§1.350τί δὲ ἰατρικός;
"And what about the medical man?
ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἄν τι ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος; οὐ δῆτα. μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ; ναί. περὶ πάσης δὴ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὁστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρᾶξιν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν.
In the matter of food or drink, would he wish to overreach a medical man or a medical action, or claim to have more?" "Not at all." "But overreach one who is not medical?" "Yes." "Consider then, concerning all knowledge and ignorance, whether any knowledgeable person at all seems to you to wish to choose to do or say more than what another knowledgeable person does or says, and not to choose the same things as one's like for the same action." "Well, perhaps," he said, "it is necessary that this indeed is so." "And what about the ignorant man?
τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτήσειεν ἄν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος; ἴσως. ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; φημί. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; φημί. ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
Would he not overreach the knowledgeable man in the same way, and the ignorant man in the same way?" "Perhaps." "And is the knowledgeable man wise?" "I say so." "And is the wise man good?" "I say so." "Then the good and wise man will not wish to overreach his like, but his unlike and opposite." "It seems so," he said.
ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ;
"But the bad and ignorant man will overreach both his like and his opposite." "It appears so." "Then, Thrasymachus," I said, "does the unjust man overreach both his unlike and his like for us?
ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
Or were you not saying so?" "I was," he said.
ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτήσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; ναί. ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογοῦμεν, ᾧ γε ὅμοιος ἑκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. ὡμολογοῦμεν γάρ. ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός. ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος ὡμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἑλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἱδρῶτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος—τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα— ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν.
"And the just man, indeed, will not overreach his like, but his unlike?" "Yes." "Then the just man resembles the wise and good," I said, "and the unjust man resembles the bad and ignorant?" "It is likely." "But indeed we were agreeing that each of them is such as that which he resembles." "For we were agreeing." "Then the just man has been revealed to us as being good and wise, and the unjust man as ignorant and bad." Now Thrasymachus agreed to all this, not as easily as I am now telling it, but dragged along and with difficulty, with an astonishing amount of sweat, inasmuch as it was also summer—then indeed I saw, though never before, Thrasymachus blushing—and when we had thoroughly agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance, "Very well," I said, "let this be established for us in this way; but we were also saying indeed that injustice is strong.
ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν.
Or do you not remember, Thrasymachus?" "I remember," he said; "but even what you are saying now does not please me, and I have things to say about them.
εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης.
If then I should speak, I know well that you would say I am speech-making.
ἢ οὖν ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἤ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶν ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις,
εἶεν
ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. μηδαμῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. ὥστε σοί, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἐᾷς λέγειν.
So either let me speak as much as I wish, or, if you wish to question, question; and I, as to old women telling stories, will say 'very well' to you, and nod and shake my head." "In no way," I said, "at least not contrary to your own opinion." "To please you, indeed," he said, "since you do not let me speak.
καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. ἐρώτα δή.
And yet, what else do you want?" "Nothing, by Zeus," I said, "but if you are going to do this, do it; and I will question." "Question then."