Humanitext Reader

Plato · Republic §2.357-2.358

Glaucon's Challenge and the Three Classes of Goods

Passage 20 of 153 · Greek

Summary

The discussion in Book 1 is revealed to be only a prelude as Glaucon presents a classification of three kinds of goods, demanding that Socrates prove justice is desirable for its own sake. To provoke a proper defense of justice, Glaucon announces that he will first thoroughly argue in favor of the advantages of injustice.

§2.357ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δʼ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον.
Now when I had said this, I thought I was freed from the argument; but it was, as it seems, actually a prelude.
ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεί τε δὴ ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλʼ ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγʼ ἂν ἑλοίμην, εἰ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ εἴη. οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει.
For Glaucon, who is always most courageous in everything, on that occasion also did not accept Thrasymachus' giving up, but said: "Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?" "Truly," I said, "I for my part would choose, if it were up to me." "Then," he said, "you are not doing what you want.
λέγε γάρ μοι· ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθʼ ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι, οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα;
Tell me: does there seem to you to be a kind of good that we would choose to have, not because we desire its consequences, but welcoming it for its own sake?
ἔμοιγε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. τί δέ;
For example, joy and all those pleasures that are harmless and from which nothing else results in the future than having joy?" "To me at least," I said, "there seems to be such a thing." "And what about the one we love both for its own sake and for what comes from it?
ὃ αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων, οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν;
For example, knowing, seeing, and being healthy?
τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που διʼ ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζόμεθα. ναί, εἶπον.
For we welcome such things, I suppose, for both reasons." "Yes," I said.
τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός;
"And do you see a third kind of good," he said, "in which are physical training, being cured when sick, practicing medicine, and other ways of making money?
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπʼ αὐτῶν. ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δή; ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τιθεῖς; §2.358ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ διʼ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους, ὃ μισθῶν θʼ ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ διʼ αὑτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὂν χαλεπόν. οἶδα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δʼ ἐπαινεῖται· ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. ἴθι δή, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ἔτι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ.
For we would say these are troublesome, but beneficial to us, and we would not choose to have them for their own sakes, but for the sake of rewards and all other things that come from them." "Indeed," I said, "there is also this third." "But why then?" "In which of these," he said, "do you place justice?" "I think," I said, "in the finest kind, which must be loved both for its own sake and for what comes from it by anyone who is going to be blessed." "It does not, however, seem so to the many," he said, "but to belong to the troublesome kind, which must be practiced for the sake of rewards and good reputation for the sake of opinion, but in itself is to be avoided as being difficult." "I know," I said, "that it seems so, and was long ago disparaged as such by Thrasymachus while injustice was praised; but I, as it seems, am a slow learner." "Come then," he said, "listen to me too, and see if you still think the same.
Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἑκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τʼ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν.
For Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you like a snake sooner than he should have been, but for me the proof concerning each has not yet been to my mind; for I desire to hear what each is and what power it has in itself when present in the soul, and to let go of the rewards and what comes from them.
οὑτωσὶ οὖν ποιήσω, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν.
This, then, is what I will do, if you also agree: I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus, and first I will say what kind of thing they say justice is and where it came from; second, that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as something necessary but not as a good; and third, that they do so reasonably, since, as they say, the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just.
ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι—βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι—μάλιστα δʼ οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι.
Although for my part, Socrates, it does not seem so at all; yet I am at a loss, having my ears dinned by hearing Thrasymachus and countless others, while the argument on behalf of justice, that it is better than injustice, I have not yet heard from anyone as I want—for I want to hear it praised itself for its own sake—and I think I am most likely to learn this from you.
διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω.
Therefore, exerting myself, I will speak in praise of the unjust life, and by speaking I will show you in what way I, in turn, want to hear you condemning injustice and praising justice.
πάντων μάλιστα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.
But see if what I say is what you want." "Most of all," I said; "for about what other subject would a man of sense more often rejoice to speak and hear?" "Most excellently spoken," he said; "and hear about what I said I would speak first: what justice is and where it came from."

Notes

  1. 357bἔχοντα — A present participle in the accusative masculine singular, agreeing with an implied subject tina ('someone'), representing the general person enjoying the pleasures. It does not agree with the grammatical subject of gígnetai but modifies the implied agent of the experience.
  2. 358aἀγαπητέον — A verbal adjective expressing necessity or obligation. The dative tôi méllonti ('the one who is going to') acts as the dative of agent, and makaríōi ('blessed') is a predicate adjective agreeing in case, gender, and number with méllonti.
  3. 358bἐᾶσαι χαίρειν — An idiomatic phrase combining the infinitive of eáō ('to let go', 'to leave alone') and the infinitive chaírein ('to rejoice', commonly used in greetings). It functions here as 'to let go of', 'to dismiss', or 'to say goodbye to' (the rewards).
  4. 358cδιατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα — A perfect passive participle diatethrylēménos ('having been dinned' or 'worn out with talk') accompanied by tà ôta ('the ears') as an accusative of specification (or respect). It literally means 'having my ears dinned'.

Cite this passage

Plato, Republic §2.357-2.358. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:2.357-2.358

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