§1.353τί δέ;
"And what?
μαχαίρᾳ ἂν ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλʼ οὐδενί γʼ ἂν οἶμαι οὕτω καλῶς ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐργασθέντι. ἀληθῆ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν; θήσομεν μὲν οὖν. νῦν δὴ οἶμαι ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, πυνθανόμενος εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἑκάστου εἴη ἔργον ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. ἀλλά, ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
Could you prune a vine shoot with a knife, or a chisel, or many other things?" "Of course." "But with nothing, I think, so well as with a pruning hook made for this purpose." "True." "Then shall we not posit this as its function?" "We shall indeed." "Now, then, I think you might better understand what I was just asking, when I inquired whether the function of each thing is that which it alone performs or performs best compared to other things." "Yes," he said, "I understand, and it indeed seems to me that this is the function of each thing." "Very well," I said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται;
"And do you also think there is a virtue for each thing to which some function is assigned?
ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν· ὀφθαλμῶν, φαμέν, ἔστι τι ἔργον; ἔστιν. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν; καὶ ἀρετή.
Let us return to the same examples: is there, we say, a function of eyes?" "There is." "Is there then also a virtue of eyes?" "Also a virtue." "And what?
τί δέ; ὤτων ἦν τι ἔργον; ναί. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή; καὶ ἀρετή. τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; οὕτω.
Was there a function of ears?" "Yes." "Then also a virtue?" "Also a virtue." "And what about all other things?
ἔχε δή· ἆρʼ ἄν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλʼ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; καὶ πῶς ἄν;
Is it not so?" "So it is." "Hold on, then: would eyes ever perform their own function well if they did not have their own proper virtue, but instead of virtue, a vice?" "How could they?" he said.
ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. ἥτις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή·
"For you probably mean blindness instead of sight." "Whichever it is," I said, "that is their virtue.
οὐ γάρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλʼ εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς. ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε λέγεις.
For I am not yet asking this, but whether it is by its own proper virtue that what performs will perform its own function well, and by vice, badly." "This at least you say truly," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦτα στερόμενα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; πάνυ γε. τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ἴθι δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι. ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον ὃ ἄλλῳ τῶν ὄντων οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε·
"Then will ears also, deprived of their own virtue, perform their own function badly?" "Certainly." "Do we then place all other things under the same rule?" "It seems so to me." "Come then, after this consider this: is there some function of the soul which you could not perform with any other existing thing, such as this: to care for, to rule, to deliberate, and all such things?
τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι; οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. τί δʼ αὖ τὸ ζῆν;
Is there anything else than the soul to which we could justly attribute them and say they are its own?" "To nothing else." "And what about living?
οὐ ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστά γʼ, ἔφη.
Shall we not say it is a function of the soul?" "Most certainly," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετήν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; φαμέν. ἆρʼ οὖν ποτε, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἀρετήν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν; συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ. ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. §1.354ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τἀναντία. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δʼ ἄδικος ἄθλιος. ἔστω, ἔφη.
"And do we say there is also some virtue of the soul?" "We do." "Then, Thrasymachus, will the soul ever perform its own functions well if it is deprived of its proper virtue, or is it impossible?" "Impossible." "Necessarily, then, a bad soul will rule and care badly, while a good soul will do all these things well." "Necessarily." "And did we not agree that justice is a virtue of the soul, and injustice a vice?" "We did agree." "Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man badly." "It appears so," he said, "according to your argument." "But surely he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not, the opposite." "Of course." "The just man, therefore, is happy, and the unjust miserable." "Let it be so," he said.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδέποτʼ ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. ταῦτα δή σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις. ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδή μοι πρᾷος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω.
"But surely to be miserable is not profitable, but to be happy is." "Of course." "Never then, my blessed Thrasymachus, is injustice more profitable than justice." "Let this, Socrates," he said, "be your feast at the Bendideia." "By your favor, Thrasymachus," I said, "since you have become gentle with me and ceased to be angry.
οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἱστίαμαι, διʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ σέ·
However, I have not been well feasted, through my own fault and not yours.
ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἁρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι·
But just as gluttons snatch at and taste every dish as it is carried past, before they have moderately enjoyed the previous one, so I think I, before finding what we were first searching for—what the just is—let go of that and rushed to consider about it, whether it is vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue; and when later another argument fell in, that injustice is more profitable than justice, I did not refrain from going after this instead of the former, so that the result of the dialogue for me now is that I know nothing.
ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστιν, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.
For when I do not know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it happens to be some virtue or not, and whether he who has it is not happy, or is happy."