and from such origins it arose, as the story goes.
ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστʼ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτʼ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει.
But that those who practice it do so unwillingly, through inability to do injustice, we would perceive most clearly if we were to do something like this in our thought: giving power to each, both the just and the unjust, to do whatever they want, and then following them, observing where desire will lead each.
ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.
We would then catch the just man in the act of going to the same place as the unjust, because of the desire to have more (pleonexia), which all nature naturally pursues as a good, but by law is forcibly turned aside to the honor of equality.
εἴη δʼ ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἣν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι.
And the power I speak of would be of this kind especially, if they were to get such a power as they say once came to the ancestor of the Lydian.
εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ᾗ ἔνεμεν.
For he was a shepherd serving the then ruler of Lydia, and when a great rain and earthquake occurred, a part of the earth broke and a chasm opened in the place where he was pasturing.
ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθʼ ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι μείζω ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὄντα περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι.
Seeing this and wondering, he went down and saw other wondrous things that they tell in myths, and a bronze horse, hollow, with windows, through which leaning in he saw a corpse inside, appearing larger than human size; this corpse had nothing else on, but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went out.
συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵνʼ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον·
When there was the usual meeting of the shepherds, so that they could report monthly to the king about the flocks, he too arrived, having the ring.
§2.360καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τῆς χειρός, τούτου δὲ γενομένου >ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου.
Sitting, then, with the others, he happened to turn the bezel of the ring toward himself, to the inside of his hand. When this was done, he became invisible to those sitting beside him, and they spoke of him as if he had gone.
καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι.
And he wondered and, touching the ring again, turned the bezel outward, and having turned it, he became visible.
καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω συμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλῳ·
Reflecting on this, he tested the ring to see if it had this power, and it turned out so for him: when he turned the bezel inward, he became invisible; when outward, visible.
αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετʼ ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω κατασχεῖν.
Perceiving this immediately, he arranged to become one of the messengers to the king, and having come and seduced his wife, with her help he attacked the king, killed him, and so seized the empire.
εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὕστινας βούλοιτο, καὶ τἆλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα.
If, therefore, there were two such rings, and the just man put on one, and the unjust the other, no one, as it would seem, would be so adamantine as to remain in justice and dare to abstain from other people's property and not touch it, when it was possible for him to take from the market without fear whatever he wanted, and to enter houses and lie with whomever he wanted, and to kill and release from bonds whomever he wanted, and to do all other things among men as a god among them.
οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ ταὔτʼ ἂν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι.
Doing so, he would do nothing different from the other, but both would go to the same place.
καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γʼ ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν.
And yet one would say this is a great proof that no one is just willingly but only when compelled, as if it were not a private good, since wherever each thinks he will be able to do injustice, he does injustice.
λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων·
For every man thinks that injustice is far more profitable privately than justice, thinking truly, as the speaker on behalf of this argument will say.
ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδέν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἅψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον.
Since if anyone who got such power should never want to do injustice nor touch other people's property, he would seem to those who perceive it to be most miserable and most foolish, though they would praise him before one another, deceiving each other because of the fear of suffering injustice.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.
These things, then, are so.
τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷοί τʼ ἐσόμεθα κρῖναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ.
As for the judgment itself of the life of those we speak of, if we separate the most just and the most unjust, we will be able to judge correctly; otherwise, not.
τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις;
What, then, is this separation?
ἥδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν.
This: let us subtract nothing of injustice from the unjust man, nor of justice from the just man, but let us place each as perfect in his own practice.