§1.347διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἑκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε αὑτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδʼ ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ·
"On account of these things indeed, my friend Thrasymachus, I was saying just now too that no one is willing to rule voluntarily and to take in hand to correct other people's evils, but they demand pay, because he who is going to perform well in his art never performs what is best for himself nor commands it when commanding according to his art, but for the ruled.
ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ζημίαν ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
On account of these things indeed, as it seems, there must be pay for those who are going to be willing to rule, either money or honor, or a penalty if one does not rule." "How do you mean this, Socrates?" Glaucon said.
ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γιγνώσκω, τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἥντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ συνῆκα. τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφην, οὐ συνιεῖς, διʼ ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν.
"For I recognize the two kinds of pay, but the penalty you speak of, and how you have spoken of it as in the place of pay, I did not understand." "Then the pay of the best men," I said, "you do not understand, because of which the most decent men rule, when they are willing to rule.
ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν; ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
Or do you not know that to be a lover of honor and a lover of money is said to be and is a disgrace?" "I do indeed," he said.
διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς·
"On account of these things, therefore," I said, "the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor.
οὔτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλῆσθαι, οὔτε λάθρᾳ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται.
For they do not wish to be called hirelings by openly demanding pay for the sake of their office, nor thieves by themselves taking secretly from the office.
οὐδʼ αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα· οὐ γάρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι.
Nor, again, for the sake of honor, for they are not lovers of honor.
δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν—ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι—τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν·
Therefore, there must be necessity and a penalty attached to them if they are going to be willing to rule—whence it is likely that going to rule voluntarily, and not waiting for necessity, is considered shameful—and of the penalty, the greatest is to be ruled by a worse person, if one is not himself willing to rule.
ἣν δείσαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν οὐχ ὡς ἐπʼ ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδʼ ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπʼ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίοσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις.
Fearing this, the decent men seem to me to rule when they do rule, and then they come to rule not as if going to something good nor as if they are going to fare well in it, but as to something necessary, and because they do not have better people than themselves to whom to entrust it, nor even equals.
ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ·
Since it is likely that if there were a city of good men, not ruling would be as fought over as ruling is now, and there it would become completely clear that in truth a true ruler is not naturally born to consider what is advantageous to himself but to the ruled.
ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.
So that anyone with understanding would choose rather to be benefited by another than to have trouble benefiting another.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.
This, then, I in no way concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the stronger.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου.
But this indeed we shall examine again hereafter; but what Thrasymachus is saying now seems to me to be much greater, when he claims that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just man.
σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἱρῇ;
Which way, then, Thrasymachus," I said, "do you choose, Glaucon?
καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. §1.348ἤκουσας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διῆλθεν τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; ἤκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οὐ πείθομαι. βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πῃ ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
And which seems to you to be spoken more truly?" "I, for my part, say that the life of the just man is more profitable." "Did you hear," I said, "how many good things Thrasymachus just now went through for the life of the unjust man?" "I heard," he said, "but I am not persuaded." "Do you wish, then, that we persuade him, if we can find a way in some way, that he is not speaking the truth?" "Of course I wish it," he said.
ἂν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὖθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὅσα ἑκάτεροι ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα·
"If, then," I said, "stretching ourselves against him, we speak argument against argument, showing how many good things being just has in turn, and he in turn speaks, and we another, we shall have to count the goods and measure how many each of us says in each, and we shall already need some judges to decide.
ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοί τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
But if, as just now, we examine while agreeing with each other, we ourselves shall be at once both judges and advocates." "Certainly," he said.
ὁποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει. οὕτως, ἔφη.
"Which way, then," I said, "pleases you?" "This way," he said.
ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
"Come then," I said, "Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning.
τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῂς εἶναι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ διʼ ἅ, εἴρηκα. φέρε δή, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις;
Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?" "Certainly I say so," he said, "and I have already told you why." "Come now, how do you speak of this kind of thing concerning them?
τὸ μέν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν; εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδή γε καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δʼ οὔ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν; τοὐναντίον, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Surely you call one of them a virtue and the other a vice?" "Of course." "Then you call justice a virtue, and injustice a vice?" "That is likely, my sweet Socrates, since I even say that injustice is profitable and justice is not." "But what then?" "The opposite," he said.
ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν. τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν καλεῖς; οὔκ, ἀλλʼ εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη.
"Do you call justice a vice?" "No, but a very noble simplicity." "Do you call injustice, then, a bad character?" "No, but good counsel," he said.
ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; οἵ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφʼ ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι·
"And do the unjust, Thrasymachus, seem to you to be both prudent and good?" "Those indeed who are completely able to do injustice," he said, "being able to bring cities and nations of men under themselves.
σὺ δὲ οἴει με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν.
But you perhaps think I am talking about those who cut purses.
λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλʼ ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον. τοῦτο μέν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὃ βούλει λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τιθεῖς μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. ἀλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι. τοῦτο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον ἔχειν ὅτι τις εἴπῃ.
Indeed," he said, "such things too are profitable, if they go undetected; but they are not worthy of account, but rather what I was just now saying." "This indeed," I said, "I am not ignorant of, what you wish to say, but this I wondered at, if you place injustice in the portion of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposites." "But I certainly do place them so." "This," I said, "is already more solid, my companion, and it is no longer easy to find what one might say."