§1.349εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες·
"For if you were putting down injustice as profitable, but nevertheless were agreeing that it is a vice or shameful, as some others do, we would have something to say, speaking in accordance with established opinions.
νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδή γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.
But now it is clear that you will say it is both beautiful and strong, and you will attribute to it all other things that we were attributing to the just, since you even dared to place it in the portion of virtue and wisdom." "You divine most truly," he said.
ἀλλʼ οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἅπερ διανοῇ.
"But indeed," I said, "we must not shrink from pursuing the examination through the argument, as long as I suppose you are saying what you think.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις; οὐδέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
For you seem to me, Thrasymachus, absolutely not to be mocking now, but to be saying what you believe about the truth." "What difference does this make to you," he said, "whether I believe it or not, and why do you not refute the argument?" "None," I said.
ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστεῖος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. τί δέ;
"But try to answer this for me in addition to those things: does it seem to you that the just man would wish to have more than the just man?" "In no way," he said; "for he would not then be polite and simple, as he is now." "What then?
τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη.
More than the just action?" "Not even more than the just action," he said.
τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο; ἡγοῖτʼ ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο. ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλʼ εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; ἀλλʼ οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.
"And would he claim to overreach the unjust man, and would he think it is just, or would he not think so?" "He would think so," he said, "and he would claim to do so, but he would not be able to." "But I am not asking this," I said, "but whether the just man does not claim to have more than the just, nor wishes to, but does so with the unjust?" "It is so," he said.
τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος;
"And what about the unjust man?
ἆρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ; οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου γε ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἁπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; ἔστι ταῦτα. ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου; ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας.
Does he claim to overreach the just man and the just action?" "Of course," he said, "since he claims to have more than all." "Then the unjust man will also overreach the unjust man and the unjust action, and he will strive so that he himself may take the most of all?" "That is so." "Let us say it indeed in this way," I said: "the just man does not overreach his like, but his unlike, while the unjust man overreaches both his like and his unlike?" "You have spoken excellently," he said.
ἔστιν δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα; καὶ τοῦτʼ, ἔφη, εὖ.
"And indeed," I said, "the unjust man is prudent and good, while the just man is neither?" "That too is well said," he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν; πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ ἐοικέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι; καλῶς.
"Then," I said, "the unjust man also resembles the prudent and the good, while the just man does not resemble them?" "How indeed is he who is of such a character not going to resemble such people, and he who is not, not resemble them?" "Good.
τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν; ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη.
Is each of them indeed such as those he resembles?" "What else is he going to be?" he said.
εἶεν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε·
"Very well, Thrasymachus.
μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον; ἔγωγε. πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα; τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἅπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν; ναί.
Do you call someone musical, and another unmusical?" "I do." "Which is prudent, and which is imprudent?" "The musical is surely prudent, and the unmusical is imprudent." "Then, in so far as he is prudent, he is good, and in so far as he is imprudent, bad?" "Yes." "And what about the medical man?
τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν; οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Is it not the same?" "It is so." "Would it seem to you then, my excellent friend, that a musical man, when tuning a lyre, would wish to overreach a musical man in the tightening and loosening of the strings, or claim to have more?" "Not to me." "What then?
τί δέ; ἀμούσου; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
Overreach an unmusical man?" "Necessarily," he said.