§1.345ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι—οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται ὅτι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσούσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσῃς—ἐγὼ γὰρ δή σοι λέγω τό γʼ ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδʼ οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἐὰν ἐᾷ τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται.
But, my good friend, make an effort to show us too—it will certainly not be laid up badly for you if you benefit so many of us as we are—for indeed, speaking for myself, I tell you that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if one lets it be and does not prevent it from doing what it wishes.
ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον.
But, my good friend, let there be an unjust man, and let him have the power to do injustice, either by going undetected or by fighting it out, nevertheless it does not persuade me, at least, that it is more profitable than justice.
ταῦτʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ·
This, then, is perhaps what someone else among us also feels, not only I.
πεῖσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι.
Persuade us, then, my happy friend, sufficiently that we are not deliberating correctly in valuing justice above injustice.
καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω;
"And how," he said, "shall I persuade you?
εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω;
For if you are not persuaded by what I was just saying, what more can I do for you?
ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; μὰ Δίʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε·
Or shall I take the argument and stuff it into your soul?" "By Zeus, no," I said, "don't you do that!
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν, ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα.
But first of all, whatever you say, stand by it, or if you change your mind, do so openly and do not deceive us.
νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε—ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα—ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾤου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθʼ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλʼ οὐ ποιμένα.
But as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—for let us still examine the previous points—that though you first defined the doctor who is truly so, you did not think it necessary afterward to keep strictly to the shepherd who is truly so; instead, you think that he, insofar as he is a shepherd, fattens the sheep, looking not to what is best for the sheep, but, like some guest who is going to feast, to the banquet, or again, to selling them, like a money-maker and not a shepherd.
τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ—ἐπεὶ τά γε αὑτῆς ὥστʼ εἶναι βελτίστη ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γʼ ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι—οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην ἔγωγε νυνδὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθʼ ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ.
But surely the shepherd's art is not concerned with anything else than that over which it is set, how it will provide what is best for it—since its own affairs, so that it may be the best, have surely been sufficiently provided for, so long as it lacks nothing of being the shepherd's art—and in this way I, for my part, thought just now that it is necessary for us to agree that every rule, insofar as it is a rule, considers what is best for nothing other than that, the ruled and the cared-for, both in public and in private rule.
σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἴει ἄρχειν; μὰ Δίʼ οὔκ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ εὖ οἶδα. §1.346τί δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε;
But do you think that the rulers in cities, those who truly rule, rule willingly?" "By Zeus, I do not think so," he said, "but I know it well." "Why is that?" I said, "Thrasymachus.
τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἑκών, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπέ·
Do you not realize concerning the other offices that no one is willing to rule voluntarily, but they demand pay, on the ground that benefit from ruling will come not to themselves but to the ruled?
οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν;
Since tell me this much: do we not say that each of the arts is always different from another in this, in having a different power?
καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα.
And, my happy friend, do not answer contrary to your opinion, so that we may get somewhere." "Yes, it is different in this," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἑκάστη τούτων ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται ἀλλʼ οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν;
"Does not, then, each of them also provide us with some private benefit and not a common one, as for example medicine provides health, navigation safety in sailing, and the others in the same way?" "Certainly." "And does not the art of wages provide wages?
αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις·
For this is its power.
ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς;
Or do you call medicine and navigation the same?
ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.
Or, if you wish to define strictly, as you proposed, if someone acting as a navigator becomes healthy because sailing on the sea is advantageous to him, would you on that account call it medicine any the more?" "Surely not," he said.
οὐδέ γʼ, οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικήν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρνῶν. οὐ δῆτα. τί δέ;
"Nor, I think, do you call the art of wages medicine, if someone is healthy while earning wages." "Surely not." "And what of this?
τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικήν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ; οὐκ ἔφη.
Do you call medicine the art of wages, if someone earns wages while healing?" "No," he said.
οὐκοῦν τήν γε ὠφελίαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; ἔστω, ἔφη.
"Did we not, then, agree that the benefit of each art is private?" "Let it be so," he said.
ἥντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι ἀπʼ ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
"Then whatever benefit all the craftsmen benefit from in common, it is clear that they benefit from it by using some same thing in addition in common." "It seems so," he said.
φαμὲν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. συνέφη μόγις.
"And we say indeed that the benefit that comes to the craftsmen by earning wages comes to them from their additional use of the art of wages." He agreed with difficulty.
οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἑκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλʼ, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἑπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται.
"Therefore, this benefit, the receiving of wages, is not for each from his own art; but, if one must examine strictly, medicine produces health, and the art of earning wages produces wages, and housebuilding produces a house, and the art of earning wages, following upon it, produces wages, and all the other arts in the same way, each works its own work and benefits that over which it is set.
ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθʼ ὅτι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη.
And if pay is not added to it, is there any way in which the craftsman benefits from the art?" "It does not appear so," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐδʼ ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται; οἶμαι ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.
"Does he then benefit no one even when he works for nothing?" "I think he does." "Then, Thrasymachus, this is already clear, that no art or rule provides what is beneficial to itself, but, as we were saying long ago, it both provides and commands what is for the ruled, looking to the advantage of that which is weaker, and not to that of the stronger."