§1.352οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἵαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθʼ αὑτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δʼ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ;
"Does it not, then, appear to have some such power that, in whatever it arises—whether in some city, or a clan, or an army, or anything else 352a whatsoever—first, it makes it impossible for it to act with itself because of faction and disagreement, and further, makes it an enemy both to itself and to everything opposite and to the just?
οὐχ οὕτως; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ δὴ οἶμαι ἐνοῦσα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι·
Is it not so?"\n"Certainly."\n"And when it is present indeed in one person, I think it will produce these very same things which it is by nature suited to work.
πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις·
First, it will make him unable to act, because he is at faction and not of one mind with himself, and next, an enemy both to himself and to the just.
ἦ γάρ; ναί. δίκαιοι δέ γʼ εἰσίν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί; ἔστω, ἔφη. καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπά μοι τῆς ἑστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν.
Is that not so?"\n"Yes."\n"And are the gods also just, my friend?"\n"Let it be so," he said.\n ¦352b "Then the unjust man, Thrasymachus, will be an enemy also to the gods, and the just man a friend."\n"Feast on the argument," he said, "boldly; for I certainly will not oppose you, so that I may not become hateful to these people here."\n"Go on then," I said, "and fill up the rest of the feast for me by answering just as you are doing now.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲ πράττειν μετʼ ἀλλήλων οἷοί τε—ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὕς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτέ τι μετʼ ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφʼ οὓς ᾖσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, διʼ ἣν ἔπραξαν ἃ ἔπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἵ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον.
For that the just appear both wiser and better and more powerful to act, while the unjust are not even able to act with one another— ¦352c but indeed, even when we say that any who are unjust ever vigorously achieved anything together in common, we do not speak the whole truth; for they would not have refrained from one another if they had been completely unjust, but it is clear that some justice was present in them, which made them not wrong both one another and those against whom they went at the same time, through which they achieved what they achieved, and they rushed toward unjust deeds being only half-corrupted by injustice, since those who are thoroughly wicked and completely unjust are also completely unable to act—these things, ¦352d then, I understand to be so, and not as you at first posited; but whether the just also live better than the unjust and are happier, which we proposed to examine later, must be examined.
φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δʼ ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον.
Indeed, even now they appear to do so, as it seems to me at least, from what we have said; nevertheless, we must examine it still better.
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν. σκόπει δή, ἔφη. σκοπῶ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. καί μοι λέγε·
For the argument is not about some casual matter, but about how one ought to live."\n"Consider it then," he said.\n"I am considering it," I said.
δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; ἔμοιγε. ἆρʼ οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. ἀλλʼ ὧδε· ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; οὐ δῆτα. τί δέ;
"And tell me: do you think there is some function of a horse?"\n ¦352e "Certainly."\n"Would you then posit this as the function both of a horse and of anything else whatsoever: that which one can perform either only with that thing or best with it?"\n"I do not understand," he said.\n"But look at it this way: is there anything else with which you could see than with eyes?"\n"Certainly not."\n"And what?
ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ταῦτα τούτων φαμὲν ἔργα εἶναι; πάνυ γε.
Could you hear with anything else than with ears?"\n"In no way."\n"Then do we not justly say that these are the functions of those?"\n"Certainly."